A philosophical assessment of the role of personal and impersonal paradigms in explanations according to the views of Robin Horton by Bernitz, Denise Henrietta
A Philosophical Assessment of the Role of 
Personal and Impersonal Paradigms 
in Explanations according to the views of Robin Horton 
by 
Denise Henrietta Bernitz 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the subject 
Philosophy 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Supervisor: Professor E.D. Prinsloo 
November 1998 
Acknowledgments 
Na hi ninda nindayitum pravartate api tu vidheyam stotum 
"The purpose of a crttique is not to find fault with others; it is to establish the proper conclusion 
about the subject" (Srila Jiva Gosvami, Tatta Sandarbha:345). 
With special thanks to my supervisor, the sine qua non of this thesis, Professor 
E.D. Prinsloo, for his suggestions and corrections in the course of this study. He 
is of course not responsible for the defects that remain. 
I would also like to thank Professor J.G. Malherbe for her interest and 
encouragement, as well as my friends Crystal Cambanis and Lesley Caplan for 
their help and support. 
Index 
Introduction 1-9 
Chapter One 
An exposition of Robin Horton's views on African traditional thought and 
Western science, with particular emphasis on their similarities in their 
quest for explanatory theory and a critique of these claims. 
10-42 
1. Robin Horton's Perspective on African Traditional Thought and 
Western Science. 
1.1 Personal and Impersonal Paradigms. 
1.2 Schemes of Entities 
1. 3 The Quest for Explanatory Theory 
1.3.1 Unity-Diversity 
1. 3.2 Simplicity-Complexity 
1. 3. 3 Order-Diversity 
1.3.4 Regularity-Anomaly 
1.4 Terminological and Conceptual Confusions 
1. 5 Inductive Inference 
1. 6 Common Sense and Theory 
1. 7 Levels of Theory 
1.8 Abstraction and Reintegration 
1.9 The Use of Models 
2. Critical Considerations 
10 
36 
ii 
1. The Closed and Open Predicaments 
2. Power of Words 
Chapter Two 
The structure of scientific explanation according to C.G. Hempel with 
particular emphasis on what explanations 
The Structure of Explanation 
1. Scientific Explanations 
1. 1 Causation 
i. Causation - efficient 
ii. Causation - necessary and sufficient 
1. 1. 1 Horton's view of Causality 
1.2 The Covering Law Model of Explanation 
1.2. 1 The Deductive-Nomological Explanation ( D-N explanation ) 
1.2.2 Universal Laws and Accidental Generalisation 
1.2.3 Horton and the 0-N Explanation 
1. 3 Probabilistic Explanations 
1. 3. 1 Horton and the Probabilistic Explanation 
1.4 The Confirmation of Scientific Explanation 
2. What Explanations 
3. The Process of Scientific Inquiry 
3. 1 The Hypothesis 
3.2 The test of an hypcthesis, its logic and its force 
3.4 Auxiliary Hypotheses 
3.5 Compatibility with previously we/I-established hypotheses 
43-97 
43 
46 
65 
69 
111 
3.6 Ad hoc hypotheses 
3. 7 Testability principle and empirical import 
3.8 Criteria of confirmation and acceptability 
3.9 The probability of hypotheses 
4. The Development of Theory 
4. 1 The Characterisation of Theory 
4.2 The formulation of theory 
4. 3 The identity of the theoretical entity 
4.4 The status of theoretical entities. 
4.4 Horton's view of theory 
Chapter Three 
79 
The status of explanation in terms of formal and informal logic, the 
justification and/or verification of theories and predictability. 
The Status of Explanation 
1. The Logical Structure of an Explanation. 
1. 1 Consistency 
1.2 Truth 
1. 3 Relevance or appropriateness 
1.4 Verification 
2. Belief and Ideas of Justification 
2. 1 Evidence, Truth and Knowledge 
2.2 Foundationa/ism 
2.3 Predictive or explanatory power 
98-132 
98 
100 
114 
iv 
Chapter Four 
Explanation and webs of belief, world views, conceptual schemes and 
paradigms. 
133-151 
1. Personal and Impersonal paradigms 133 
2. Problems within and across paradigms - Relativism in conceptual 
schemes 
2. 1 Kuhn - the idea of incommensurability 
2.2 Horton and relativism of paradigms 
2.3 Problem of indeterminacy - Quine 
2.4 Operationalism as a paradigm - black box 
2.5 Problem of incommensurability - Donald Davidson 
Chapter Five 
138 
Rationality and the issues of relativism, objectivity and subjectivity and 
their application to the views of Horton. 
1. Rationality 
1. 1 Horton's view of rationality 
1.2 Laws of thought 
2. Relativism 
2.1 Evolutionism and relativism 
2.2 Translation 
2.3 Relativism of Reason 
2.4 Objection to evolutionism 
2.4. 1 Thomas Kuhn 
152-184 
152 
158 
v 
2.5 The Strong Form of Relativism - Barnes and Bloor 
2.6 Strong form of Relativism - Winch 
2. 7 Plausible arguments for relativism 
2.8 Objections to relativism. 
2.8.1 Behavioural explanations 
2.9 Local rationality and Universal rationality. 
3. Subjectivity and Objectivity 
3. 1 Subjective and objective views on rationality - Horton 
3. 1. 1 Subjective and Objective accounts of Knowledge 
3. 1.2 Subjective rationality 
3. 1.3 Objective rationality 
3.2 Words and magic 
Conclusion 
Bibliography 
176 
185-189 
190-198 
1 
Introduction 
My view is that an inauthentic life is a crime against wisdom and it is particularly 
inauthentic to dismiss the contribution of other cultures to our understanding of 
the world on the grounds of their perceived inferiority. As Westerners we 
believe we are in possession of truth and rationality. 
The notion of Western superiority has been driven by the ideas of objectivity, 
truth, rationality and Western scientific methods. It is based on misguided beliefs 
that ascendancy is determined by issues like sex, creed or colour. However, our 
perceptions are as distorted and limited as those of our traditional neighbours. 
According to Robin Horton (1974) there is no difference in status between the 
explanations of reality, offered in Western science and those offered in African 
thinking. There is only a difference in the paradigms or idioms used. He 
substantiates his view by analysing what is involved when explanations are 
given and complements his analysis with examples taken from Western science 
and African thinking. He makes general claims about the nature of explanation 
and compares Western science with African thinking in order to show that both 
types of thinking can be accounted for by the structure of explanation. 
I perceive Horton's attempt to assimilate Western science and African traditional 
thought as a device that is well-intentioned, but it does not appreciate African 
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traditional thought in its own right. He implicitly holds that the standard and 
methodology of Western science are the benchmark against which to measure 
the thinking of another culture. If he succeeds in convincing us that the type of 
explanation presented in African traditional thought is like that of Western 
science, African traditional thought is 'elevated' to the status of Western 
science. It is no longer considered primitive, backward and irrational and has 
achieved credibility. 
My contention is that both paradigms have problems but little is gained by 
reducing the one to the other. They both bring a distinct but essential element to 
our thinking and by consideration of both paradigms we can transcend 
differences and enrich our appreciation of the diversity of the world. 
In comparing Western science and African traditional thought, Horton claims 
that the intention of both is to explain the events in the world and to come to 
some kind of knowledge of it. It does not necessarily follow that the means are 
similar. Even within Western thinking there are different types of explanation that 
provide different kinds of knowledge. There is knowledge of what which 
provides information or descriptions of the world It is important to distinguish 
between concepts like classification, clarification, elucidation and explanation. 
There is also knowledge of why, which is considered in most quarters to provide 
understanding - a distinctive feature of scientific explanation (Salmon 1984:9-
11 ). For example let's attempt to explain the event of someone committing 
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suicide: 
i) A doctor may say the person died because he shot himself. This provides a 
physiological explanation about death as due to the damage caused by a bullet 
that penetrates the brain. One could argue however, that death is not the result 
in all instances of a bullet in the brain, even though a bullet in the head 
generally results in death. 
ii) A psychologist may say the person died because he was depressed. This is 
a psychological explanation of the effects and consequences of depression as 
the cause of suicide, but as before, not all instances of depression culminate in 
suicide. 
iii) A lawyer may say that the person died because he was in dire financial 
straits and under pressure from his creditors. This explanation is in terms of a 
moral or legal justification where the object is not necessarily to 'explain' but to 
attribute responsibility. 
Certainly in i) and ii) above there is no explanation as to why death resulted in 
this instance. For scientific explanation it is necessary to use a form 'x occurred 
because of y', which means that the explanation contains a universal 
generalisation - x must entail y. This is the basis of the Covering Law Model of 
Explanation and its core, the Deductive-Nomological Argument as propounded 
by Carl Hempel (1966:49-56). None of our explanations about the suicide 
meets this criterion, and this raises questions about the nature of causality, a 
perennial philosophical problem (Salmon 1984:ix). 
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Science purports to explain why things are as they are or how they came to be 
that way. Such explanations involve principles of change, since they illuminate 
something about how one state of the world changes to another. The events 
have some relationship in terms of time, and the question is how are they 
connected and how the occurrence of certain events is necessary in the light of 
certain facts. They are questions that ask for cause and essential in scientific 
thought is the issue of causality (Taylor 1970:4). 
A comparison between Western science and African traditional thought is 
possible but is not necessarily satisfactory as it is simplistic to assume uniformity 
of explanation within each system. The reality of the intrinsic layers of 
explanation and the value of each layer need careful consideration. There may 
well be a similarity in kind but the degree of difference may be such as to render 
the comparison unsatisfactory. 
The focus of my work is explanation and the premise is to explore Horton's 
approach in which he draws attention to the continuities and contrasts in 
Western scientific and African traditional thought. I do this with the inherent 
reservation that he fails at some level to establish the similarities and 
differences on the grounds which he proposes. Horton suggests that the arena 
of discourse in Western science that provides the instruments of translation for 
African traditional thought, is associated with theoretical entity concepts. These 
concepts allow both modes of thought to go beyond the narrow causal vision of 
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everyday common sense thinking. He draws a parallel between theoretical 
entities in science, for example the kinetic theory of gases and spiritual beings 
in African traditional thought stating that they both fulfill the same explanatory 
function. He treats traditional African religious systems as theoretical models 
much like science and seems to be trying to break down the contrast that 
considers African traditional thought as non-empirical and scientific thought as 
empirical. He argues that the difference between the explanations of African 
traditional thought and Western science, constitute a difference in idiom, rather 
than substance. 
The hypothesis that the difference in idiom relates to the notion of paradigm 
and that Western science operates in terms of an impersonal paradigm while 
African traditional thought is personalist, is one of the central concerns of this 
thesis. It is my contention that this paradigm difference is substantial and that 
the notion of explanation introduces many traditional philosophical problems. 
The issues of definition and description, conceptions of causality, induction, 
scientific laws, inference, reason and rationality will all receive consideration. 
Inherent in Horton's quest, is the issue of contrast across different societies and 
their 'modes of thought' and perhaps the most important property in relation to 
modes of thought is rationality (Finnegan & Horton 1973:13,17). The existence 
of a variegated spectrum of beliefs across cultures, poses the complex question 
of whether there are alternative standards of rationality. Belief systems vary 
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from culture to culture and in African culture in particular we are concerned with 
a predominantly oral tradition. Here the spoken word takes on the full weight 
of explanation. As documented by anthropologists the access to belief systems 
in African traditional life is verbal folk-lore. 
What is meant by traditional thought and does it stand in contra-distinction to 
scientific thought or is it like Horton suggests part of a continuum, a process of 
apprehending the world? Problems in relation to translation from one mode of 
thinking to another and interpretation accompany such an undertaking. In the 
process of making sense of another perspective of the world can the translators 
accurately depict the other's belief system? It is Steven Lukes' (1973:230) 
contention that it is to some extent possible to access and assess another belief 
system by virtue of the fact that the criteria of rationality are both general or 
universal and context-dependent. It is not possible without this assumption to 
ask the critical questions about difference in beliefs between modern, scientific 
and traditional thought. This is in opposition to the relativist point of view that 
states that the criteria of rationality (in their extreme form) are defined solely and 
purely in relation to the particular culture in which they occur. Truth and values 
are therefore variable from culture to culture according to the relativist point of 
view (Barnes & Bloor 1982:35). 
Lukes (1973, 1982) considers that there are varieties in theory and 
concomitantly diversity in truth and values across cultures. He argues that 
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although context-dependent criteria are necessary for rationality they are not 
sufficient. What would constitute sufficiency is the admission of general or 
universal criteria of rationality. The crucial issue is whether such invariable 
criteria exist. If Lukes succeeds in establishing general criteria of rationality he 
has to establish a nexus between context-dependent rationality and general 
rationality. He achieves this by considering traditional beliefs against general 
criteria. He concludes that traditional beliefs in a fundamental sense have no 
existence entirely separate from universal criteria. They derive from and owe 
their existence to universal beliefs. If they are at odds with universal criteria they 
can be rendered meaningful against the background of such criteria. For 
example the social reality of truth has a logical connection with verification, and 
therefore verification constitutes the foundation paradigm against which other 
criteria of truth gain their meaning (Lukes 1973:240-1 ). 
The notion that beliefs are socially determined does not constitute sufficient 
evidence that their truth or validity are relative. Lukes holds that diversity in itself 
does not preclude invariable criteria of truth or validity. 1 believe that allegiance 
to either universalism or relativism in their extreme forms, limits understanding 
of the world. 
I intend to build my argument in the following way: 
Chapter One sets out Horton's perspective on African traditional thought and 
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Western science with particular emphasis on the similarities in their quest for 
explanatory theory. With reference to the rigorous critique of Horton's work by 
E.D. Prinsloo, terminological and conceptual confusions, differences between 
description, elucidation clarification and classification and their relationship to 
explanation, inductive inference, the use of theoretical models, abstraction and 
integration as well as the use of analogy receive consideration. Some attention 
is given to the differences between African traditional thought and Western 
science. The open and closed paradigms are considered. The power of words 
as an example of fallacious causal links merits attention. 
Chapter Two focuses on the structure of scientific explanation as advanced by 
C.G Hempel who is an important figure in the philosophy of science. This will 
serve as the standard against which Horton's views will be considered. 
Causality, what questions, fundamental issues in scientific methodology such 
as the development of an hypothesis, its logic, testability, confirmation and 
acceptability, the foundations of theory, are all part of this section. It will 
become clear that Horton is comparing concepts of scientific explanation which 
are rigid and methodologically-determined to those that are far more flexible 
and humanistic. 
Chapter Three considers explanation further with particular emphasis on its 
logical structure, and issues of coherence and consistency. Attention is given to 
verification. Consideration of beliefs and justification leads to a discussion of 
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evidence, truth and knowledge. African traditional thought provides reason-
giving explanations, which in the absence of clear causal connections fail to 
meet the criteria of scientific explanations as defined in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Four contemplates explanation in relation to personal and impersonal 
paradigms which are underpinned by notions like webs of belief/world views 
and conceptual schemes. The writings of Quine, Kuhn and Davidson are 
considered. 
Chapter Five centres on rationality which is the final and arguably the most 
important test of any paradigm. Aspects such as relativism, universalism, the 
laws of thought, consistency, coherence and truth as well as subjectivity and 
objectivity, are all fundamental issues in determining whether thinking is 
rational. 
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Chapter One 
An exposition of Robin Horton's view on African traditional thought and 
Western science with particular emphasis on the similarities in their quest for 
explanatory theory, and a critique of these claims. 
1. Robin Horton's Perspective on African Traditional Thought and 
Western Science. 
Robin Horton (1974) in his article 'African Traditional Thought and Western 
Science' considers traditional African religious systems as theoretical 
models analogous to those of the sciences with the intention of casting doubt 
on the well-worn dichotomies usually used to conceptualise such 
differences: 
"Intellectual versus emotional; rational versus mystical; reality-orientated versus 
fantasy-orientated; causally orientated versus supernaturally orientated; empirical 
versus non-empirical; abstract versus concrete; analytical versus non-analytical: All of 
these are shown to be more or less inappropriate" (Horton 1974:152). 
For Horton the importance is to uncover basic structures for understanding 
the world according to African traditional cultures in terms of categories of 
scientific explanation. The acquisition of scientific knowledge involves 
scientific inquiry and central to this is the structure of scientific explanation 
and the insight into the physical world it affords (Hempel 1966:47). For 
Horton there is no difference in status between explanations offered by 
Western science and those put forward in African traditional thinking 
regarding various aspects of reality. The difference lies in the paradigms or 
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idioms used. He proposes the notion of impersonal and personal idioms to 
show how the dichotomies mentioned are inappropriate. It is my view 
however, that these dichotomies reflect genuine conceptual differences. 
Horton (1974) substantiates his view by analysing the process that takes 
place when explanations are given, illustrating his analysis with examples 
from so-called Western science and African traditional thinking. 
He analyses the structure of explanations in the following manner: 
i. The quest for explanatory theory is basically the quest for 
unity underlying diversity; for simplicity underlying apparent 
complexity; for order underlying apparent disorder; for 
regularity underlying apparent anomaly. 
ii. Theory places things in a causal context wider than that 
provided by common sense. 
iii. Common sense and theory have complementary roles in 
everyday life. 
iv. Level of theory varies with context. 
v. All theory breaks up the unitary objects of common sense 
into aspects, then places the resulting elements in a wider 
causal context. That is, theory first abstracts and analyses, 
then reintegrates. 
vi. In evolving a theoretical scheme, the human mind seems 
constrained to draw inspiration from the analogy between the 
puzzling observations to be explained and certain already familiar 
phenomena. 
vii. Where theory is founded on analogy between puzzling 
observations and familiar phenomena, it is generally only a limited 
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aspect of such phenomena that is incorporated into the resulting 
model. 
viii. A theoretical model, once built, is developed in ways which 
sometimes obscures the analogy on which it was founded (Horton 
1970:132-148). 
1. 1 Personal and Impersonal Paradigms. 
According to Horton, African traditional thought and Western science offer 
the same kind of explanation but differ with regard to idiom. In Western 
science the concern is with the world of things, an impersonal idiom; and in 
African traditional thought, it is with the world of person, a personal idiom. If 
this is Horton's basic premise the problem can be formulated as follows: 
In his argument regarding indistinguishability between kind and degree 
Horton claims that both Western science and African traditional thought 
share this view of explanatory theory. The difference is that African traditional 
thought uses personal idioms while Western science uses impersonal 
idioms. This continuity of structure and intent in both African traditional 
thought and Western science forms the basis of likeness in kind, whereas 
the idiom employed, of personal and impersonal paradigms, constitutes 
differences between them. Horton does not explicitly state the precise kind 
of explanation that might be appropriate for African traditional thought but 
seems to cast his favour on a Western scientific one. The problem with 
Horton's claim is that he does not clarify the nature of the explanation. 
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Different kinds of explanation exist, from psychological to mystical or 
scientific. It is important to distinguish between these different kinds as they 
differ with regard to function and status or level (Cohen 1995:263). Horton's 
view is that the function of explanation, in both African traditional thought 
and Western scientific thought is to seek unity, simplicity, order and 
regularity, but that they employ different analogies in this quest. 
1.2 Schemes of Entities 
The essence of explanation on a theoretical level is the formulation of 
schemes of entities that underlie the world of everyday experience. These 
schemes fulfill a number of roles in the process of the construction of theory. 
To understand the significance of these schemes of entities one needs to 
examine the ontology of African traditional thought. In other words it is 
essential to know the nature of the things or objects that are relevant in the 
world for that particular culture. There is a close relationship between the 
ontology of a culture and its epistemology, or what that culture claims to 
know about the world (Kinoshita 1990:305). In Western scientific thinking 
the ontology is considered to be dualistic in character. There are objects that 
belong to the material/physical world, known to us by our senses , and there 
are objects that belong to the world of the supernatural/spiritual or 'other 
world' that are intangible and immaterial and perhaps only known through 
intuition. 
14 
The ontology of African traditional thought is seen as monistic in that all 
things whether physical objects of the material world or objects of the 
supernatural world, are essentially the same. Gilbert Ryle (Malherbe 
1993:24-5) introduced the term 'ontologising' in reference to the process of 
taking something that doesn't exist in its own right and talking about it as if it 
did. He used the example of 'the mind' to illustrate this process. Western 
scientific thought has focused on the things of the material physical world, 
which are more satisfactorily demonstrated and where knowledge claims are 
more easily justifiable. 
According to Malherbe (1993:25) the scepticism with which Western culture 
considers spiritual entities and its banishment of such to the arena of 
religion is a result of the hegemony in Western thinking of scientific 
discourse. The works of Robin Horton (1967, 197 4, 1993) have opened the 
possibility of revisioning this position, and considering the spiritual entities 
of traditional religious thought, as the same order of things as the 
theoretical entities of science. Central to Horton's argument is the concept of 
explanation, whereby both science and African traditional thought use 
unobserved but postulated entities grounded in relations of cause and effect 
to provide an explanatory framework for events and phenomena that occur 
in the world of experience. 
"As explanatory principles or theories ... witches and devils have the same status as 
atoms and light waves" (Malherbe 1993: 26). 
Whether this view is tena':Jle has to be established by considering 
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explanatory principles or theories. Horton himself holds this view. He says 
that the gods and spirits of African traditional thought, despite an apparent 
unruly complexity and elaborateness, reflect the development of schemes 
which allow a diversity of experience to be reduced to more limited, hence 
simplified kinds of processes that underlie the diversity. He suggests the 
same process exists in Western science where common sense objects are 
seen as a proliferation of molecules. He points out in his work on the 
Kalabari that everything that happens can be interpreted in terms of a 
theoretical scheme comprising three basic forces: ancestors, heroes and 
water spirits. He goes on to show that for each of these constellations of 
beings there are capacities of jurisdiction in the world of observable events, 
and the assumption made by the spiritual diviner is that there is regularity in 
their behaviour. These gods in African traditional thought, just like molecules 
and waves in Western science, introduce unity in diversity, simplicity in 
complexity, order in disorder, regularity in anomaly. 
1.3 The Quest for Explanatory Theory 
In a critique of Horton's work, E.D. Prinsloo (1993:105) analyses the 
premises underlying the quest for explanatory theory to see whether they 
conform to standards of consistency and sound reasoning. Particular 
reference is made to the principle of non-contradiction. Briefly this principle 
states that 'nothing both is and is not' (Kirwan 1995:476). 
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1.3.1 Unity-Diversity 
In this first pair, Prins loo (1993:105) says that Horton classifies events or 
entities in such a way that critical differences are omitted. The classification 
permits a reduction of a multitude of entities to schemes of entities, but fails 
to really explain anything. Horton's word 'unity' in this sense is not unlike 
'unify', used in scientific parlance to indicate some kind of numerical 
decrease. The point however, is that unification must explain the event or 
entity under consideration. Friedman (1974) says: 
"We don't simply replace one phenomenon with another. We replace one 
phenomenon with a more comprehensive phenomenon ... We thus genuinely 
increase our understanding of the world" (Kinoshita 1990: 297). 
Kitcher (1981) also concludes: 
"By using a few patterns of argument in the division of many beliefs we minimize the 
number of types of premises we must take as underived. That is we reduce, in so far 
as possible, the number of facts we must accept as brute" (Kinoshita 1990: 297-8). 
Hempel (1966:44) does not specifically follow Friedman's and Kitcher's 
equation of unity and numerical decrease but takes a different angle. If there 
are logical (derivational) relations among 'types of facts' then explained 
(derived) facts are logically unified among one another. An example of 
unification in the scientific sense is found in the kinetic theory of gases 
wherein the theoretical application serves to unify the mechanics with the 
theory of heat phenomena. This unification has birthed an independent 
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science known as thermodynamics.' The result of Horton's search for unity 
is a system of classification, not a logical derivation of facts. 
1.3.2 Simplicity-Complexity 
For Horton the idea of schemes also serves the purpose of simplifying 
complexity. Simplicity is significant as it is a process that is perfectly natural 
both in ordinary life and in science. The simplest theory is the one that fits all 
the available facts (Hempel 1966:41 ). African traditional thought introduces 
additional, complex, unobservable entities to account for phenomena. This, 
Horton says is not unlike the Western scientific idea of the hypothetical 
construct. However, used in the way Horton does, it has the effect of 
complicating and obscuring the facts that originally inspired it, while failing 
at the same time to explain these facts scientifically. In reducing the number 
of entities in the interests of unity and simplicity, Horton does not reduce the 
kinds of entities and it is the nature of these entities which is problematic. 
Hence this reduction to a common denominator cannot serve as an 
adequate explanation. 
Simplicity is one of the criteria for the confirmation and acceptability of a 
scientific hypothesis. If there is an alternative hypothesis that accords with 
the same data and does not differ in other respects relevant to its 
confirmation, the simpler hypothesis will count as more acceptable. 
' The application of this kinetic theory of heat has resulted amongst other things in artificial 
refrigeration. 
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"Any criteria of simplicity would have to be objective. Of course they could not just 
refer to intuitive appeal or to the ease with which the hypothesis is understood or 
remembered" (Hempel 1966:41). 
In the case of theories, the number of independent basic assumptions is 
sometimes suggested as an indicator of complexity. Assumptions can be 
combined or split up in many ways, therefore there is no unambiguous way 
of counting them. The same applies to the proposition that the number of 
basic concepts in a theory serves as an index oi complexity. The quesiion of 
criteria of simplicity has in recent years received a good deal of attention 
from philosophy, however, a satisfactory general characterisation of 
simplicity has not been identified (Hempel 1966:42, Hendry 1995:826-7). 
Certainly there are cases in which even in the absence of explicit criteria, 
investigators would be in substantial agreement about which of two 
competing hypotheses or theories is simplest. 
An interesting problem concerning simplicity is the notion of justification. 
One of the reasons for adhering to the principle of simplicity is that scientists 
have expressed the conviction that the basic laws of nature are simple. 
However, this assumption is as untenable as the principle of simplicity is 
sound and thus cannot provide a justification for it. Some, such as Mach, 
Avenarius, Ostwald and Pearson (Hempel 1966:42-3), believe that science 
offers an: 
"economic and parsimonious description of the world, and that general hypotheses 
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purporting to express laws of nature are economic expedients for thought, serving to 
compress an indefinite number of particular cases ... into one simple formula". 
Simplicity in this sense is not a sufficient justification. Popper's view (Hempel 
1966:44), elucidates the kind of simplicity that is of concern to science. 
"Simple statements, ff knowledge is our object, are to be prized more highly than less 
simple ones because they tell us more: because their empirical content is greater and 
because they are better testable". ' 
1.3.3 Order-Diversity 
The next notion presented by Horton is that of order-disorder. You can order 
or arrange furniture in a room according to determining factors such as 
whether the room is residential or for business, or whether the furniture is for 
removal or for sale. Prinsloo (1993:106) points out that order does not have 
the same logical status in the different examples. In the context of the room, 
ordering is a matter of spatial relationships and consequently the notion of 
ordering without clarification does not explain anything. Ordering in the 
scientific method means ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy. 
Prinsloo demonstrates that there are types of ordering, logical constructions 
of order or means of classifying and contrasting order and disorder but 
these do not explain the contrast between order and disorder. Horton 
(1974:133) gives an example from the Kalabari to demonstrate the notion of 
' Ockham's razor or the principle of parsimony - "a methodological principle dictating a bias toward 
simplicity in theory construction, where the parameters of simplicity vary from kinds of entity to the 
number of presupposed axioms to characteristics of curves drawn between data points. Although 
found in Aristotle, it became associated w~h William Ockham because it captures the spirit of his 
philosophical conclusions" (Adams 1995:633). 
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order-diversity. The Kalabari heroes are responsible for all aspects of the life 
and strength of the community, and for its institutions. The heroes underpin 
human skill. This, says Horton, allows an ordering of human behaviour. It 
provides a system of categorisation and Prinsloo concludes, as there is no 
causality, the explanatory function of ordering remains doubtful. 
1.3.4 Regularity-Anomaly 
As regards the final pair, regularity-anomaly, Horton makes a single 
reference to regularity. The work of the religious expert in African traditional 
thought depends on his determining regularities in the behaviour of spiritual 
agencies in relation to happenings or events in the everyday world. This, 
according to Horton, is not unlike the scientist who expresses the 
uniformities that reveal themselves in the observation of a class of events, 
as empirical laws. The aim of theory then is to explain these regularities to 
deepen understanding , and also to account for, and even predict 'new' 
regularities of a similar kind (Hempel 1966:70). There is little evidence in 
Horton's examples that chains of causes between events exist to make 
them better understood, deepen understanding or to account for or predict 
events. Neither does Horton indicate what is meant by anomaly (Prinsloo 
1993:106). Anomalies seem to be ignored or accounted for by ad hoc 
hypotheses. The ideal of Western science is that when an anomaly is 
discovered, it is investigated and in that process it may be accommodated in 
the theory or discarded (Hempel 1966:70). 
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1.4 Terminological and Conceptual Confusions 
Prinsloo (1993:104) begins his analysis of Horton's work, by asking for 
clarification of the terms used in the quest for explanation. Some definition 
of terminology is required. Further Prinsloo questions how Horton chose the 
particular pairs he delineates in the quest: unity-diversity; simplicity-
complexity; order-disorder; regularity-anomaly. 
Terms or concepts can either be used in very specific ways or rather loosely 
so that part of the meaning rather than the complete meaning, comes to 
imply the whole. Where definitions are vague or incomplete such use results 
in abstractions that are illegitimate and comparisons that are inaccurate. For 
Prinsloo there is lack of clarity in Horton's definition of terms. In some 
senses he seems to use them all synonymously, making very little distinction 
between them. Prinsloo makes recourse to the use of these terms in 
everyday language to determine whether they can be regarded as 
synonymous. 
In this rigorous examination, Prinsloo demonstrates that Horton fails to 
distinguish between kinds of explanations, and to separate them from other 
categories such as identification, classification, clarification and elucidation. 
With regard to unity and diversity, it appears that unity allows phenomena to 
be identified and classified but not elucidated and clarified. It is also not 
clear how different causes or reasons have the effect of unification. Similarly 
the contrast between simplicity and complexity is unclear with simplification 
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resembling classification, clarification and at times, explanation. Similar 
ambiguities exist for ordering and for regularity and anomaly. 
According to Prins loo (1993:107) Horton mystifies by coming up with general 
and vague meanings of the quests for explanatory theory and assimilating 
them without due regard for the different contexts of application. 
"In this sense two logical errors have been committed by Horton simultaneously: one 
is illegitimate abstraction, the other misapplication". 
Horton therefore makes his first logical error in his failure to clarify 
terminology. If terminology is not defined in such a way that its meaning is 
specifiable by providing criteria for its application, then however, 'intuitively 
clear and familiar [it is, it] leads to meaningless statements and questions' 
(Hempel 1966: 90). Words such as order, unity, anomaly as used here are 
ambiguous and polymorphous and applicable to many situations. Horton 
has taken the lacuna to make these comparisons. He is accused of taking 
general and diffuse meanings of the quests for explanation and assimilating 
them in Western scientific thinking and African traditional thought, without 
taking into account the different contexts to which the different quests are 
applicable (Prinsloo 1993:107). 
Still in relation to Horton's first precept, Prinsloo maintains that underlying 
the concept of 'quest for', is the arena of types or kinds of questions that can 
be posed. He examines what, why, and how questions to see whether their 
answers constitute explanations. For example, what questions might call for 
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the identification or classification of information or for elucidation or 
clarification. The question arises whether these constitute explanations. It 
might be argued that these notions have some properties of explanation that 
can be fused, and that by ignoring the differences the idea of explanation 
becomes ambiguous. The vague terminology and failure to distinguish the 
logic of identification from that of clarification or causal explanation, allows a 
particular property of explanation to be identified with certain other 
properties so that it appears as if they belong together. However, in a 
broader context the identification would not be acceptable. An example 
might be that a 'cow' is a 'table' because they have the same brown colour 
(Prinsloo 1994b). 
Why questions and how questions call for reasons and causes. An adequate 
scientific explanation would entail reasoning and causality. The form in logic 
is modus ponens - if p then q. The question then arises though as to 
whether the reason is sufficient to explain, and further whether the purported 
explanation is real. It is important to distinguish between the structure of an 
explanation and its truth. The form in argument is called modus to/lens - if 
H is true then so is I. If the evidence shows I is true then so is H. This 
suggests that if the premises are true then so is the conclusion (Hempel 
1966:7). These issues are dealt with in greater detail in chapter two. 
The second logical error of which Horton stands accused is that of confusing 
the scope of classes so that he makes illegitimate abstractions. The scope of 
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the class elucidation is wider than the scope of the class explanation. There 
are some connections he makes but according to Prinsloo (1993:107) he 
confuses and conflates ideas, causing confusion with vague use of terms 
and the juggling of concepts. In legitimate abstraction a part of a property is 
taken for the whole but it can result in mystification. When there is 
overlapping between meanings of 'kind' and 'degree' problems of this kind 
arise. For example if we speak of a general category called transport we 
may well include both bicycles and motor cars as means of transport . That 
they are both means of transport is undeniable. The problem arises when 
we are looking at different modes of transport, and conclude that a bicycle is 
a car. This kind of reductionism impairs our quest for explanatory theory. It 
would imply that any kind of explanation is equal to or the same as any 
other. This will be further examined in relation to the concept of explanatory 
relevance later on. Horton's mystifications are a consequence of his 
ontologising. He postulates all kinds of entities to explain events without 
evidence that they really exist. 
1. 5 Inductive Inference 
The next arena of critique of Horton concerns the wider context of causality. 
Horton maintains that people use common sense as a way of placing ideas 
in a causal context. This manner of 'putting two and two together' (Horton 
1974:135) is inductive and achieved by a process of inference. It does 
however, have limitations since it is only possible to perceive adjacent, or 
proximal antecedent conditions amongst events, and not what happens at a 
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distance. Theory, however, permits the transcendence of these limitations of 
mind by revealing a range of causal connections that common sense cannot 
offer. Horton (1974:135) uses the example of the disease Bilharziasis, where 
he explains wider context to mean that the explanation for the disease must 
have a pattern of components related to each other in a systematic and 
causal way, so that all future cases of the disease can be accommodated. 
In this example, the observables are related to each other and there is no 
introduction of forces that transcend experience. Transcendence of 
experience only happens when a law is postulated for future cases of the 
disease. 
Prinsloo (1993:107) comments on Horton's view that the African traditional 
thinker transcends experience by introducing gods and spirits. These are not 
observable and cannot be inferred either directly or indirectly from other 
experiences. The question is whether this 'transcendence' is the same as 
that used in Western science. In the case of disease, transcendence refers 
to the explication of a law that is linked to experience and permits 
identification of future cases. In the instance of African traditional thought, 
transcendence refers to going beyond experience in that the gods are 
neither observable in reality nor in principle. It is a postulation, and has no 
connection with, and cannot be inferred from, preceding experience. Horton 
(1974:136) argues however, that the traditional healer has to explain cause 
in the form of observable, concrete events, as to why the particular spiritual 
agency intervened. He says this would invariably relate to issues like 
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disturbed family relations, such as family jealousy, hatred or transgressions 
that evoke ancestral displeasure. He can see no difference between a 
physicist explaining the mushroom cloud of the hydrogen bomb as a 
'massive fusion of hydrogen nuclei' and disease as 'spirit anger because of 
a breach of kinship morality.' For Horton (1970:136) 'in both cases reference 
to theoretical entities is used to link events in the visible tangible world 
(natural effects) to their antecedents in the same world ( natural causes)'. 
Theory is used to transcend the restrictions of what is perceived by common 
sense. Horton claims that the difference between Western scientific and 
African traditional thought lies in the particular theoretical idiom that a culture 
adopts. The specific idiom consequently emerges out of the experience of 
members of that culture and the attention given to juxtapositioning certain life 
events. In traditional African life, where the strength and unity of the social 
group is critical, it would make sense that the idiom is personal and that the 
adversity suffered by an individual should be linked to social disturbance. 
Horton maintains that modern medical science would benefit from this type 
of association of events. In more recent years, he adds, there has been a 
move towards considering the contribution that social factors make to both 
psychological and physical illnesses . 
1.6 Common Sense and Theory 
For Horton, theories originate from the world of things and people and 
should lead us back to that world. The premises of a theory through the 
process of deduction should reunite us with statements that encompass the 
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completeness of the common-sense world. If this does not occur the theory 
has failed. In addition Horton considers common-sense thinking more 
functional and economic than theoretical thinking in that it is only when the 
need arises to go beyond the limited causal vision of common sense that 
theory comes into play. According to Prins loo (1993:108) Horton's 
illustration of the use of common salt in a domestic versus industrial context 
adds nothing to the relation between theory and common sense and only 
has relevance to the requirement of the wider causal context. Similarly 
Horton's 'jump' from common sense to mystical thinking, in his example of 
sickness in the Kalabari, is a recourse to theory in the face of the limited 
causal vision of common sense, but contributes little to explaining the link 
between common sense and theory. Prinsloo is concerned with the manner 
in which the process of deduction and inference occur in the two modes of 
thinking. 
1. 7 Levels of Theory 
Just as the choice between common sense and theory permits the 
placement of events in a wider causal context, so too does the choice of 
levels of theory. A low-level theory is one that 'covers a relatively limited area 
of experience' (Horton 1974:143) while a higher-level theory is more 
ambitious about context. Horton describes the concept of 'the many and the 
one' in African traditional religious systems. This relates to ideas concerning 
numerous spirits on the one hand and one supreme being on the other. 
There has been much debate about how both poly- and monotheism might 
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be accommodated in a single system of thought. This has led to a 
proliferation of theories. Horton explains firstly that the many and the one can 
be understood in terms of causal context where the spirits permit the settling 
of events in a more restricted causal context, that is, closer to the thinker's 
community and immediate environment. On the other hand, the one 
supreme being offers the widest possible context, for it is the basis of the 
theory of ultimate concern, the origin of the world. Secondly, since the idea 
of the one and the many represents different levels of thought within the 
same system, it can be understood in the same way as the different levels of 
theoretical thinking, of Western science. The relationship between one god 
and many spirits is no different from the relationship between atoms and 
planetary systems. Both reflect the way in which theories are used in 
explanation. 
Prinsloo (1993:108) again accuses Horton of drawing fallacious parallels. 
In Western scientific thinking, the relationships between homogeneous 
atoms and planetary systems of fundamental particles are structural and 
logical, whereas in African traditional thought the different elements bear no 
structural relationship to each other, but exist separately and are additional 
postulated entities. 
1.8 Abstraction and Reintegration 
According to Horton, the scientific method takes the objects of the common 
sense world, breaks them up in order to get to an underlying causal 
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meaning, then organises them in theoretical schemes. This process of 
theorising involves abstraction, analysis and then reintegration. The West 
African belief that the individual is made up of three levels presided over by 
different spiritual agencies, demonstrates for Horton the parallel in African 
traditional belief of the processes of abstraction, analysis and reintegration. It 
is possible that the identification of a biological entity (segr), a personality 
component (Nuor yin) and the overseers of personal fortune (yin ancestors) 
presiding over an individual, provides a scheme which permits a deeper 
understanding of individuals and their relation to society by abstraction and 
analysis. However, there is no evidence of reintegration (Prinsloo 1993:109). 
Again Prinsloo asks whether the procedure wherein which abstraction of 
waves in the theory of light is deduced, is not the same procedure whereby 
African traditional thought arrives at the notion of water spirits and ancestors. 
The comparison of the abstraction of spiritual entities with abstraction in the 
Cambridge or Parsonian traditions, is for Prinsloo, vague and therefore 
unacceptable in rigorous critique. Furthermore, for Prinsloo 'the relation in 
Western science is still structural and that of African thought still additional in 
the sense of separately postulated entities' (Prinsloo 1993: 109). 
1.9 The Use of Models 
According to Horton, in formulating theories there is recourse to the drawing 
of analogy between the unfamiliar and the familiar. Hence atoms, electrons 
or molecules, or gods spirits and entelechies, are theoretical constructs that 
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have their roots in the experiences of every day life, or in other words in 
analogies with the familiar. Horton defines 'familiar phenomena' as those 
associated in the mind of the observer with order and regularity, and as he 
has demonstrated earlier, therefore satisfy the search for explanation. He 
suggests that this quest of the mind for familiar explanatory analogies lends 
weight to his claim that Western culture tends to couch explanation in 
impersonal idiom, while African traditional thought uses a personal idiom. In 
Western industrial societies the inanimate allows order, simplicity, regularity 
and predictability. Things are more comfortable than relationships with fellow 
human beings and so the mind turns most easily to the inanimate in its quest 
for explanatory analogy. In traditional societies it is in the human world that 
the qualities of order, regularity and predictability are evident, and so people 
and their relationships are the explanatory analogies that are sought. 
While it is sometimes true that scientific explanation attempts to reduce 
bewildering and unfamiliar phenomena to familiar facts and principles, it's 
purpose is not to create familiarity. The feeling of familiarity may well be 
evoked by metaphorical accounts that have no explanatory value. Scientific 
theoretical explanation does not aim at a subjective kind of understanding 
which is intuitive but an objective insight: 
"achieved by a systematic kind of unification, by exhibiting the phenomena as 
manifestations of common underlying structures and processes that conform to 
specific, testable basic principles. If such an account can be given in terms that show 
certain analogies with familiar phenomena, then very well" ( Hempel 1966:83). 
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Horton describes how philosophers of science use the molecular (kinetic) 
theory of gases to demonstrate that only some aspects of certain 
phenomena are incorporated into theory. He describes how in the kinetic 
theory of gases, molecules are seen to be analogous with fast moving 
spherical balls in different kinds of space. Although the important properties 
of these balls have been considered, equally important properties like 
colour and temperature have been excluded. They are excluded, Horton 
postulates, because they do not serve an explanatory function, relative to the 
original observations that inspired the theory. He suggests that in the sense 
that some features are included and others omitted, a process of abstraction 
has taken place and that this sort of abstraction is critical to scientific 
thinking. Horton points out that a similar process takes place in African 
traditional thought. In so far as traditional thought uses people and their 
social relationships as the raw data for its theories, it incorporates some 
aspects of human life and neglects others in its theoretical entities. The 
definition of a god may not make reference to his appearance or his abode, 
just as the kinetic theory of gases does not make reference to the colour of a 
gas or the temperature of an electron. The process of abstraction is the 
same in both Western science and African tradition, where features that 
have explanatory relevance are included and those which are irrelevant are 
omitted. 
Prins loo (1993:109) points out that in an analogy there is usually a one-to-
one correlation between the components of the analogy and the features of 
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the lived-in world. Central to the quest for explanation is the linking of 
theoretical schemes or analogies with the observed world, by statements 
identifying these links. These identification statements are known in 
Philosophy of Science as Correspondence-Rule statements. Horton 
(1993:132) shows how explanation, in this way, raises a philosophical 
perennial and that is, how we can say 'that a thing is at once itself and 
something quite different'. There is good reason to consider both the things 
of common sense and the things of theory as real. The 'is' of 
correspondence rule statements is both the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of class 
membership, giving rise to the idea of 'unity-in-duality'. Correspondence-rule 
statements can be attributed to Carnap (Urmson 1960) and his verifiability 
theory of meaning. According to the criteria he developed for cognitively 
meaningful discourse, metaphysical utterances were nonsensical. In due 
course he came to say most if not all scientific statements were hence 
meaningless. He later developed a less extreme version of the theory 
proposing the criterion that ·a statement is meaningful if, and only if, the 
statement itself or some of its logical consequences can be tested by 
sensory observation' (Urmson 1960:59). If this view is accepted then 
Horton's idea that correspondence-rule statements are applicable to both 
Western science and African traditional thought, is not accurate, as the 
schemes of entities are not testable in terms of logical consequences or 
sensory observation. It seems that Horton's recourse to analogy and to 
theoretical entities does not 'safeguard him against structural criticism' since 
neither find their one-to-one correlation between their components and the 
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features of the lived world (Prinsloo 1993:110). 
Hempel (1966:83) quotes the work of the physicist N.R. Campbell who 
maintains that for a scientific theory to have any value at all: 
" it must 'display an analogy: the basic laws that its internal principles specify for the 
theoretical entities and processes must be analogous to some known laws, as the 
laws for the propagation of light waves are analogous to (have the same mathematical 
form as) the propagation of water waves". 
At this point it is interesting to consider the contribution of Tambiah 
(1973:199) who writes on the Form and Meaning of Magical Acts. For him 
both 'magic' as in African traditional thought and 'science' use analogy but 
they use it in different ways so that 'it would be inappropriate to measure and 
verify them by the same standards'. He quotes the work of Lloyd who 
explores argumentation in early Greek thought, and claims that analogy 
fulfills two roles in science, to explain and to control reality. It attempts to 
achieve the latter: 
"by using links which it believes may be formed between things by their 
similarities .... The relationship of similarity may sometimes constitute a magical bond 
between two things so that what happens to one of them may influence what 
happens to another" (Tambiah 1973:207). 
In his compelling style Tambiah analyses the analogic mode of thought in 
modern science and prescientific traditions and shows that their intention is 
different. He refers directly to ti1e work of Horton and accuses him of abusing 
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analogy. Tambiah maintains that Horton's fundamental error is the belief 
that both Western science and African traditional thought are concerned with 
the same intellectual task. He goes on to say that in Western science, use of 
analogy is linked to prediction and verification, and its value is determined 
in terms of inductive support, or of meeting standards of probability criteria, 
or tests of falsifiability. In magic or ritual the intention is more likely to be 
'persuasion', 'conceptualisation', 'expansion of meaning' and its adequacy 
is conveyed by notions such as 'validity', 'correctness', 'legitimacy', and 
'felicity' of the ceremony performed. 
Horton's last word on analogy is that it may be obscure, but that both 
Western science and African traditional thought have obscured analogies. 
He claims this occurs when a theory is in its first draft and comes across data 
for which it cannot account. Rather than discard the model it may choose to 
undergo successive changes to enlarge its capacity to account for the data. 
In the process the model may develop some bizarre hybrid, removed from 
the phenomena that originally provided its inspiration. For example the 
atomic theory of matter has undergone a number of changes to 
accommodate data and expand explanatory coverage to the extent that the 
founding analogy has been obscured. In African traditional thought Horton 
(1974:133) takes examples from the life of the Kalabari and he makes 
reference to the work of Middleton and the Lugbara. Both tribes have 
categories of spiritual agency - for the Kalabari, ancestors, heroes and water 
spirits and for the Lugbara, ancestors and the adro spirits, some of which 
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are considered decidedly odd. The contrast and opposition between the 
different categories permit understanding of conflicts in the world of everyday 
experience. He points out that the need for models is the result of 
developmental processes, not unlike those of Western science, that the 
'oddities' that develop are essential to explanation and have theoretical 
significance. 
Prinsloo (1993:11 O) retorts that analogy used in this way postulates 
additional entities. He describes this as ontologising, which does not 
constitute a functional explanation as is the case of the atomic theory of 
matter. He adds there is a counter argument to this in the sense that analogy 
in this way is a logical construction. 
Some concluding remarks in Prinsloo's critique of Horton regard the concept 
of coherence. For Horton it seems that 'understanding' is so broad that 
almost anything that is coherent is acceptable. Prinsloo uses the modens 
ponens argument to show that if there is coherence, which is 
correspondence in the formal structure, it does not necessarily follow that 
the premises are acceptable, which is correspondence in the informal 
structure. Horton uses this manner of argumentation and Prinsloo maintains 
he could only defend this view through recourse to the use of metaphorical 
language. Metaphor however, stands for attributes, and not for entities like 
the spirits of traditional thought . 
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2. Critical Considerations 
Horton (1974:131) starts his article with an explanation of why he chooses 
to seek out the commonalities in Western and African traditional thought 
before detailing the differences. His aim is to play down the differences 
between personal and impersonal theories to reopen the bridge (blocked 
by many anthropologists by their own thought patterns) to the idea that 
traditional thought is not 'wholly other'. Horton (1974:152) adds that the 
differences are a surface difference beneath which lies an 'underlying 
similarity of intellectual process'. The difference is nothing more than a 
difference in idiom. The explanatory quest is the same. 
2. 1 The Closed and Open Predicaments 
Horton (1974:153) sees the open and closed predicaments as the key 
difference between African traditional thought and Western science, and all 
other differences in human reasoning emerge from this. Here Horton turns 
from questions regarding the content and logic of traditional and scientific 
explanation to social contexts in which these theories are constructed and 
mobilised. 
" It is that in traditional cultures there is no awareness of alternatives to the 
established body of theoretical tenets. Whereas in scientifically orientated cultures 
such an awareness is highly developed. It is this difference we refer to when we say 
that tradttional cultures are 'closed' and scientifically orientated societies are 'open'". 
To support this view he quotes Evans-Pritchard (Horton 197 4:154): 
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" In this web of belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande 
cannot get out of its meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not 
an external structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and he 
cannot think that his thought is wrong". 
This lack of awareness of alternatives removes any possibility of 
questioning as the tenets are sacred. A further consequence of this closed 
system, or lack of alternatives, is the threat of impending chaos should the 
established tenets al the belief system be contested. There are iimiis set 
by patterns of ritual and mystical belief and they, the Zande, cannot operate 
beyond these limits. 
Horton borrowed the contrast between open and closed societies from Sir 
Karl Popper's (1979:160) use of the notion but has restricted his 
application of the term exclusively to a sense of theoretical knowledge. 
This view (both Popper's and Horton's adaptation of it) has been widely 
criticized. Thomas Kuhn to whom Horton refers, claims that science is in 
fact not open to alternatives but constrained by socially imposed 
paradigms. Horton's view of scientific conduct is that when a scientific 
theory fails, it is discarded forthwith. One of the principle differences 
between science and African traditional thought is that in science there is a 
progression or perhaps an accumulation of knowledge. It is to this view 
that Kuhn objects most strongly. Kuhn is concerned with scientific 
discovery in a sociological sense and denies the neutral objective 
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implications of science, willingly relinquishing one theory for another and 
thus progressing. 
In Kuhn's (1970) scheme there is no objective or paradigm-free reality and 
hence no direct unmediated access to reality. In Horton's scheme there is 
an assumption of the existence of an external reality, other than a mere 
social perception of it, and that social styles of thought can be classified, in 
terms of that independent existing observable reality. He assumes this 
reality to be such that, the awareness of alternatives, is more cognitively 
effective than the closed version. The difficulty with this, Kuhn would say, is 
that some Western scientists have difficulty in conceiving alternatives and 
therefore cannot discard a theory as readily as they perhaps should. 
However, Kuhn while adding to Popper's analysis of scientific discovery 
has devalued the scientific method which is rigorously applied in causing 
changes in science and by implication fostering progress (Dennis 
1972:58). However, this does not mean that African traditional thinkers 
are incapable of conceiving alternative theories or world views. 
Wars and diplomacy in much of pre-colonial Africa are not consistent with 
a view of Africa as unaware of the rest of the world. Hence the cognitive 
world of traditional cultures cannot be regarded as closed in the face of the 
complex history of cultural exchange and cross fertilization. In the face of 
this criticism, Horton (1993: 121) has altered his notion of African society 
as a closed system to that of an accommodative system. He contrasts this 
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system with the adversarial style of scientific theory, which is characterised 
by the way in which the impulse to change a belief does not result in a 
novel experience but a rival theory. 
Appiah (1992:211) in his paper 'Old Gods, New Worlds', suggests that 
Horton has captured something significant regarding these different 
modes of thought, in that he sees them relating not to individual cognitive 
strategies but to intersubjective social ones. On the other hand, Horton's 
position may be interpreted as applying to individuals. In this case 
questions would arise regarding the individual observer's own sense of 
coherence, a problem aggravated by the absence of documentation on 
African belief systems. The problem of arbitrariness or bias would be 
inherent even if there were written sources, but that it would more likely be 
so in the case of an individual. If we return to the former idea, regarding 
cognitive social strategies, then Horton's theory is seen as a system of 
thought and therefore an abstraction, which can be isolated on the basis of 
the behaviour of groups. 
The significance of social organisation in differentiating traditional religion 
and natural science is important when we consider the extent to which they 
result from different kinds of social processes. Differences between these 
two modes of thought lie in the social organisation of inquiry. As 
experimentation, systematic development of alternative theories which are 
synonymous with the Western scientific method are intelligible as an 
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organised social enterprise of knowledge. 
The accommodative system of African traditional thought as suggested by 
Horton is possible in an oral society. Apparently unchanging folk lore is 
handed from one generation to another with no systematic research or 
consistent interpretations. Knowledge is seen as an unchanging lore of 
truth derived from the ancestors. Yet a highly developed sense of the 
criteria of alternatives does not necessarily lead one from a traditional to a 
scientific scheme. It is quite possible for a traditional thinker to become 
aware of alternatives and choose to adopt another scheme or not. This is 
far from the notion that if one theory is judged better than another, the 
better will be adopted. Furthermore the grounds on which a theory will be 
seen to be better than another, prejudges the question of the relative merits 
of one system over another. 
Horton (1974:155) says that having understood that all the critical 
differences between scientific and traditional world views are in terms of the 
closed and open predicaments, he chooses to divide the differences into two 
groups - those that are concerned with the presence or absence of a vision 
of alternatives, and those concerned with the presence or absence of anxiety 
about threats to established beliefs. 
2.2 Power of Words 
Only the Power of Words which is the first notion in Horton's group of 
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differences connected with the presence or absence of a vision of 
alternatives will receive consideration in this section. It is interesting and the 
researcher believes it may have rather broad implications for the study as a 
whole. Horton calls this 'magical versus non-magical attitude' to words. 
In all traditional African world views, there is an assumption about the power 
of words. To know the name of a being or thing is to exercise some degree 
of control over it. In traditional societies there is a 'unique and intimate link 
between words and things' (Horton 1974:156). In science, however, while 
there is power in words, the control is indirect, arising through the functions 
of explanation and prediction. 
Central to this is the relationship between words and reality. The philosophy 
of language explores the relationship between ourselves and our language: 
at the semantic level, how we invest words and sentences with meaning, 
and the relationship between our language and the world: at a pragmatic 
level, how words refer to things or to the facts they describe. These levels 
can be blurred. A common endeavour in the philosophy of language is to try 
and reveal the deep structure whereby one thing may be inferred by another 
and may be hidden by the surface structure. Some of these concepts can be 
attributed to the work of the linguist Noam Chomsky. What is significant for 
this dissertation is the premise that the relationship between meaning and 
language is interwoven with the relationships on other levels of inquiry, 
particularly the relationship between thought and language. 
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"We don't know what to think until we know what to say. And if we cannot mean 
something, then we cannot understand it either. This suggests that if an investigation 
into language delivers results about the limits of meaning, then our science and our 
conception of the world must also conform to these limits" (Blackburn 1995: 459). 
Wittgenstein in his concept of language-game says that language is: 
"a form of human rule-governed activity, integrated into human transactions and social 
behaviour, context-dependent and purpose-relative" (Haker 1995: 461 )-
Philosophers have been traditionally inclined to look for simplicity and 
uniformity where none exists. Consequently they ignore significant 
differences in function between sentences that are often only superficially 
similar. The attempt to blend one function of language with another or to 
treat one as a paradigm to which others conform is, for Wittgenstein, the 
source of perennial problems in philosophy (Flew 1979:376). It appears that 
this is precisely the trap into which Horton falls, with his failure to define his 
terms and his imprecise use of the concept of analogy. 
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Chapter Two 
The structure of scientific explanation according to C.G. Hempel with particular 
emphasis in what explanations. 
The Structure of Explanation 
The concept of explanation is fundamental to many arenas of philosophical 
inquiry (Taylor 1970: ix, Salmon 1984: ix). There are a multiplicity of ways of 
studying explanation. Explanation can be studied as it arises in different 
disciplines like biology, maths or the social sciences, or in the disciplines of the 
explanation study itself (Kinoshita 1990:297). The critical issue however, is to 
separate scientific explanation from other forms. This comes about through the 
kinds of questions asked (Taylor 1970:32, Salmon 1984:4, Salmon 1993a:131 ). 
This chapter will discuss the structure of scientific explanation and its relation to 
what, how and why questions. 
The idea of explanation according to C G Hempel (1966) will make up the 
main body of this section and will serve as the standard against which Robin 
Horton's (1974) views will be assessed. Hempel was chosen for the purposes 
of this dissertation because he is considered one of the leaders of the logical 
empiricist movement in the philosophy of science (Haak 1995:351) and a 
distinguished scholar with a particular interest in the contemporary 
methodology and philosophy of natural science. Since Horton (1974) claims 
his own training was in both the natural sciences and in the philosophy of 
science, Hempel's work was thought to provide a bench-mark against which 
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Horton's pursuit could be measured.' 
Hempel (1966:1) points out that there are two major groups of scientific inquiry, 
the empirical and the non-empirical sciences, differentiated by the nature of 
their interest in the facts of our experience in the world, and the empirical 
evidence for these facts. The empirical sciences comprise the natural and the 
social sciences, and there is some debate on the features distinguishing these 
two divisions. In general, the natural sciences include physics, chemistry and 
biology, while the social sciences include disciplines like sociology, political 
science, anthropology and economics. It is of course widely held that there are 
basic differences between these fields, but whether these differences are of 
systematic significance, requires a very careful and thorough analysis of these 
divisions. Questions in terms of subject matter, objectives, methods or 
presuppositions have been raised in this regard. To do justice to this question a 
more thorough exploration of these claims would be required. In addition a 
close analysis of the social sciences as well as of the natural sciences would 
have to be undertaken which is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purpose 
of this study, Hempel's choice to consider 'sciences' and 'scientific' as referring 
to the whole area of empirical science, will be adhered to. 
' Issues such as 'what is the logical structure of explanation?', 'are all explanations patterned in a similar 
way?' 'what condttions are necessary for an adequate explanation? ' led me to the work of John Stuart Mill 
and his 'System of Logic' where he elaborated a model of explanation that came to be known as the 
'deductive model'. There have been refinements of this model by philosophers like Richard Braithwaite 
(Scientific Explanation 1953), Can Hempel (Philosophy of Natural Science 1966), Ernest Nagel (The 
Structures of Science 1961) and Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery 1959). The dominant 
tradition in the philosophy of science and more particularly, the epistemology of science, that provides the 
most detailed delineation and defence of the model is the logical empiricism of Carl Hempel (Papineau 
1996:1-2). 
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Horton's view of explanation was to some extent considered in chapter one. As 
already mentioned, for Horton (1974) both African traditional thought and 
Western scientific thinking are similar in structure. He does not specify to which 
particular view of Western science he is referring. A comprehensive 
representation of scientific explanation in the Western world has challenged 
philosophers since Greek antiquity and continues today. Since Aristotle 
through to Laplace and then Braithwaite, Nagel, Popper and Hempel, a number 
of approaches and basic conceptions have enjoyed prominence (Salmon 
1984:21 ). Horton's domain is sociological and therefore a social science. As 
previously mentioned, Hempel asserts that in general the methods and 
rationale of scientific inquiry apply both to the social sciences and the natural 
sciences. This is the approach that will be followed. There are of course, 
inherent problems in applying explanations of natural phenomena to those of 
human society. The phenomena of human behaviour have 'meaningfulness' as 
an essential aspect, which is irrelevant in relation to inert matter. Nevertheless 
the social sciences remain empirical and factual and recourse to "some 
mysterious and non-empirical faculty of 'intuition' in order to determine the 
meaning of a situation to an agent is not necessary" (Ryan 1970:17). In 
explaining the work of Robin Horton it is inevitable that these qualities inherent 
in the natural and social sciences will emerge for consideration. 
One way of approaching the subject of explanation, is to identify differences in 
explanations and then to determine the importance of these differences for the 
consequences that flow from them. Taylor (1970:2-3) describes three main 
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kinds of explanation: 
1. Scientific explanations 
2. What-explanations 
3. Reason-giving explanations. 
The first two will be considered in this chapter and the third in chapter three. 
1. Scientific Explanations 
Scientific explanation is at the core of scientific knowledge, and this knowledge 
according to Salmon (1984:4), is of two kinds, knowledge of what and 
knowledge of why. Two types of answers arise from these questions. The first 
are answers that serve as explanations of purpose. An example is to explain 
disease in terms of its meaning, and not in terms of its mechanism or cause. The 
second is an explanation of cause and an example would be to explain 
disease in terms of its root or origins. Using Taylor's distinction of three kinds of 
explanation as the point of departure for this chapter, causation will be 
considered in this section and purpose will be dealt with later. 
Hempel's clear and elegant exposition of scientific explanation is called the 
Covering Law Model of Explanation. According to Taylor (1970:8), supporters 
of this model deem this a satisfactory account of an explanation in the field of 
science. Explanations of this kind answer questions about how things have 
developed or changed in the world. These appear to be questions regarding 
cause. 
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1. 1 Causation 
Scientific explanations are essentially causal. However, the causal conception 
suffers from difficulties and there is some perplexity concerning the nature of 
causality (Salmon 1984:ix). Yet the simple idea of causation. is that a cause is 
an event or state which: 
i. is prior to an event whose occurrence it is presumed to explain (efficient 
causation), and 
ii. is necessary for this event to happen . 
i. Causation - efficient 
The event, process or phenomenon that brings about an event defines the 
notion of efficient causation. Aristotle (Urmson 1960) introduced the idea that a 
full explanation had four 'causes': what the event was made of - material 
cause, what it is essentially - formal cause, what brought it into being - efficient 
cause and what function or purpose it serves - final cause. It should be born in 
mind that 'cause' as used originally in the translation from Greek had a much 
wider meaning than would be acceptable in science today. 
Science attributes a particular meaning to the term 'cause'. The notion of cause 
within science is efficient causation. This means that for the notion of causation 
to be specified the following criteria must be fulfilled: 
- cause and effect have to be an intertwining chain 
- there can be no action at a distance 
- they have to be contiguous. 
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ii. Causation - necessary and sufficient 
Sometimes causation is necessary but not sufficient. For example in the event 
of fire, a match, a certain chemical, and oxygen all produce the flame. There is 
also the hand that strikes the match. Therefore it is the entire chain of events or 
the whole set of conditions that brings about the flame and that constitutes the 
efficient cause. It is known that oxygen is critical for combustion so it would not 
be possible to have the flame without oxygen. At the same time however, 
oxygen alone will not result in combustion. Oxygen therefore is necessary but 
not sufficient in the set of conditions that would bring about a flame. In other 
words a necessary condition is one without which the event cannot occur, and a 
sufficient condition is one which must be present for the event to occur. The 
word 'cause' may then be used sometimes to reflect the necessary condition 
and sometimes to refer to the sufficient condition. In the germ theory of disease, 
germs are the cause of the disease in a necessary sense, because in their 
absence the disease will not occur (Copi 1978: 400). 
1. 1. 1 Horton's view of Causality 
Horton (197 4 :140) says: 
" I am not claiming traditional thought as a variety of scientific thought .. but both aim at 
grasping causal connections and to some extent succeed in this aim". 
It seems to me that Horton often talks of causal notions when they appear to be 
correlations or particular conjunctions of events in the minds of the thinker. 
Horton claims the intellectual function of theory is to extend people's vision of 
natural causes and that the idea of empirical versus non-empirical is 
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misleading. He is not interested in empirical verifiability which is fundamental to 
the Western scientific method - he is interested in science in so far as it extends 
people's vision and in so far as it grasps 'reality' (Horton 1974:140). 
Consequently he introduces the notion of causality embedded in the context of 
his ideas of the purpose of theory as it relates to meaning. These ideas will be 
further elaborated. 
Karl Jaspers (Erwin 1993: 403-4) in his critique of Freud says that 'the falseness 
of the Freudian claim lies in the mistaking of meaningful connections for causal 
connections'. While some hermeneutic thinkers would agree with Jaspers, there 
are those who reject this point of view 'and argue that meanings in so far as 
they are explanatory, are causes'. It would seem that Horton in arguing his 
case for Western scientific thinking resembling African traditional thought, takes 
a similar position to those that reject Jaspers. The work of Carl Hempel (1966) 
which aligns itself with Jaspers' view will now receive consideration. 
Taylor (1970:7-8) says that for the purposes of science, the critical issue is not 
in finding causes that both precede and are necessary for their effects, but 
explaining the effects, by finding general Jaws or universal propositions that 
take the form: 
"Whenever an event of type a occurs, an event of type b occurs. These universal 
propositions express the connections between events which figure in scientific 
explanation. But these laws or universal generalisations, do not express a necessary 
connection, they express a contingent, or factual, connection ... To give an explanation of 
why an event occurs is to show how it is related to other events by s;ich universal 
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generalisations". 
1.2 The Covering Law Model of Explanation 
According to this model, attributed to Hempel (1966), three elements are 
necessary to explain an event a: 
i. "a universal generalisation or law statement - of the form described above: whenever an 
event of type b happens, an event of type a happens; 
ii. a statement of initial condnions: b happened; 
iii. a statement of the consequent conditions: a happened" (Taylor 1970:48). 
These three elements form a valid argument; the definition of a valid argument 
is if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. Consequently in this 
model, statements in the explanation logically 'entail' the statement that the 
event being explained occurred. 'Entail' as used in logic encapsulates the idea 
that by a process of valid deductive inference, the relationship between 
propositions holds, so that in 'a valid argument the premises taken together 
entail the conclusion ... entailment also holds between certain pairs of 
statements' (Taylor 1970:10). The explanation must contain a universal 
generalisation, and without universal generalisations there is no entailment. 
Hempel (1966:51) has applied his method to history, human actions and 
functional explanations in biology and the social sciences. In summary his 
conception of explanation is derived from what he terms 'covering laws'. This 
means that the occurrence of an event is explained by subsuming that event 
under a general law. When the covering or subsumed laws are deterministic, 
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the explanation takes the form of a deductive argument with laws and 
statements of antecedent conditions as premises and an appropriate statement 
describing the event to be explained as its conclusion. These explanations are 
called deductive-nomological (D-N) explanations. 
1.2. 1 The Deductive-Nomological Explanation ( the 0-N explanation ) 
This kind of explanation comprises a number of explanatory sentences or facts, 
from which the phenomenon to be explained follows deductively. The 
explanatory statements can describe certain facts and/or may have the 
attributes of general laws demonstrating empirical connections that are uniform. 
In other words: 
'1he explanation fits the phenomena to be explained into a pattern of uniformities and 
shows that its occurrence was to be expected, given the specified laws and the pertinent 
particular circumstances" (Hempel 1966:50). 
The form of this type of scientific explanation can therefore be depicted in the 
following way: 
L 1 , L2, ...... Lr (general laws) 
[D-N] ExplananS sentences 
C1, C2 ....... Ck (assertion about facts) 
E Explanandum sentence 
The explanation resulting from such a process can be formulated as a 
deductive argument where the conclusion is the explanandum sentence, and 
where the premises are the basic or general laws and assFlrtions about facts, 
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collectively known as the explanans. 
Hempel (1966:51) describes explanatory accounts of this kind: 
"as explanations by deductive subsumption under general laws or deductive nomologicall 
explanations .... The laws invoked in a scientific explanation will also be called the covering 
laws tor the explanandum phenomenon, and the explanatory argument will be said to 
subsume the explanandum under those laws". 
Tr1e expianandurn phenomenon in a D-N explanation may be i) an event 
occurring at a specific place or time or ii) some regularity found in the natural 
world or iii) a uniformity expressed by an empirical law such as Galileo's. 
Deductive explanations of such regularities and uniformities then bring into 
being laws of broader scope. These empirical laws are then explained by 
means of theoretical principles that pertain to structures and processes 
underlying the uniformities and regularities under discussion. This will be 
elaborated later in this chapter. 
1.2.2 Universal Laws and Accidental Generalisation 
Laws play an essential role in D-N explanations. They can link the particular 
circumstances that operate to explain the occurrence of a given event. When 
the explanandum is not an event but a uniformity such as angles of reflection of 
parabaloidal and spherical mirrors, the explanatory laws reveal a complex of 
more comprehensive uniformities of which the given one is but a special case 
(Hempel 1966:51 ). 
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There is an implication of causality in the link between the circumstances and 
the occurrence of the event. When a law is stated then causes are assumed. A 
causal relationship leads to general laws or more accurately efficient causation 
leads to general laws. This is basically what Hempel is saying although his 
account is stated in terms of laws rather than causes. However, on reading 
Hempel it becomes clear that a causal relationship is essentially a law (Sapire 
1994). In the basic tenets of Hume's theory of knowledge, it is stated that an 
idea emerges from the repeated experience of one kind of thing followed by the 
experience of a thing of another kind, setting up a connection in thought 
between things of two kinds. He says that one thing as the cause of another can 
not result from thought alone but must emerge from the experience of contiguity 
between the two things (Stroud 1993:183). 
Hempel (1966:52) points out that some scientific explanations follow the 0-N 
pattern very closely, while others are expressed in an elliptical form that leaves 
out assumptions that are presupposed by the explanation because they are 
implied by the given context. Explanations of this type are sometimes stated in 
the form " 'E because c· where E is the event to be explained and C is some 
antecedent or concomitant event or state of affairs". The details of how slush on 
a sidewalk remains liquid despite the frost is given to illustrate this example. 
There is no explicit statement of the law regarding the fact that salt dissolved in 
water lowers its freezing point. It is however, assumed. 
Tl1G example demonstrates that corresponding genera! laws, presuppose that 
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there is always an explanatory statement, to the effect that a particular event of a 
certain kind G was caused by an event of another kind F. This raises thorny 
complexities regarding the notion of cause. However, the general maxim 'same 
cause same effect' can be applied to such explanatory statements and it yields 
the claim that whenever an event of kind F occurs it is accompanied by an event 
of kind G. 
In this sense then, an explanation that is grounded in general laws does not ask 
that its discovery requires the discovery of the laws. Rather, it may be in the 
discovery of some specific fact "which by virtue of antecedently general laws 
accounts for the explanandum phenomenon" (Hempel 1966:53), that some 
critical insight might be gained. 
In D-N explanations, the laws must have the same basic characteristic. They 
must be statements of universal form. Statements of this kind claim a uniform 
link between different empirical phenomena or between different features of an 
empirical phenomenon. They take the form that whenever and wherever 
conditions of a certain kind Ftake place, then specific conditions of a kind G will 
occur regularly and without exception. There are many examples in the natural 
sciences to demonstrate this, such as whenever a magnetic rod is broken, the 
pieces retain their magnetic qualities, or whenever a solid is dissolved in a 
liquid, the boiling point of the liquid is raised. In the natural sciences many of 
the laws are quantitative. There are explicit mathematical connections between 
different quantitative features of physical systems (pressure of gas, temperature) 
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or processes (time and distance in free fall). 
Hempel (1966:55) makes the point, that strictly speaking, there should be 
reasons to assume that a statement of universal form is true, for it to be 
considered a law. However, if this requirement were to be upheld, there would 
be laws such as Galileo's which would not retain their status as laws. In 
contemporary physical knowledge laws only hold to an approximate extent and 
within certain parameters. Hence the word 'law' is used here rather liberally. 
A scientific law then cannot be satisfactorily defined as a true statement of 
universal form. It therefore constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the distinguishing of universal laws. The question then arises as to how to 
discriminate between genuine laws and accidental generalisations? 
One difference is that a law can support counterfactual conditionals whereas an 
accidental generalisation cannot, and Hempel (1966 :56) uses this to make the 
distinction. A counterfactual conditional takes the form - if A were (or had been) 
the case, then B would be (or would have been) the case, when in fact A is not 
(or has not been) the case . An example would be to assume that if ice had 
been placed in boiling water it would have melted. A may not have been the 
case but it is supported by the law that ice is liquid above a certain temperature. 
In addition a law in contrast to an accidental generalisation can support a 
subjunctive conditional. This is a way of stating a connection between event A 
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and B so that there is a dependency of B upon A. Take the following two 
possibilities as a example: In the first, event A - the strike of a clock; event B -
father comes home from work. Every time the clock strikes father comes home 
from work. In contrast take the second : event A - Every time I drop a glass, 
event B - it breaks. 
In the first there is no causal connection, while in the second there is very 
obviously, a causal connection. The subjunctive conditional can be used to 
express the second but not the first pair. The form is 'if - then'. There is also the 
possibility of a subjunctive negative - if A had not occurred then B would not 
have occurred either. In a counterfactual conditional or a subjunctive 
conditional there will always be a causal connection. A similar notion can be 
discerned in the work of Hume (1975). Pondering the issue of cause in his 
theory of knowledge, he points out that there are three types of elements: a 
present impression connected with an item, some idea of an event related in 
time and finally the connection or inference. The connection concerns the 
constant conjunction of events and Hume calls the one cause and the other 
effect. 
Of particular interest to this discussion is that a universal law can serve as a 
basis for an explanation, whereas an accidental generalisation cannot. This is 
in accordance with the form of the D-N explanation, and with the Covering Law 
Model that has as its first element a universal generalisation or law statement. 
As already described, a statement of universal form can hold as a law if it can 
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support counterfactual and subjunctive statements about instances that may 
occur and might have in the past. However, there are instances where a 
statement of universal form may qualify as a law when there are no instances at 
all of occurrence. Under such circumstances recourse is made to theory: 
"A statement of universal form, whether empirically confirmed or as yet untested, will 
qualffy as a law if it is implied by an accepted theory" (Hempel 1966:58). 
Statements of this kind are known as theoretical laws and will be considered 
1ater in this chapter. 
1.2.3 Horton and the D-N Explanation 
In many of Horton's (1974) examples he attempts to show how an event a is 
explained by an event b. He often cites cases of illness - someone becomes 
sick, the illness is intractable and a diviner is consulted. The diviner attributes 
the sickness to an ancestor angered by the patient's lack of adequate concern 
for his kinsmen. The diviner prescribes appeasement of the ancestor by 
offerings and changes in behaviour of the patient in relation to his kinsmen. The 
patient is finally cured. 
As described above the laws necessary for the D-N explanation, that is, 
universal laws require a uniform connection between either different empirical 
phenomena or aspects of empirical phenomena. Such a statement takes the 
form that whenever or wherever conditions of a specific kind F occur, then so 
will and without exception, specific conditions of another kind G occur (Hempel 
1966:53). Could one deduce from Horton's example that whenever someone is 
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ill (an empirical phenomenon), then without exception there will always be an 
angry ancestor needing placation? The angry ancestor could be considered an 
intervening variable or for Horton a theoretical entity - something that intervenes 
between the empirical phenomena of illness on the one hand and the recovery 
from illness, on the other. We have in this instance some association between 
events, not a uniform connection, or the logical regularities required by Hempel 
(Kinoshita 1990:299). Equally if one were to attempt to paraphrase the 
argument it would not support either counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals 
and we would be left to the conclusion that what we have is an accidental 
generalisation and not a universal law. ( Personal entities exhibit the features of 
accidental generalisations and therefore cannot be considered to be laws). 
1.3 Probabilistic Explanations 
Hempel's first type of scientific explanation is deductive (D-N) as discussed 
above. He does however, recognise a second type of scientific explanation and 
that is the probabilistic explanation. 
In the D-N explanation the deductive inferences from the premise-set or 
explanans statements yield a conclusion that is true since it is logically implied 
from the premises. The laws are, in this instance, laws of universal form. 
In the probabilistic form, the explanans implies the explanandum, not with 
'deductive certainty' but with near certainty or with high probability (Hempel 
1966: 58). The law of probabilistic form provides an inductive explanation. It 
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demonstrates that on the basis of the information contained in the explanans, 
the explanandum will be expected with high probability or 'practical certainty'. 
The distinction between laws of universal form and laws of probabilistic form is 
not: 
'1he strength of the evidential support ... but the form which reflects the logical character of 
the claim they make" (Hempel 1966:66) . 
A law of universal form states that in all cases where conditions of kind Fare 
present, conditions of kind G are present as well, while a law of probabilistic 
form contends that under certain conditions, a certain kind of outcome will 
occur in a defined percentage of cases. Therefore, irrespective of whether 
outcomes are true or false, well or poorly supported, laws of universal form and 
laws of probabilistic form are of a logically different character. 
Central to any conception of probability is the notion of relative frequency and 
the probabilities referred to in probabilistic laws denote relative frequencies 
(Hempel 1966:62). There is a lot more that could be said about scientific 
hypotheses in the form of statistical probability statements and observed 
frequencies, but this has little relevance for the work at hand because Horton 
does not refer to the notion of relative frequency or make use of statistical 
methodology. 
However, it could be said that the probability that the explanans accords the 
explanandum, in certain instances characterises a "relation between sentences 
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not between (kinds of) events" (Hempel 1966: 67). For example in the case of 
exposure to a virus there is a high probability of contracting the virus, but not all 
people exposed to it succumb. Here probability could be expressed in statistical 
terms but in this instance it could be said to refer to the rational credibility of the 
explanandum, in relation to the content of the explanans. Since it is construed 
as a probability it reflects a logical or inductive probability and attributes more or 
less strong backing for the event under scrutiny. 
Therefore it is possible to distinguish deductive-nomological explanations from 
probabilistic ones in so far as the former result in a deductive subsumption 
under laws of universal form, while the latter effect an inductive subsumption 
under the laws of probabilistic form (Hempel 1966:68). 
It is important to note that a probabilistic account, because it is inductive, 'does 
not explain the occurrence of an event, since the explanans does not logically 
preclude its non-occurrence' (Hempel 1966:68). Despite this, probabilistic laws 
and theories are increasingly found in science, and Hempel says that accounts 
based on these principles do in fact yield explanations even though they are 
not as tight as those realised by the D-N form. They are accounts expressed 
as explanations 'only' with high associated probability but they do constitute 
explanations of an acceptable kind for science. 
1.3.1 Horton and the Probabilistic Explanation 
Horton (1974) does not provide examples of explanation of the probabilistic 
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type in African traditional thought. In fact in his section on differences he 
indicates why probability explanations do not occur in traditional thought. He 
introduces the notion of 'open' and 'closed' predicaments, and says that the key 
difference between traditional and Western cultures is the capacity for an 
awareness of alternative ways of seeing the world, and an absence of 
questioning of established theoretical tenets. If an ill person does not get better 
despite the intervention of a diviner, Horton (1974 :163) says that: 
" the client never takes his repeated failures as evidence against the existence of the 
various spiritual beings named as responsible for his plight, or as evidence against the 
possibility of making contact with such beings ... nor do the members of the wider 
community ... try to keep track of the proportion of success or failures in the remedial 
actions based on the beliefs, with the aim of questioning the beliefs". 
The concept of 'closed' and 'open' predicaments will receive further 
consideration in chapter four. At this point in the absence of considering 
outcomes in terms of numbers of successes as opposed to numbers of failures, 
and the absolute validity of accepted beliefs any possibility of probabilistic 
explanations in African traditional thought is precluded. 
When an explanation is tendered, two types of questions about the explanation 
can be asked and according to Taylor (1970:19) they must be kept separate: 
- is it an explanation? The Covering Law Model proffers an answer to this and 
what it explains constitutes a valid argument. Another way of putting this is to 
say that if e is an explanation of something h, then only h may be deduced by 
valid argument from e; it does no~ say that the statements that make up e are 
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true. 
- is it the correct explanation? A valid argument may contain false propositions 
so that it becomes important to establish the truth of the statements making up 
the explanation. It is this that determines whether. or not, the explanation is 
correct. 
1.4 The Confirmation of Scientific Explanation 
In order to determine the correctness of an explanation the truth of the universal 
generalisation must be established, or the truth of statements about specific 
situations is required. While there may be some difficulty in establishing facts 
about the happening of a specific event and the circumstances in which it 
happens, it is not theoretically impossible to do so. In the case of universal 
generalisations however, it is logically impossible to do this, because of the 
infinitely large classes of events or things that are involved. It is not possible to 
assert a proposition that "all leopards are spotted" is true, because it is always 
possible that in some place at some time a striped leopard may be discovered. 
Despite the impossibility of establishing the truth of a universal generalisation, 
it is possible to test it, not by proving it true, but by attempting to falsify it. If a 
universal generalisation survives repeated attempts at falsification, a certain 
confidence in the generalisation begins to emerge (Taylor 1970:24). 
" Underlying Hempel's work on explanation are the following two central ideas: first, 
explanation or scientific understanding is not merely a matter of intellectual satisfaction 
but must have an objective, testable basis: second, this testability condition is to be 
implemented by the requirement that an acceptable explanation must show that the 
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occurrence of the phenomena to be explained can be rationally expected on the basis of 
the information contained in explanatory premises" (Kim 1993:172) . 
As is clear from the quotation above, for Hempel (1966:46-7) scientific 
explanations must satisfy two systematic requirements: 
i. the requirement of explanatory relevance and 
ii. the requirement of testability. 
The requirement of explanatory relevance is met when the phenomenon in 
question is to be expected under the circumstances specified in the physical 
description. Hempel (1966:48) uses the phenomenon of a rainbow to 
demonstrate this principle. The explanatory information contained in the optical 
laws of reflection and refraction, suggest that whenever a spray of water is 
caught in a strong white light in a particular relation to an observer, a rainbow 
will appear. Even if you had never seen a rainbow, the explanatory information 
given in the physical account would provide good grounds for anticipating or 
believing that a rainbow would appear if those conditions occurred. This 
explanation would then meet the requirement of explanatory relevance. The 
notion of explanatory relevance is however, only a necessary condition for an 
acceptable explanation and is not sufficient. 
This brings us to the second requirement for scientific explanation, namely the 
requirement of testability, which demands that the statements constituting a 
scientific explanation must he capable of empirical test. To illustrate Hempel 
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(1966:49) proposes that gravitational attraction is a natural tendency much 
like love. For Hempel there is no empirical substance in this statement and 
therefore there is no basis for expecting the characteristic phenomena of 
gravitational attraction. The account lacks objective explanatory power, and in 
fact abandons any attempt at explanation at all. The statements accounting for 
the rainbow explanation, on the other hand, have various implications for 
testing, such as the conditions under which a rainbow will be seen in the sky, 
the appearance and order of the colours, as well as similarities and differences 
in rainbow phenomena in the spray of a breaking wave or the mist of a lawn 
sprinkler. 
0-N explanations very powerfully satisfy the requirement of explanatory 
relevance: the premise-set of information implies the explanandum deductively, 
and the explanandum phenomenon is to be expected because logically 
conclusive grounds are provided. They also meet the testability requirement 
since the explanans demonstrates among other things, that under the particular 
conditions, the explanandum phenomenon occurs. 
As mentioned previously, probabilistic explanations, being inductive in 
character, afford less stringent explanations than the 0-N explanation but they 
do meet the requirements of explanatory relevance and they lend themselves to 
testability (Hempel 1966:68). 
Before taking a closer look at the process of scientific inquiry, with its notions of 
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hypothesis building, testing, confirmation and establishment of theory, as 
propounded by Hempel and then compared with Horton, what explanations 
will be considered. 
2. What Explanations 
There are what explanations that merely say what something is, like this is an 
item used in a religious ceremony. However, these what explanations are not 
necessarily identifiable by the verbal form of the question that they answer. It is 
not the specific syntax of what questions that is the focus - words like why, who 
or how may also introduce the question (Kinoshita 1990:300). The focus is 
rather on what they do and whether they qualify as scientific explanations 
(Taylor 1970:33). 
As mentioned previously a good deal of scientific inquiry devotes itself to 
developing general theories and then applying them to specific events, and as 
will be elaborated later, many formulations of scientific theory are characterised 
in terms of the behaviour of theoretical entities. If a what explanation is applied 
to a particular event, it is necessary to redescribe what was observed when the 
event took place using the terms of the theory. For example to explain 'the 
behaviour of gases in terms of the kinetic theory, it is necessary first to 
redescribe the gases as collections of molecules' (Taylor 1970:33). Explanation 
in this manner serves as a preliminary to a scientific explanation. 
In explaining what is actually going on in relation to an event, an even closer 
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approximation to a scientific explanation is achieved. You'll recall that a 
scientific explanation arises out of a deduction from premises that consist of 
universal generalisations and statements of antecedent conditions. It is 
possible to give an explanation of what is going on, which may refer to such 
generalisations and statement of circumstances. An example would be 'the 
electrical current is breaking the water down into hydrogen and oxygen'. This is 
considered to be a scientific explanation that is simply an elliptical explanation 
of events. 
The extent to which a what explanation is related to a scientific explanation is a 
matter of whether or not and how far the redescription makes use of terms 
acceptable to a scientific theory. When the what explanation attempts to explain 
what is going on, the extent to which it is related to a scientific explanation is a 
matter of relationships which are expressed in the universal generalisations of 
that theory. This does not necessarily mean that no what explanation can be 
related to a scientific explanation unless there is already a well-formulated 
theory in the field. If some hundred years ago a man asked what was going on 
in a chemical reaction and was told that a large number of small particles were 
being reorganised, he would have been given something close to a scientific 
what explanation. 
"However, to be equivalent to a scientific explanation an explanation of what is going on 
must either contain an elliptical reference to some known universal generalisation or imply 
the truth of some such generalisation. so as to allow its reformulation according to the 
covering law model. To say that a particular what-explanation is related to a scientific 
explanation is to say that it redescribes something or some event in terms which can be 
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employed in an explanation conforming to the covering law model" (Taylor 1970:3 4). 
Decisions as to whether or not a what explanation is equivalent to a scientific 
explanation, or related to a scientific explanation, are difficult to make. Certainly 
there are a great many what explanations whose explanatory character 
precludes the possibility of either reformulating them as, or of relating them to 
scientific explanations. 
Taylor (1970:35) says there are instances where an object or event appears to 
be an x but also has properties that are not compatible with being an x; there 
are instances in which something could be one of a number of things but it can 
not be identified specifically from the available evidence. From this it becomes 
clear that what explanations can be used to serve different functions: 
i) what explanations for the purpose of satisfying theoretical or scientific interest. 
Such explanations involve rediscriptions in terms which link the object or event 
to scientific laws from which the behaviour of the object or the event might be 
deduced, and future behaviour or events predicted. Such explanations may or 
may not have consequences for those who receive the explanation. 
ii) what explanations which provide information to satisfy our curiosity and 
which may affect practical decisions in ordinary life. 
In Horton's thinking, in African traditional thought the explanation for the 
question for what is going on when a tribe suffers a drought could take the form 
of attributing the cause of the drought to some form of retribution on ttie part of 
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annoyed ancestors for the anti-social behaviour of the tribe. This would be an 
acceptable example from his field work with the Kalabari where the ancestors 
are presumed to represent the forces underlying the life and strength of the 
descendants, bringing misfortune to those who betray the values of the line and 
favour to those who align with them. Horton appears to take descriptions of 
what is happening and gives them the status of scientific explanation. In the 
redescription and explication of links, he attempts to satisfy the requirements for 
a scientific explanation. At best he may produce something related to a scientific 
explanation, but it is possible that the explanatory character has nothing to do 
with scientific explanation at all, but simply provides information that satisfies 
people's curiosity about the world and makes the world meaningful. 
It is possible that saying what something is can be explanatory, whether it is 
feasible or not to theorise or give scientific explanations. In the field of h.uman 
behaviour explanations of this sort may be acceptable. But the question 
remains open as to whether these explanations are of a scientific kind with all 
that this implies about the possibility of testing the explanations by deduction 
and prediction. The evidence at present seems to suggest that they are not 
scientific. Horton (1974) implies that all 'what' questions are scientific and by 
implication African traditional thought in answering a 'what' question such as: 
'what is wrong with my body' with 'your ancestors are angry' provides a valid 
scientific explanation because of the very fact that it takes the form of a what 
explanation. As the above discussion indicates, this is not the case. 
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In conclusion, there are different types of explanations but the criteria as to what 
constitutes scientific explanation are rigorous and stringent. At the same time 
one has to bear in mind that explanations can be formally successful yet dated. 
One might have asked a third century Alexandrean alchemist "what is this 
event?" and be told quite legitimately that it was a case of a certain substance 
being brought from a manifest state to an occult state. If the explanation was 
formally successful, then it still is formally successful in its context of the past, 
even if one rejects the ontology of substances (Kinishota 1990:305). 
3. The Process of Scientific Inquiry 
While the structure of explanation is the central theme of this chapter, the whole 
process of scientific inquiry from which scientific knowledge is established, 
needs to be discussed. How hypotheses are developed, tested, and confirmed 
(the observational terms) will be considered in this chapter. The expansion of 
these terms into theory will receive attention in chapter three. All these aspects 
are relevant for a comprehensive evaluation of Horton's thesis. 
3. 1 The Hypothesis 
Scientific inquiry requires the gathering of data or information, and a way of 
making links and sense of the information. If an explanation is to be found for a 
body of empirical findings then there must be an hypothesis about how the 
findings are connected. The hypothesis can be arrived at by inductive inference 
from the previously gathered information, but the question arises as to how to 
get from data to theory. Hempel (1966:14-5) points out that there are no 
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mechanical procedures of inference, nor general 'rules of induction'. 
Furthermore, that the terms in which scientific hypotheses and theories are 
formulated are not necessarily present in the description of the experimental 
findings on which they are based and which they attempt to explain. What is 
needed to make the transition from information to theory is what he calls 
'creative imagination'. 
"Scientific hypotheses and theories are not derived from observed facts, but invented in 
order to account for them. They constitute guesses at the connections that might obtain 
between the phenomena under study, at uniformities and patterns that might underlie 
their occurrence" (Hempel 1966:15). 
An echo of the methodology of Western science can be discerned in Horton's 
(1974) paper. He draws attention to uniformities that underlie events and by the 
process of induction he too arrives at a conception regarding the phenomena 
at hand. Horton claims that inductive inference is common sense: 
"Thus the principle tool of common sense is induction or putting two and two together, 
the process of inference so beloved of the positivist philosophers" (Horton 1974: 135). 
Horton therefore accepts the view that hypotheses are invented to account for 
observed facts but if an analysis of uniformities is to lead to an explanation of 
the phenomena under study, it has to be based on an hypothesis about how 
the phenomena are connected with empirical findings. Without this connection 
the endeavour does not serve the purposes of science. For Hempel (1966:18) 
this would leave us with. what he refers to as a pseudo hypothesis because it 
has no bearing on empirical phenomena. 
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While creativity and imagination are encouraged in science, in particular in the 
generation of scientific hypotheses (and there is no doubt about Horton's 
capacities at this level), scientific objectivity must be assured. This is achieved 
by the principle that hypotheses can only be accepted into the body of scientific 
knowledge if they pass a process of critical scrutiny that involves, amongst other 
procedures, careful observation followed by empirical testing (Hempel 
1966:16). In other words, scientific objectivity is ensured by the demand for an 
objective validation of the inventive speculations. 
"Scientific knowledge ... is arrived at not by applying some inductive inference procedure 
to antecedently collected data, but rather by what is often called 'the method of 
hypothesis', i.e. by inventing hypotheses as tentative answers to a problem under study 
and then subjecting these to empirical test" (Hempel 1966: 17). 
Horton shows how ordinary experiences of life in traditional African cultures 
can be attributed to spiritual agencies that operate behind these observed 
events. In developing his hypothesis about such spiritual agencies he shows 
how gods can operate just like the atoms, molecules and waves of Western 
science. There is again no doubt that these observations have been collected 
over time through careful inquiry and observation, but this is not the scrutiny of 
scientific empiricism in the Hempelian tradition. The regularities in the patterns 
of events that Horton describes do not constitute the logical explanatory 
hierarchy demanded by Hempel (Kinoshita 1990:301 ). 
3.2 The test of a hypothesis, its logic and its force 
The word 'hypothesis' in Hempel's (1966:19) sense refers to any statement 
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that is under test, no matter whether its purport is to describe some particular 
fact or event, or to articulate a general law or some more complex proposition. It 
seems fair to say then that since every scientific explanation is regarded as a 
hypothesis, it is regarded as acceptable only to the extent that there is evidence 
for it. It is this continual search for more evidence to decide the question that 
leaves the question of truth or falsehood open. The term 'evidence' refers to 
experience. 'Empirical' in science contends that the test of truth of its 
propositions is sense experience, and in this sense a scientific proposition must 
be amenable to testing by observation. It is this sensible evidence that is "the 
ultimate court of appeal in verifying scientific propositions" (Copi 1978: 461 ). 
An hypothesis in the normal course of events has test implications that are 
conditional in that they state that an outcome of a particular kind will occur 
under specified test conditions. The test implications are twofold. The 
implications are derived from the hypothesis, and they have the form of if- then 
sentences, which are called conditionals or material implications in logic 
fModens ponens). The test conditionals must be technically operationalisable, 
through bringing under control some factor that affects the particular 
phenomenon under scrutiny, according to the given hypothesis. There must be 
a basis for experimental test (Hempel 1966:20). In Western science hypotheses 
are mainly expressed in quantitative terms. In African traditional thought the 
attributes of personal theoretical entities are qualitative, not quantitative. 
According to Hempel (1966:21) experimentation in science is not only 
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employed as a method of test but also as part of a process of discovery. It is in 
relation to the second point that the requirement that certain factors be kept 
constant is critical. In the natural sciences many, though not all, hypotheses 
lend themselves to experimental testing. 
3.4 Auxiliary Hypotheses 
As already indicated an hypothesis is stated and from this, test implications are 
'derived' or 'inferred'. This statement though is only an approximation of the 
relationship between an hypothesis and the setting out of its test implications. 
There are instances when the derivation of test implications is clear and 
conclusive, but there are situations of greater complexity. The example Hempel 
(1966:22) gives is of childbed fever and contamination by infectious matter. 
The test implication is that if people making contact with the patients were to 
wash their hands in chlorinated lime, then there would be a reduction in 
mortality from childbed fever. It is clear that there is an additional idea here and 
this statement does not follow deductively from the hypothesis alone. There is a 
further premise in its derivation and that is that a chlorinated lime solution will 
destroy infectious matter to a greater extent than will be achieved by soap and 
water alone. This constitutes an auxiliary assumption or hypothesis and is a 
silent premise that is taken for granted. 
The above can be stated in this way: 
'~hat if hypothesis H is true then so must be the test implication I, but only ... if both H and 
the auxiliary hypothesis a:e true, then so will be I" (Hempel 1966:23). 
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In the testing of scientific hypotheses there is a reliance on auxiliary hypotheses 
more often than not, and in the event of unfavourable test results this reliance 
has an important consequence. If the test implications I are found to be false so 
is the hypothesis under investigation. There are no test implications in the 
construct of personal theoretical entities. 
"If H alone implies I, and if empirical findings show I to be false then H must also be 
qualified as false" (Hempel 1966:23). 
This ioiiows by ihe ililmius joiiens argumeni 
"1 both H and A (Aux H) are true, then so is I 
but (as the evidence shows) I is not true 
Hand A are both not true" (Hempel 1966:23). 
The auxiliary hypotheses are significant at many levels in testing. Take the 
example of Htested through a test implication, 'if C then E' which is arrived at 
through H and a number of A auxiliary hypotheses. The test then involves 
determining whether or not E does occur in the test situation where to the best 
of ability the experimenter has realised conditions C. This may not in fact be the 
case if, for example, there is a failure in the adequacy of test equipment both in 
terms of its reliability and sensitivity. Then E may not happen even if both Hand 
A are true. For this reason it is presupposed that all the auxiliary assumptions 
should include the supposition that the test arrangement satisfies the specified 
conditions C. 
This is of particular significance when the given hypothesis has stood up well 
in previous tests and is central to a larger system of interconnected hypotheses 
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that are also supported by other diverse evidence. In an instance like this it 
would be important to account for the non-occurrence of E by showing that 
some of the conditions C were not satisfied in the test. 
In understanding the test of an hypothesis, it is important to remember that there 
can be no incontrovertible proof of any body of empirical findings no matter 
how accurate or comprehensive. This holds particularly in those instances 
where recourse has to be made to general laws that imply some process that is 
not directly observable, as well as for phenomena that are more easily 
accessible to observation and measurement (Hempel 1966:29). 
3.5 Compatibility with previously well-established hypotheses 
Science seeks to achieve a system of explanatory hypotheses. They must be 
self consistent with no contradictory set of propositions. In fact, inconsistencies 
automatically prove the hypothesis wrong. In a conflict between two 
hypotheses, recourse is made to the observable to decide between them. The 
ultimate deciding factor would be our experience in the world, generally leading 
to the modification of the hypothesis. It can be seen from the above that African 
traditional thought would experience problems in terms of mediating a conflict 
between two different hypotheses and this would result in the adoption of ad 
hoc hypotheses in order to bolster tradition. 
3.6 Ad hoc hypotheses 
Auxiliary assumptions are often additional premises that can be used in 
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deriving test implications I from an hypothesis H. If the test result is negative, 
showing I to be false, then H or one of the auxiliary hypotheses must be false. A 
change must be made somewhere in the set of sentences if the test result is to 
be accommodated. In fact, states Hempel, (1966:28) it is almost always 
possible to hold on to H even if test results are negative if there is a willingness 
to revise the auxiliary hypotheses. But, he says, it is not in the interests of 
science to hold on to its hypothesis or theories at all costs. Again the mode of 
traditional thought would value the continuity of tradition above the quest for 
understanding. 
3. 7 Testability principle and empirical import 
To propose a statement or set of statements as a scientific hypothesis or theory 
necessitates an objective empirical test which is attainable at least in principle. 
In such a case, where no test implications can be formulated, an hypothesis 
would be considered to lack empirical import. Hempel (1966:30-1) gives the 
example of mutual gravitational attraction to explain love. The idea is that 
there are natural affinities underlying gravitational attraction that are related to 
love. However, it is not possible to derive any test implication from so 
insubstantial a claim. 
"No specific empirical findings of any kind are called for by this interpretation. No 
conceivable observations or experimental data can confirm or disconfirm it. In particular 
therefore it has no implications concerning gravitational phenomena. Consequently it 
cannot possibly explain those phenomena or render them intelligible ... " 
(Hempel 1966:31). 
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Therefore, Hempel (1966:31) continues that the question of whether such a 
claim is true or false makes no sense and that is why scientific inquiry cannot 
possibly decide this. Hempel calls this a psuedo-hypothesis, because it is an 
hypothesis in appearance only. In Kalabari religious thought there are three 
categories of spirits: ancestors, heroes and water-people, that underpin the life 
of the community. A conception that the water spirits are" the 'owners' of the 
creeks and swamps... the forces of nature.. the patrons of human 
individualism ... " (Horton 1974:150) has all the features of a psuedo-hypothesis, 
yielding little possibility of deriving test implications, or any conceivable 
observational or experimental data to confirm or disconfirm either their 
existence, or their function. 
For a proposed hypothesis to have empirical import, we have to question what 
auxiliary hypotheses are explicitly or tacitly presupposed in the given context 
and whether in conjunction with the latter, the given hypothesis yields test 
implications. The auxiliary hypotheses implicit in African thought are, according 
to Horton, in the form of their intention, that is, prediction, control and 
explanation. But of course there are no test implications so it is doubtful 
whether they would even qualify as auxiliary hypotheses in scientific terms. 
A scientific idea will often be introduced in an initial form that offers only limited 
and tenuous possibilities for test and on the basis of such initial tests it will 
gradually be given a more definite precise and diversely testable form. 
Testability is one of the features to which an acceptable hypothesis is expected 
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to conform. The primary distinguishing feature of a scientific hypothesis is that it 
is testable. This means that there must be the possibility of making observations 
that can confirm or disprove it. Some hypotheses are formulated in terms of 
unobservable entities, for example electrons and electromagnetic waves, of 
which Horton is well aware. It is here that he locates the similarity between 
African traditional thought and Western scientific thinking. Although both are 
unobservable, scientific entities are observable if even only indirectly. There 
must be some way of getting from unobservable entities to statements about 
directly observable entities. There has to be some connection between a 
scientific hypothesis and empirical data or facts of experience as in pointer 
readings or lines on a photographic plate. The connection between 
unobservable and observable entities cannot be in terms of belief or social 
connections as according to Horton, in order to qualify as scientific hypotheses. 
3.8 Criteria of confirmation and acceptability 
A favourable outcome of even very extensive and exacting tests cannot provide 
conclusive proof for an hypothesis, but only more or less strong evidential 
support or confirmation. In appraising what might be called scientific 
acceptability or credibility of an hypothesis, one of the most important factors to 
consider is the extent and the character of the relevant evidence available and 
the resulting strength of the support it gives the hypothesis. Relevant evidence 
might be construed as the familiarity of the context from which the model is 
derived. Yet again testing eliminates African traditional thought. 
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According to Hempel (1966:45) the definition of the aim of science is to 
produce: 
"A comprehensive body of sound empirical knowledge, represented by a well confirmed 
system of empirical statements and it is accordingly prepared to give up or modify 
whatever hypotheses ij may previously have accepted". 
In terms of Horton's view it is difficult to see how an hypothesis might be 
modified in fact, as there is no method or precedent to effect this. 
3.9 The probability of hypotheses 
The credibility of an hypothesis at a given time depends strictly speaking, on the 
relevant parts of the total scientific knowledge at the time. This would include all 
the evidence (relevant to the hypothesis) and all the hypotheses and theories 
then accepted that have any bearing upon it. The credibility of an hypothesis is 
relative to a given body of knowledge. The given body of knowledge in Horton's 
view would be context-dependent in that it is derived from a world of limited 
experience and limited exposure to scientific method. This in Horton's view 
validates African traditional thought as an explanation comparable with that of 
Western science. 
4. The Development of Theory 
4. 1 The Characterisation of Theory 
This section will start with the characterisation of theory, and be followed by the 
principles whereby theory is formulated. 
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The nature of a good scientific theory is difficult to define in precise terms. 
According to Salmon (1993b: 506) there are two primary views: 
'~he received view [that} theories are partially interpreted axiomatic systems ... {and} ... the 
semantic view, a theory is a collection of models". 
In the axiomatic method all propositions stem from a clearly specified set of 
initial assumptions. The theory contains symbols, rules of formation, definitions, 
axioms, rules of inference. Furthermore the theoretical systems developed are 
consistent and complete in the sense that they enable all the true propositions 
to be proved (Flanagan 1995:572). The semantic view involves models all of 
which involve some form of analogy between the model and either reality or 
some scientific claim. Theoretical models try to chart some aspect of reality and 
involve simplifying assumptions which are adapted or aborted depending on 
the model's predictive success. The semantic view holds that theories are 
families of models having relevance for particular empirical circumstances and 
not general systems applicable to an aspect of reality (Ruse 1995:583). 
Hempel's approach falls within the received or axiomatic view. The theory 
regarding this view states that when some degree of understanding has been 
achieved by the acceptance of empirical laws in an inquiry, the systematisation 
afforded by theory will extend that understanding. It permits, in its process of 
organisation, a unified account of events or happenings that are apparently 
disparate. If these phenomena can be linked to the same underlying 
processes, the diverse empirical uniformities they exhibit can be seen to 
repri3sent one common set of basic laws. Hempel (1966:75) shows how 
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Newton's theory of gravitation and motion can account for such different 
empirical regularities such as free fall, the simple pendulum, the motions of the 
moon, the planets, comets, double stars and artificial satellites as well as tides. 
Similarly in the kinetic theory of gases, explanations for a diversity of empirically 
established regularities are presented, and considered as macroscopic 
indicators of statistical regularities in the underlying molecular and atomic 
structure. 
In Hempel the echo of Horton's proposition of the quest for unity underlying 
apparent diversity, for simplicity, order and regularity, and the search for forces 
operating 'behind' the world of common sense, is evident. For Western science, 
these structures if not observable are at least potentially observable and 
grounded in systems of other observations. While there are aspects of Horton's 
view that are covered by both axiomatic and semantic views of theory in 
Western science, it is difficult to see how the theoretical entities of African 
traditional thought are linked to observables in the world. 
Suggesting that common sense and theory have complementary roles in 
everyday life, Horton (197 4:142-3) describes the Kalabari view of disease. At 
some point the traditional doctor introduces the influence of spiritual agencies 
in the process of the disease. Horton says: 
"What we are describing here is generally referred to as a jump from common sense to 
mystical thinking ... it is also, more significantly, a jump from common sense to theory. And 
here, as in Europe, the jump occurs at the point where the limited causal vision of 
common sense curtails its usefulness in dealing with the situation in hand" (Horton 
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1974:142-3). 
Consider how Horton uses the word 'jump'. Horton uses the language of the 
natural sciences. It appears at first as if there is common ground with scientific 
thinking, but on closer inspection, Horton's use is confusing. Horton seems to 
jump between different levels of theory and fails to show the link between 
levels. Hempel uses the word 'jump' to mean the movement of an electron in 
relation to the measurable phenomenon of light - linking internal and bridge 
principles. The wholP. notion of induction and the method of generation of an 
hypothesis described earlier is condensed in Hempel's word 'jump". 
In his most recent work, Hempel (Kim 1993:171) arrives at this important holistic 
view: 
"whole scientific theories must be taken as the ultimate units of cognitive significance, 
and it is only when a theory is taken together with its 'interpretive statements' (i.e. a set of 
statements in which both the 'theoretical' and ·observational' terms occur) that one can 
meaningfully speak of its empirical content". 
In the process of extending understanding, a theory often demonstrates that the 
previously established empirical laws that it organises, hold approximately and 
only within certain boundaries of applicability. 
A good theory can also extend knowledge and understanding by predicting 
and explaining phenomena that were unknown when the theory was 
formulated. Horton does concede that African traditional thought cannot 
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compete with the predictive success of Western science. 
Predictive success will strengthen confidence in a theory and give insight 
beyond the empirical laws. Therefore a scientifically adequate explanation of a 
class of empirical phenomena can only be understood by way of an 
appropriate theory. The directly observable world is explained by way of laws 
stated in terms of observables and is limited. These laws can, therefore, only 
hold approximately: 
" ... whereas by theoretical recourse to entities and events under the familiar suriace, a 
much more comprehensive and exact account can be achieved" (Hempel 1966: 77). 
From the above it is clear that central to the formulation of theory in Western 
science is the concept of theoretical entities and their relation to the world. This 
will be the focus of the next section. 
4.2 The formulation of theory 
Hempel (1966:72) says that there are two types of principles required for the 
formulation of theory: 
i. internal principles which represent the basic entities and processes 
organised by the theory and the laws to which they are presumed to 
correspond. Jn the kinetic theory of gases then, the internal principles 
distinguish the 'microphenomena' at the molecular level and attempt to state the 
Jaws that govern them. 
ii. bridge principles which show the relationship tletween the processes 
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incorporated by the theory and the known empirical phenomena and how the 
theory may then explain, predict or 'retrodict' these relationships. In the kinetic 
theory of gases, the bridge principles link specific features of the 
microphenomena with the corresponding 'macroscopic' characteristics of gas. 
For Hempel, bridge principles connect certain theoretically assumed entities not 
directly observable or measurable. Examples are molecules, their masses, 
momenta and energies, with aspects that are more or less directly observable 
or measurable. Of course bridge principles are not always involved with 
theoretical entities that are unobservable and empirical phenomena that are 
observable. They can link entities that are characterized in terms of previously 
established theories and their observation or measurement may be based on 
presuppositions from the principles of those theories. 
Without bridge principles, theory would have no explanatory power nor would it 
be subject to test. The internal principles of a theory focus on the specific 
entities and processes assumed by the theory. They will be expressed in terms 
of theoretical concepts which refer to those entities and processes. However, 
the implications that allow those theoretical principles to be tested must be 
expressed in terms of objects or happenings which are antecedently known, 
and for which there are methods of observation, measurement and description. 
Therefore, while the internal principles of a theory are framed in its 
characteristic 'theoretical terms', the test implications must be defined in terms 
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which are antecedently understood in that they have been introduced prior to 
the theory and are independent of it. They are sometimes known as 
'antecedently available' or 'pretheoretical terms'. In order to derive such test 
implications from the internal principles of the theory, other premises that 
establish links between the two sets of concepts are necessary. This is 
achieved by way of relevant bridge principles ('connecting for example the 
energy released in an electron jump with the wavelength of the light that is 
emitted as a result') (Hempel 1966:75). Without bridge principles, the internal 
principles of a theory alone could not generate test implications and would 
violate the requirements of testability. 
A good scientific theory must yield to considerations such as confirmation and 
acceptability as discussed earlier, in relation to scientific hypotheses. Complex 
criteria determine whether explanations hold. The next chapter will deal further 
with the status of explanation and the justification and verification of theories. 
4.3 The identity of the theoretical entity 
As already discussed according to Horton (1974) the major difference between 
Western science and African traditional thought is that traditional thought is 
described in terms of personal entities while scientific theory is couched in 
impersonal terms. 
These personal or impersonal worlds of common-sense things, are organised 
into theoretical schemes for the purposes of achieving causal understanding 
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that surpasses common sense. The theoretical schemes comprise theoretical 
entities that are unobservable and have properties that are invisible. 
"In a theoretical identity, one term apparently refers to an observable entity or property, 
whilst the other term apparently refers to a theoretical entity or property - ie. one which is 
either unobservable in principle or observable only indirectly and which stands in an 
explanatory relation to what is observable" (Horton 1993: 261). 
In African traditional thought such entities would comprise ancestors, spirits and 
their various human-like and superhuman potencies, while in science they 
would consist of atoms, electrons, energy and such like. In the section entitled 
paradox and explanation in African religion, Horton (1993 :248) claims that 
spirit and divinity stand in an explanatory relationship to the phenomena and 
entities which are asymmetrically defined with them. This to Horton is an 
inescapable by-product of the explanatory quest. Spirit has attributes like 
personality which the rain lacks, yet they claim that rain is spirit. Like science, 
he goes on to say, there seems to be an irreducible element of obscurity that is 
central to the explanatory quest. 
"For the explanation to be a satisfying one, the explanans must be seen as something 
other than the explanandum. Yet on the other hand, application of what is known about 
the behaviour of the explanans to the explanation and prediction of observable 
phenomena would seem to require identification of the latter with the former. In other 
words, the puzzles associated with 'rain is Spirit' are particular examples of the puzzles 
associated with explanatory statements generally" (Horton 1993:284). 
In Hempel's view {1966:79), as alrecidy discussed, the only two possible 
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accounts of the relationship between the explanans and the explanandum is 
characterised either by a probabilistic inductive argument or a deductive-
nomological one. 
Horton (1966:53) says "it is the right attitude that we call science". He is 
concerned with purpose and function, with making sense of the world and 
creating meaning. While Horton does make reference to the notion of cause, it 
is not cause as used in the scientific sense which aims to extend understanding 
of the world and to make predictions. 
4.4 The status of theoretical entities. 
The natural sciences have achieved some of their most profound insights 
through the conceptualisation of structures, forces and processes underlying 
the known empirical objects of the world. Hempel (1966:77-8) points out that 
there are thinkers who consequently consider that these underpinning entities 
are the real elements of the world, but he finds their argument unsustainable. It 
is not the purpose of explanation to explain away events or happenings, as if 
the phenomena of ordinary experience are not 'really there'. This raises the 
whole question of reality and existence and debates concerning realism, which 
will be discussed in chapter three. 
The antithetical view is one that maintains that theoretical entities or theoretical 
assumptions about such entities, cannot exist. The three different forms of this 
argument are as follows: 
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i. The first form contends that all components of theory, including the new 
concepts used in its development, must be subject to clear and objective 
definition. An examination of the links between new theoretical entities and their 
precursors often indicates that such definition may not be possible. In this form: 
"its principles which purport to speak about certain theoretical entities .. are neither true or 
false; at best ... form a convenient and effective symbolic apparatus for inferring certain 
empirical phenomena ... from others" (Hempel 1966:79). 
The demand for full definition here, is the demand for operationalisation of 
definitions and Hempel thinks that this is an 'overly stringent' demand. Clear 
and rigorous use of a concept is possible where only partial precision of 
meaning, rather than a full definition, has been achieved. For Hempel, bridge 
principles of a theory stated in terms of antecedently understood ideas provide 
the partial criteria for theoretical entities. This notion, he says, puts paid to the 
contention that theoretical concepts are 'mere symbolic computation devices' 
(Hempel 1966:80) which was the idea put forward by the Logical Positivists in a 
stringent test of verification. 
ii. In principle many different laws and theories can account for a body of 
empirical findings however, heterogeneous. At the level of laws, there are any 
number of experimentally established pairs of values for 'independent' and 
'dependent' variables that can be described by tentative laws about their 
relationships. The same holds when it comes to alternative theories. If 'real 
existence' is attributed to the hypothetical entities that characterise theory, then 
it must be granted to the rather different entities characterising the other theory. 
The conclusion then can only be that the entities cannot be held to exist in 
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actuality. Hempel (1966:75) points out, however, that in science there are ways 
of determining verifiability of assumptions, through the testing of implications. 
He concurs that by a process of gradual elimination, it is possible to narrow 
down the alternative views, but it is unlikely that certainty, that a particular theory 
is true can be achieved. This, he says, regards all empirical knowledge and is 
not a failure of the concept of theoretical entities. 
iii.The 'facts' of the events that are encountered in everyday life are what 
scientific theory attempts to organise systematically and coherently. The 
explanatory assumptions should therefore only make reference to entities or 
processes that are potential facts, because they are potentially knowable by the 
senses. That which is outside the phenomena of everyday experience, cannot 
possibly refer to aspects of the physical world and cannot be more than 'useful 
formal devices' (Hempel 1966:81 ). In terms of this rigorous account, African 
traditional personal entities are not potential facts and do not refer to the 
physical world and can therefore be no more than a formal device. 
Hempel's argument is that science would be unable to generate explanatory 
laws if it were to confine itself only to the exploration of observables. There is 
evidence that science can formulate quantitatively specific and encompassing 
explanatory principles in terms of underlying entities such as molecules and 
atoms. If it can be done at this level, which Hempel says is hypothetical, then 
there is no reason to reject the idea of underlying entities at a theoretical level. 
Both levels have entities framed in terms of more or less observable events 
(and observable may be possible only through instrumentation, such as 
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electron microscopes) and are subject to the same tests of confirmation. The 
level encompassing underlying entities is hypothetical which means that it is 
tentative and provisional, more or less probable on the basis of available fact 
and relevant evidence. In African traditional thought, it would seem that 
theoretical entities used as they are to link observable events in the world of 
common sense (natural effects) with their antecedents, which Horton considers 
'natural causes', constitute an explanation that seems to appeal 'to tradition or 
popularity rather than evidence' (Copi 1978: 464). For Hempel (1966:82) in 
Western science, there is a: 
'gradual transition from the macroscopic objects of our everyday experience to bacteria, 
viruses, molecules, atoms and subatomic particles; and any line drawn to divide them into 
actual physical object and fictitious entities would be quite arbitrary'. 
4.5 Horton's view of theory 
This was discussed in chapter one. What is significant at this point is Horton's 
argument about personal theoretical entities, which unlike the impersonal 
theoretical entity of Western science cannot be located in bridge principles nor 
orientated within the scheme of the same class membership. The most current 
idea is that there are good reasons for conceding the reality of both common 
sense things and theoretical entities. Scientific realism claims that theoretical 
posits like electrons, force fields and quarks are as real as observable entities. 
The realist in any such area insists on the reality of the entities in question in the 
discourse and holds that these exist independent of our thinking about them 
(Petit 1993:420). Elements of idealism are refuted by Hempel (1966: 78) who 
says: 
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"It is neither the aim nor the effect of theoretical explanations to show that the familiar 
things and events of our everyday experience are not 'really there". 
Horton's aim is not to prove or disprove the existence of theoretical entities but 
rather to find the arena of discourse in English that can provide adequate 
instruments of translation - not just dictionary equivalents but an allocation of 
concepts and conceptual processes to their appropriate intellectual categories. 
The arena that provides this instrument of translation, Horton then suggests is 
associated with concepts of theoretical entities which evolve from primary 
theory. 
An important element of continuity between African traditional and Western 
thought is the presence of two distinct yet intimately complementary levels of 
thought and discourse. Originally Horton (1974:141) referred to them as 
'common sense, everyday' and the other as 'theoretical'. He has concluded that 
this formulation of the relationship between the two levels implies an antithesis 
which is false. The antithesis that Horton realised was that the concept of 
everyday material language i.e. common sense, was neither more nor less 
theoretical than his use of the term theoretical. In view of the need to 
differentiate between the two levels of discourse, he has substituted the terms 
Primary theory and Secondary theory. 
"Thus like other theoretical concepts, they were embedded in a usually implicit though 
intermittently explicit scheme of causal regularities, which in turn were shaped by a 
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particular pattern of human activ~ies and interests. It follows therefore, that I shall use the 
later terminology" (Horton 1993: 11 ). 
It is unclear whether by this Horton means that everything is purely a theoretical 
construct. There are certainly those thinkers for whom the only real elements of 
the world are the 'hidden' structures, forces or processes of theory (Hempel 
1966:77). If everything that exists is mind-dependent, then nothing can exist 
outside the mind. It is interesting in this context to note Horton's (1974:132) use 
cf the word 1apparent' in articulating his quest for explanatory theory - apparent 
diversity, apparent complexity, apparent disorder, apparent anomaly. Although 
Horton claims to be a realist this seems to be an apparent contradiction. 
More recently Horton (1993 ) has agreed that the events and the familiar things 
of everyday experience are really there, but he has not yet specified how they 
are to be explained. 
For both Hempel (1966: 70) and Horton (1974:132) theories play an important 
role in scientific explanation, but according to Hempel theories are introduced 
when a system of uniformities can be expressed as empirical laws. Then 
theories explain the uniformities to give a more exact understanding of the 
phenomena observed. 
"Theory construes phenomena as manifestations of entities and processes that lie 
behind or beneath them. These are governed by characteristic theoretical laws or 
principles by means of which the theory then explains the empirical uniformities that have 
been previous1y discovered and usually predicts 'new' regularities of similar kinds" 
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(Hempel 1966:70). 
According to Horton (1974:132): 
'1heory is constructed to demonstrate a limited number of kinds of entities or processes 
underlying the diversity of experience. These entities operating behind or within the 
world of common sense observation, must be of a limited number of kinds and their 
behaviour must be governed by a limited number of general principles". 
Horton seems to take the diversity of experience and to subject that to a process 
of categorisation that results in a reduced number of conglomerates, whose 
behaviour he then says is governed by certain principles. He does not speii out 
what the principles are, whereas Hempel insists on an accurate and empirical 
uniformity of theoretical laws and principles. In addition the principles are 
expected to yield the prediction of 'new' uniformities of a similar kind. 
An example of this is given by Hempel (1966: 71) as follows: 
"The kinetic theory of gases offers explanations for a wide variety of empirically 
established regularities by construing them as macroscopic manifestations of statistical 
regularities in underlying molecular and atomic phenomena ". 
According to Hempel's view of scientific explanation, the basic entities and 
processes posited by the theory, in addition to the laws assumed to govern 
them, must be specified with appropriate clarity and precision in order to count 
as scientific. African traditional thought, contrary to Horton's view, does not 
lead to prediction as the uniformity of the scientific laws does. Without clarity 
and precision insight may be conveyed in an intuitive sense, but this alone, 
does not qualify it as a scientific theory. To qualify the underlying processes 
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must be sufficiently definite to permit specific postulates concerning the 
phenomena that the theory is attempting to explain. According to Horton, 
African traditional thought displays the same features or structure of a scheme 
of entities or forces operating 'behind or 'within' the world of common sense 
observation. 
Both accounts invoke nonmaterial agencies. In Horton's case they are personal 
entities, and in Hempel's, impersonal entities. But in Hempel's case a theory 
includes specific assumptions expressed as laws which in turn determine 
previously observed uniformities as in the example he gives of Newtonian 
theory (Hempel 1966:72). Newton's theory includes specific assumptions, 
expressed in the law of gravitation and laws of motion, which determine (a) 
what gravitational forces each of a set of physical bodies of given masses and 
positions will exert upon others (b) what changes in their velocities and 
locations will be brought about by those forces. Horton's personal entities 
demonstrate no laws or uniformities "even though each category of beings has 
its appointed functions in relation to the world of observable happenings" 
(Horton 1974:133-134 ). He claims that the spiritual agencies at work behind 
observed events are regular in their behaviour. The problem is that personal 
entities by their very nature are conceived of as erratic. In so far as they are 
described in human or animal-like ways, they never constitute regularities as in 
science. 
It seems that for Horton, (1993) primary and secondary theories are 
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comparable with what Hempel interprets as hypothetical and theoretical 
constructs. Horton is ambiguous in his use of these two levels. He concedes 
that there is a problem in how the-world-as-described-in-primary-theoretical-
terms relates to the-world-as-described-in-secondary-theoretical-terms and he 
suggests that Western science too has failed to adequately link these levels. It is 
also apparent that in terms of the tenets of Western science, Horton fails to 
ground his theoretical constructs in either observables or assumptions 
antecedently established, and there are no implications for empirical testing. 
I shall discuss Horton's use of the neovitalistic doctrine and Hempel's basic 
objections to further illustrate the ideas above. 
The neovitalistic doctrine has at its centre the notion of entelechy - a vital 
principle presumed to direct processes in an organism towards completion, or 
the realisation of a certain end (Goldman & Bender 1995:434). The neovitalistic 
doctrine does not meet the requirements of an adequate scientific theory. This is 
not, as Hempel points out, because entelechies or vital forces are nonmaterial 
agencies. Gravitational force in Newtonian thought is also nonmaterial, but it 
yields implications from specific assumptions expressed in laws of gravitation 
and motion. Vital force does not. 
Horton's view of African traditional thought in its postulation of spiritual 
agencies, seems to encounter problems similar to the neovitalistic doctrine, in 
its bid to achieve scientific status. It seems that Horton fails to link the basic 
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entities and processes and the statements about them, to the phenomena of 
the empirical world. In Hempel's terms, Horton's examples are not compatible 
with internal and bridge principles necessary for theory construction. If Horton's 
notion of spiritual agencies as theoretical entities is analysed critically in terms 
of the principles of Western science, it becomes difficult to derive specific 
implications from the assumptions about the underlying processes, that permit 
empirical testability. This is also the case with entelechies in the neovitalistc 
doctrine. 
African traditional thought is a system of meaningful connections within a 
particular society whereas science is causal. The method of science is verifiable 
if only in principle whereas African traditional thought, though a valid form of 
argument, encounters insurmountable difficulties in this arena. Certainly 
according to Hempel's view of scientific explanation a valid account may be 
given in terms of occult forces accounting for the visible in terms of the invisible. 
However, on closer inspection of bridge principles which are the requirements 
that have to be met, the traditional argument is dated and this may be why 
Horton introduces the idea of the evolution of scientific thinking, starting with 
magic and evolving into science.' 
The stringent requirements for scientific method set traditional African thought 
and Western science apart. Perhaps this can be attributed to the level of 
modern scientific achievement. Science still lacks a general theory of 
'Problems of this idea of evolution are dealt with by JaNie and Agassi (1987) in an article entitled 'The 
Problem of the Rationaliiy of Magic' 
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acceptability. Horton answers the question of how African traditional thought 
accounts for the way things are in the world through schemes of personal 
entities in the form of gods and spirits. Horton postulates what lies behind 
existence but does not answer the question why. 
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Chapter Three 
The status of explanation in terms of formal and informal logic, the justification 
and or verification of theories and predictability. 
This chapter is concerned with the status of explanation in terms of formal and 
informal logic, the justification and/or verification of theories and the notion of 
predictability. It analyses the question whether all explanations may be 
considered logically equivalent. 
The Status of Explanation 
If difference for Horton (1974) is merely a difference in the idiom of the 
explanatory quest, then it might be understood that the two explanations, that of 
African traditional thought and that of Western science are essentially the same, 
differing only with regard to expression in terms of either personal or impersonal 
entities. 
The main difference between what constitutes an explanation of an event and of 
the psychological questions of the mind of the inquirer, is the logical and 
conceptual question of what constitutes an adequate explanation of the event. 
In general explanations are concerned with answering questions about the 
world and there are different ways these answers can be given. For example a 
narrative understanding, which is the most primitive form of explanation, allows 
one to make sense of the world by fitting events or phenomena into stories 
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(Morton 1995:853). The patterns that are revealed allow us to think that we have 
some grasp of why the events occurred. This is the genetic approach to the 
process through which knowledge is constituted and distinguished from the 
analytic approach which is concerned with definition. The purpose of theoretical 
definition is to: 
" Formulate a theoretically adequate or scientifically useful description of the object to 
which a term applies" (Copi 1978:140). 
There is a widespread claim that explanation operates within a context or 
background or web of belief or theory. This means that there is an ambiguity in 
explanation when it is decontextualised. 
By using vague terminology Horton attempts to blend properties of scientific 
explanation with those of African thought. He decontextualises African 
traditional thought and does not specify or define the terminology he employs. 
This results in a certain property of one object being confused with all the 
properties of another. For example the table is square and the swimming pool 
is square therefore the table is a swimming pool. 
Explanations help us to understand the world and make sense of it. The status 
of explanation is incumbent upon the underpinnings of the theory to which it 
belongs. There is a difference between the theory of African traditional thought 
and the theory of Western science regarding the nature of the particular 
knowledge claims which are empirically and scientifically construed (as Quine 
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& Lillian (1970) suggest] as opposed to the non-empirical view of metaphysics. 
However, Horton holds that: 
" between the logic of religious thought and the logic of scientific thought there is no 
abyss" (Durkheim cited by Horton 1993:71-2). 
Whether there is in fact an abyss between the logic of these two types of thought 
and whether this abyss can be formulated in terms of empirical versus non-
empirical views lends insight to the meaning of explanation. 
In determining the status of explanation, it is the task of philosophy to ask two 
different kinds of questions: the first concerns the logical structure of the 
explanation and its internal validity; the second concerns the factual truth of the 
explanation at both the level of its premises and conclusions, and its relation to 
external reality (Ryan 1970:25). Central to the first of these concerns is logic, 
while the second raises the notion of belief and ideas of justification and 
verification. 
1. The Logical Structure of an Explanation. 
The evaluation of any explanation considers factors such as consistency or 
coherence, truth or correspondence with facts, relevance or appropriateness, 
meaningfulness and various forms of verification and falsifiablity which form part 
of an evaluation in terms of truth and meaningfulness (Prinsloo 1994a). 
1. 1 Consistency 
Formal logic whether modern or traditional, is concerned with sound reasoning 
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and the rules that govern it. These rules provide principles for what constitutes 
proper inference (Hodges 1995:500, Taylor 1970:53). The notion of necessary 
and sufficient conditions provides formulations of conditional statements in 
addition. 
Mascio (1994:7) discusses Levy-Bruhl's theory of the pre-logical in which he 
says there are two systems of inference: Western inferential practice, reliant on 
'the naturalist view of material causality and ... supported by observation' is the 
conditional argument or modus ponens of logic in a formal sense. Non-Western 
inferential practice referred to as the 'primitive mind' (Mascio 1994:8) does not 
have sufficient observational support and introduces other factors considered 
unrelated into the explanation of phenomena of the world. Horton (1993:261-4) 
contends that these other phenomena are not unrelated but have the status of 
unobservable or theoretical entities as described in Western science.' 
Arguments which are in fact 'chains of reasoning' (Ryan 1970:24) are valid 
because of their form. A valid argument establishes its conclusion only 
conditionally; on the condition that its premises are correct (Copi 1978:3-5). 
It is clear that logical brilliance cannot compensate for errors of fact, and 
accuracy of fact cannot repair incoherent logic (Ryan 1970:26). What is 
1 Levy-Bruhl (Masolo 1994:8) recognised later in his work that he had made some errors of over-
generalisation in his views about societal ways of reasoning, and concluded that there was not a 
dichotomy of different logics in different cultures, but that two ways of thinking, or two forms of 
experience, both naturalistic and mystical could co-exist in the same culture. However, this does not imply 
that they are logically equivalent. 
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important is to distinguish between what is logically valid and what is factually 
true. Consistency is what makes an argument valid, validity is not concerned 
with truth. The issue really is how the parts of the argument relate to each other, 
how they cohere, and not how they relate to the world. 
Ryan (1970:33-4) concludes: 
"the rule for a valid syllogism (something posited, something else necessarily follows] is 
that: the contradictory of the conclusion is contradictory of the premises taken together. 
Whatever is inconsistent with the conclusion is inconsistent with the premises; and what 
this means is that the conclusion asserted is the only one which is consistent with the truth 
of the premises, so that it is logically improper to accept the premises and deny the 
conclusion". 
In order to apply this kind of argument it is crucial to have a set of statements 
where the logical structure conforms to that of a valid deductive argument, 
characterised by stringent constraints on relationships of consistency and 
inconsistency. Without these there would be no way to determine where 
mistakes occur (Ryan 1970:34-5). In the Covering Law Model of Explanation a 
conclusion follows logically from premises in a valid argument that the event 
which is to be explained occurred (Taylor 1970:19). This model provides a way 
of deciding whether or not something is an explanation but leaves open the 
question whether or not it is a correct or true explanation (an argument though 
valid may contain false propositions). Science seeks to achieve a system of 
explanatory hypotheses. They must be self-consistent with no contradictory set 
of propositions. In fact, inconsistencies automatically prove the hypothesis 
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wrong. This was discussed in chapter two. 
Horton (1993:56) lists five arguments concerning oral cultures posited by Neo-
Tylorian British social anthropologists. One of these is that oral cultures 'seldom 
form logically consistent systems. Hence ... 'a search for logical consistency is 
inappropriate'. Modern Western world views, Horton claims, also fail to cohere 
in a logically consistent way, especially in the arena of human behaviour. He 
concedes that striving for consistency is important but difficult to achieve. In his 
view it is the pervasive sense of the supreme being as the sustainer of 
everything material and spiritual that is the index of the search for consistency in 
African traditional thought (Horton 1993:57). Prinsloo (1994b) suggests that a 
statement like 'all men are mortal' may be said to transcend experience, in the 
sense that 'all men' expresses an infinite set. We are familiar with the mortality 
of numerous men. But the Kalabari claim that 'all men are underpinned by 
spiritual entities' (Horton 1974:142-144) has no links with common experience 
so there is no possibility of a general statement that can be inferred. 
In this context, Horton uses words like logical structure and consistency but he is 
not using the language of formal logic or exercising the precision necessary for 
such an endeavour. At best Horton could be said to be alluding to some of the 
assertions that would hold for informal logic. The natural quality of the language 
of African traditional thought, opens the possibility of access to the richness of 
the culture, to the personal attitudes and feelings that infiltrate and direct the 
chains of reasoning. If the concept of the supreme being is the ultimate 
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consistency integrating the apparent multiformity in African traditional life then 
is not disciplined formal logic but a religious theory. 
1.2 Truth 
We require a theory of truth to assess the plausibility of our thesis and to explain 
why we hold it. The explanatory demands on a theory of truth are that it must 
adhere to the requirement that 'when a proposition satisfies its conditions of 
proof (or verification) then it is regarded as true' (Horwich 1993:511 ). We take 
verification to indicate truth but a proposition may be true even if we are unable 
to prove it or conversely false even though we may have reason to believe it. 
So verification and truth may be correlated but are not necessarily the same 
thing. 
A rather simpler view of truth would be that the proposition that snow is white is 
true if and only if snow is white without further principles in the form: 
"X is true n and only if X has property P" [such as verifiability correspondence with reality 
and as a basis for action] (Horwich 1993:511). 
The problem is that the property 'P' specifies the truth . The simpler claim, 
namely the proposition that x is true if and only if x depends on whether it will 
explain central facts about truth. This equivalence schema means when two 
statements are linked by "if and only if" that each is the necessary and the 
sufficient condition for the other. This means that the two statements are 
equivalent and that they have exactly the same truth values. 
"If two statements are always true and always false together they have the same empirical 
meaning and when two things are neces'3arily co-occurrent, (that is, the one cannot 
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possibly ·occur without the other being present as well ), then they are the same thing" 
(Malherbe 1994:22). 
This approach deprives truth of metaphysical implications. If truth is inexplicable 
then the fact that X is true would be completely independent of us. We should 
have no reason to assume that the propositions we believe actually have this 
property so scepticism would be unavoidable. Moreover we cannot assume that 
X and X is true are equivalent, as equivalence holds by definition, given the 
account of true that is being employed . 
" If truth is defined by reference to a metaphysical or epistemological characteristic then 
the equivalence schema is thrown into doubt pending some demonstration that the truth 
predicate, in the sense assumed, will satisfy it" (Horwich 1993:514). 
If truth is defined in a way that it is independent of human practices, then in 
terms of this theory of truth, that is, in terms of equivalence, it will fail. Horton 
(1993) introduces the correspondence theory of truth with a view to showing that 
truth conditions are problematic both in science and in traditional thought. The 
correspondence theory of truth defines truth as a relationship of similarity 
holding between some representation of the world and the relevant part of the 
world itself (Malherbe 1994). However, we cannot get beyond our experience 
to a truly objective world, so whether a belief is true or not is beyond discovery. 
What is relevant though, is that the belief seeks correspondence in the world. 
African traditional thought is a belief system and Horton on the basis of 
equivalence would have to say that science too is a belief system of a similar 
type. 
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1.3 Relevance or appropriateness 
There are many different kinds of explanation applicable to different issues. 
Explanations differ in terms of the things they wish to explain, whether they are 
processes or action and so on. It is in these terms that one can ascertain which 
kind of explanation is appropriate. 
Horton has fixed on scientific explanation for both African traditional thought and 
science as he claims they both intend to predict, explain and control the world 
and therefore scientific explanation is appropriate to both theories. The question 
is however, whether that is really the intention of African traditional thought. It is 
also highly improbable that spiritual entities are offered in the African context as 
empirical explanations (Prinsloo 1994a). 
African traditional thought could be more appropriately clarified through 
teleological explanation as it contains a final cause and an encompassing 
concealed purpose for all occurrences which are considered appropriate for a 
religious explanation (Prinsloo1994a). Horton claims similarity between 
African traditional thought and science, but the introduction of personalised 
entities can only be examined in terms of certain beliefs, faith or spiritual 
experience. This raises the question whether faith in personalised entities and 
Western science can be bracketed together as Horton seems to imply. However, 
according to Hick (1983:65) 'a scientist's faith is merely preliminary: a phase en 
route to experimental verification when it may become tested knowledge'. The 
scientist's faith has value only in relation to subsequent verification. It is in the 
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generation of hypotheses that faith or creativity or imagination as mentioned in 
chapter two, play their part. Thereafter scientific objectivity must be assured. 
Faith in personalised entities entails a condition of permanence, one that 
precludes the possibility of verification in the scientific sense. 
African traditional thought has it that forces or entities underlie everyday 
appearances and are mystical. This is unlike an attempt to find a basic 
substance in materialism to account for phenomena in terms of a single 
substance because this substance is still material. This leads one to consider 
whether a more appropriate explanation might not be in terms of a religious type 
of argument which can be considered as faith. 
Traditional thought has often been interpreted as symbolic. If the explanations 
offered by this type of thought are considered symbolic, it would necessitate that 
the spirits function as symbols. For example the metaphor of ancestors could 
then be interpreted as good fortune. This is equivalent to Western usage of 
metaphor. However, the problem of accounting for the enactment of a magical 
rite for rain, which is an action undertaken to achieve this goal as a symbolic 
one, is that it is not considered symbolic by the person performing it. This leaves 
one with the problem of how to account for the magical rite. Symbolic 
explanation is therefore not an appropriate one however tempting it may be. 
1.4 Verification 
Traditional thought makes statements about schemes of entities comprising 
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ancestors and various spirits. Given that these kinds of statements provide one 
with no certainty as to an external reality, one might ask whether their 
propositions are nevertheless meaningful. On the grounds of the verifiability 
criterion of meaning, a proposition like "God exists in heaven" must first pass 
the test of being empirically verifiable. There seem to be no conditions which 
would reveal this proposition as true as there is no relevant observation which 
would show the proposition to be false. Since there is no conceivable way of 
verifying the proposition even in principle, it cannot in this view be considered 
a cognitively significant utterance. A proposition must at least be probable by 
reference to human experience. 
"If its truth or falsity makes no difference that could possibly be observed. the proposition 
is cognitively meaningless it does not embody a factual assertion" (Hick 1983:95 ). 
In line with this view, failing to make an experiential difference would result in 
the proposition being classified as cognitively meaningless. Horton's (1974, 
1993) view about both science and African thought reacting in different ways to 
the same set of facts is underpinned by his view that they are not contradictory 
assertions but rather an expression of differing idiom. However, the problem still 
remains, that the postulation of personalised entities unlike Western science, 
does not constitute assertions or even possible assertions about the world. We 
would rather speak of meaning as satisfying in an emotional sense, in this 
context. In contrast to this, in science verification consists in: 
"Finding that the postulate or theory is borne out by appeal to external tacts and tallies 
with them" (Hick 1983:65). 
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Religious faith cannot be objectively verified. It cannot provide us with any 
certainty as to its external reality. Horton (1974:142-144) with reference to the 
Kalabari tries to show that the identification of patterns (illness, absence of 
heroes) are logically the same as in science and that there is no difference 
between the empirical and the non-empirical. Prinsloo (1993:108) demonstrates 
that this is not true as the entities of African traditional thought become 
additional ideas that cannot be verified. In his view they may well be coherent 
ideas but the truth conditions are not satisfied. It is a peculiarity of Robin Horton 
that he does not regard the cognitive processes of African traditional thought as 
equivalent to the structure of explanation in Western religious thought rather 
than science. 
In clarifying their meaning, logical positivism divides statements into those of 
formal logic or science and others as motivational, emotive or poetical. The first 
are considered significant, while the latter, if they have any meaning at all, are 
not considered significant. 
"A sentence will be factually (i.e. not analytically) significant to a given person if and only if 
he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express: that is, if he knows 
what observations would lead him under certain conditions to accept the proposition as 
being true, or reject it as being false" (Ayer 1946:95). 
Accordingly it does not mean that the statements are false but rather they are 
literally 'without sense' The verification principle is based on two basic tenets: 
the analytic and synthetic propositions, and the criteria for determining when a 
proposition is cognitively meaningful. With regard to the distinction between 
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analytic and synthetic propositions we can consider two propositions: 
a) All husbands have heads (synthetic + empirical). This is like science and 
derives truth from empirical investigation. 
b) All husbands are married (analytic + meaning). This is like formal logic and 
derives truth from its formal structure. 
Both of these are true yet they are true in different ways. It is possible to imagine 
a husband without a head but it is impossible to conceive of a husband that is 
not married. To prove a) true would require an empirical investigation but to 
prove b) true we only have to understand the meaning of the word 'husband'. 
Propositions that require empirical investigation are termed synthetic while 
those whose truth follows from meaning, are called analytic. 
In line with this, every significant proposition must be either analytic or synthetic, 
but none can be both. Broadly, all analytic propositions belong to formal logic 
and they are true by virtue of their formal structure. Synthetic propositions are 
like the propositions of science in that they require empirical investigation 
before their truth can be established. Analytic propositions assert something of 
the subject that is obtained by analysis of the subject term. We therefore verify 
such propositions by examining the words they contain. Synthetic propositions 
result from a synthesis of two logically unrelated things. For example, my thesis 
is good. This can only be verified by empirical investigation to determine 
whether in fact this relationship is true (Ayer 1946:95, Carnap 1967). 
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A further distinction was drawn by the logical positivists namely that of the 
'trivial' and 'informative'. This distinction is important because analytic 
propositions do not refer to the world in the way in which synthetic propositions 
do. Analytic propositions are considered trivial whereas synthetic propositions 
are seen as informative. Although an analytic proposition appears to be 
addressing items in the world, those items make no claim on the world. The 
truth of an analytic proposition does not allow us to infer that the items 
mentioned by the terms in the proposition, exist. They are true merely by virtue 
of their logical form or by definition. From the analytic truth, for example 'all 
unicorns are unicorns', we cannot infer that there are in fact unicorns at all. 
However, a synthetic proposition 'this thesis is good', in some sense makes a 
claim about reality, and when true makes a definite claim. 
To establish whether a synthetic proposition which purports to be about the 
world is significant, a test known as the 'verifiability criterion of meaning', is 
introduced. A proposition which fails this test must be either analytic and hence 
not about the world, or without sense. This would apply to metaphysical 
statements. A proposition which passes the test would be deemed significant in 
a factual sense (Ayer 1946:95). 
All propositions which aim to express genuine knowledge about the world must 
pass the test of being empirically verifiable in terms of this view. The criteria for 
verifiability were formulated by Schlick and Ayer (Hanfling 1981 :40-42). 
Basically the notion is that it must be possible to describe what sorts of 
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observations have to be made, in order to determine whether a proposition is 
true or false. If some observation could be described which would be relevant 
in determining the truth or falsity of a proposition, then the proposition would be 
significant, if not it would be meaningless. There is a distinction between 
propositions which are verified and those which are verifiable, or between 
practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. The example "there is life on 
other planets" is in principle verifiable (we could go to other planets and check) 
whereas the statement "God lives in heaven" is not verifiable in principle. 
It is clear from the above that African traditional thought, as well as any other 
traditional thought would fall short of being considered authentic by the logical 
positivists in so far as the traditional thought relies on metaphysical 
propositions. The propositions of African traditional thought are not subject to 
confirmation because it is impossible to formulate an observation proposition by 
which the African traditional thought proposition can be tested. The propositions 
of African traditional thought are not verifiable in p;inciple either. The argument 
that explanation is religious in the case of African traditional thought means that 
it cannot be verified but is rather accepted as an article of faith. This does not 
necessarily mean that the argument is not rational as it may well be coherent or 
consistent. It would only mean that its truth is questionable (if we distinguish 
truth from faith). 
For Horton (1974:131-132), the same kind of explanation applies to both types 
of thinking, and the implication is, that they have the same status and that they 
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are logically equivalent. This means that the theory underpinning African 
traditional thought and Western science has to be considered to be the same. 
However, to the extent that our knowledge is coextensive with science, and the 
conditions of science are such that it's propositions are at least verifiable in 
principle, then there is no comparison on the grounds suggested by Horton. 
Quine and Liiiian (1970:4-5) reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements and thus the very enterprise of conceptual analysis, because it 
implies that knowledge is reliably produced and truth is arrived at independent 
of, and prior to scientific investigation, and that knowledge is a product of 
conceptual analysis (Kornblith 1993:299). Quine claims that the distinction can 
only be upheld if radical reduction is true. 
Quine and Liiiian (1970:21-31) apply the rules of formal logic to explore beliefs 
and their validity and truth. They use the idea of logical truths and suggest that 
all truths do in some part depend on the meaning of the words, but it would be 
inaccurate to attribute logical truth to a statement merely on the grounds of its 
language. Logical truth can be deduced from self-evident truths by a process 
of demonstrability which can either be absolute or relative. A sentence is 
considered to be logically true when it is an instance of a valid logical form. 
Masolo (1994:7-8) urges an approach to African thinking that breaks with 
Western categories. In his paper 'Excavating Africa in Western Discourse' he 
presents the views of a new school of thinkers in the study of African systems of 
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thought. They are difficult to classify but united at least, in their critique of 
ethnophilosophy which they consider a philosophy of Western imperialism 
emerging out of Western power and knowledge. As regards logic, he moves 
away from analytic approaches to understanding thought, and proposes the 
examination of thought as people employ it, in relation to their everyday lives. In 
a sense he emphasises connections of meaning rather than causal connections 
(Ryan 1970:129). This view raises problems as everyday and scientific 
knowledge is arrived at in the same way. In both cases some property of a 
material thing is being predicated and the discovery made through heuristic 
investigation. The claim is testable, capable of being confirmed or disproved 
and based on empirical evidence (Malherbe 1994:6). There is no abyss 
between an analytic approach to thought and the examination of thought people 
employ in their daily lives. 
When statements are used to explain phenomena, the implication is that they 
are true. The question here is how to assess the adequacy of reasons for truth 
and the link between statements and the facts or evidence from which they 
have been inferred. This brings us to the issues of belief and justification. 
2. Belief and Ideas of Justification 
For something to qualify for credibility there must be something about it which 
makes the truth of its conclusion objectively likely (Malherbe 1994:101 ). We 
cannot prove a belief by comparing it with naked reality as this is logically 
impossible. We can only select criteria which support the likelihood of truth in a 
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belief, and these criteria are the justification of the belief (Malherbe 1994:103). 
Although justification is truth-seeking, truth is not necessary nor sufficient to 
ensure justification. 
Explanation operates within a context, or background, or web of belief or 
theory. The background in African traditional thought is the various schemes of 
personal entities. If we take our criteria to be the realm of actual experience, 
Horton is reasoning beyond all possible experience as well as beyond the limits 
for which we have a guarantee that our rational faculties are reliable (Kant). He 
does this by illegitimately extending principles to questions that transcend all 
possible experience and he comes to conclusions about the necessary 
existence of personal theoretical entities. He constructs various arguments 
around the similarity of the two systems. However, he has ignored the limits of 
the application of reason (reason being defined in terms of possible experience) 
so dilemmas arise. Arguments that transcend possible experience present the 
problem of how one should establish standards for valid argumentation. If these 
standards cannot be established we have no way of determining whether we 
have successfully established truth. 
Even if there is no ultimate standard of agreement as to the ultimate basis for 
evaluating a fundamental truth as regards scientific knowledge, there does 
seem to be consensus as to probable evidence. This is so because the appeal 
is to public experience, experimental data and records (Malherbe 1994:123-4). 
The type of information contained in African thought can be established as 
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being personalised theoretical entities, but their truth value cannot be 
established. However, one thing is certain, personal theoretical entities are 
different from empirical knowledge and we cannot evaluate them in the same 
manner. One might argue that this is also true of the impersonal theoretical 
entities. There are a number of views on the existence or fictions of theoretical 
entities of Western science as discussed in chapter two. The entities in both 
African traditional thought and science share the common feature of being 
invisible, however the entities of science are at least potentially visible and may 
belong to a category of things that can be seen, for example the sequences and 
bases of a DNA- strand. 
For something to be considered an item of knowledge, stringent definition is 
needed. Knowledge in the analytic sense consists in justified true belief. In 
order to ascertain whether African traditional thought is an instance of justified 
true belief we would have to consider contextualism. Contextualism is 
described by Malherbe (1994:147) as fitting a cluster model 'in which the loci of 
justification are contexts definable in terms of a shared public language'. 
The theory of contextualism is the view that justification is the acceptability of a 
belief among people, and, that this acceptability is determined on the basis of 
conventionally agreed norms and practices and relative to some epistemic 
concept (Malherbe 1994:123). Contextualism denies the possibility of individual 
knowledge as a consequence. Contextualism ties belief to its consistency with 
a coherent whole - the belief system of the entire community, and it bestows on 
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this theory the power of explaining the objective reference of beliefs as a public 
reference. Justification of a belief will always be relative to some context where 
context is 'at least a complex of agent time and the values determined by the 
community for the issues being dealt with' (Malherbe 1994:123). Because it 
identifies the justification of a belief state with its social acceptability, it partially 
fails as justification is separate from the social properties or relations the 
believer or his belief may have. Furthermore it has no proof against the 'regress 
of justification' unless terminal beliefs are set in place by convention. This 
socially agreed-upon basic belief however, cannot be self-justifying and so by 
the regress argument will stand in need of justification. The only way around 
this impasse would be to specify a level of justification which is not 
intersubjectively agreed to as basic, but is independent of social conventions. 
(Malherbe 1994:124). The idea of a belief's justification being conceived of as 
'in it's place' within the whole set of a person's beliefs, means that the function 
of justification is to determine the consistency of a belief's relationship, to the 
person's other beliefs. 
Horton (197 4, 1993) may also be interpreted as implicitly arguing that theistic 
belief is very much like a scientific hypothesis. Theories devised to explain 
phenomena derive warrant from their success in explaining phenomena 
generating hypotheses and testing them, as described in chapter two. 
However, theistic beliefs are not hypotheses. Theistic beliefs, it may be argued, 
are not accepted because of their explanatory powers but rather upon the 
evidential relation of the theistic belief to the other things one believes 
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(Plantinga 1993:439). The nature of beliefs associated with theism may relate 
to some other kind of thinking or cognitive process, but is not aimed at truth. 
On these grounds it seems the explanation Horton is offering regarding the 
nature of African traditional thought as an explanation is not an explanation at 
all. 
Belief can be defined as a mental state and is determined both by its content 
and a variety of other conditions. Those views that focus exclusively on content 
see belief as an attitude paired with a proposition, and the objects of such 
beliefs can be anything from empirical beliefs concerning things in the material 
world, to religious beliefs about the existence of God. They could be moral, 
concerning right and wrong, or a priori and a posteriori, or a number of other 
kinds. Mental life involves other conditions such as desires, wishes, intentions, 
fears, doubts and hopes. Beliefs, however, are different in that they have, at 
some level, an implication of truth (Heil 1993:48, Malherbe 1994:123-4). By 
implication of truth, I mean that one would only say one believed something if 
one believed it to be true, even though it may later turn out to be false. 
Believing may also be defined as a latent disposition that can linger 
unobserved, a disposition to act in particular ways in response to certain 
conditions, according to Quine and Lillian (1970:4). They emphasise the 
importance of language in comprehending and expressing ideas. Their 
argument will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter. 
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In the light of the above, the term 'belief' as used here, will embrace certain 
essential features. All beliefs will be considered 'truth-directed, evidence-
sensitive, holistically-interrelated and action-related' (Leyden 1993:2). While all 
these characteristics are important, at this point, the issue of evidence and its 
implication for truth and ultimately knowledge, will be the focus. 
2. 1 Evidence, Truth and Knowledge 
The logical positivists make some attempts to describe the exact conditions for 
scientific knowledge. They initially suggested verifiability as an essential 
condition. One is justified in claiming to know x if x was verified. This created 
problems and verification gave way to a weaker condition, confirmation. This too 
is far from an ideal condition for scientific knowledge. The essential issue here, 
however, involves the construction of a strong enough link between hypothesis 
and the evidence, for it to allow the assertion that the hypothesis holds - in other 
words, to claim the hypothesis is knowledge. Basically the problem is how to 
decide that there is sufficient evidence. With Hume's problem of induction in 
mind, it appears that any amount of back-up, short of insisting on total evidence 
( all evidence, past, present and future) is arbitrary. To escape this problem 
recourse is made to truth conditions. In the absence of certainty, knowledge 
was considered to be justified true belief. Justified true beliefs are not 
necessarily knowledge (Lehrer 1993: 69, Luper-Foy 1993:235, Salmon 
1993b:292). 
This does however, raise other epistemological problems, most centrally that 
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there is a difference between knowledge and belief. If knowledge is 
conceptualised as certainty, and is abandoned for something less robust in a 
cognitive sense, the issue of whether we ever really have knowledge is 
permanently with us. As regards the philosophy of science in particular, in so 
far as the less cognitively demanding approach is accepted, the nature of 
scientific knowledge remains obscure and accretion of knowledge as the signal 
for the success of science, no longer holds. 
Despite this difficulty, science does produce explanations and what is important 
is the nature of these explanations - the central concern of this study. As already 
discussed, there are two reasons why philosophers pay attention to scientific 
explanations: they tell us about the workings of the world and this information 
permits the manipulation or control of the environment; and science is 
considered the best mechanism for generating the explanations required. The 
status of explanation is what can guarantee knowledge. Explanation is crucial 
and it becomes the bench-mark for the adequacy of scientific advancement. 
The significance of the concept of explanation in the philosophy of science has 
been evolutionary, and it is now considered the foundation of a theory of 
justification. The justification of a cognitive claim is no longer determined by 
whether the claim qualifies as knowledge or whether there is enough evidence 
to support it. What is important is the role it plays in explanation. In this sense a 
cognitive claim is justified if it produces an inference to the best explanation. 
(Sanford 1995 :408). 
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There is support for 'inference to the best explanation' to constitute a valid form 
of non-deductive reasoning (Fumerton 1993:207). It involves making inferences 
from evidence as inferences are non-demonstrative, in that the conclusions do 
not necessarily follow from the evidence. Because of the non-demonstrative 
element, induction includes inferences that are predictive and what have been 
termed, by Ginsberg 'default assumptions' (Harman 1993:200-2, 204). At the 
simplest level, default assumptions refer to assumptions that are based on 
generalisations, but could be incorrect. It is likely that the evidence in non-
demonstrative induction complies with a number of hypotheses or ideas, and a 
decision needs to be made as to the inference that constitutes the best 
explanation. Given the problems that inductive reasoning raises, this may be a 
way to minimise some of the inherent difficulties. If a cognitive claim produced 
an inference to the best explanation then this lends credibility to Horton's view 
of African traditional thought. An inference to the best explanation may be read 
in Horton's terms as an explanation that by historical accident evolved along the 
lines of schemes of personalised entities. If an explanation is given in cognitive 
terms, only with no recourse to empiricism, then any explanation could be 
considered an explanation as we would have no grounds for asking whether 
this constitutes an explanation, nor would it be possible to determine whether 
this was the correct explanation. Inference to the best explanation is also 
subjective as no objective criteria exist to determine what would constitute the 
'best' explanation. 
This decision-making process highlights the problem of scepticism, a chronic 
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issue in philosophic debate. For the purposes of this work, what is relevant is 
how a particular conclusion is justified and justification lies in the domain of 
non-scepticism, on the scepticism/non-scepticism axis. 
To return to the idea of inference to the best explanation, it seems necessary to 
spell out criteria for choosing between explanations in such a way that the 
outcome is not simply a disguised inductive inference. Simplicity is a virtue of 
explanation, and could stand as a criterion for determining the acceptability of 
the explanation. The explanatory power of an explanation is another criterion 
and familiarity is a further one. Horton considers all of these essential features 
of explanation. Of course the crucial ambiguity in the idea of inference to the 
best explanation concerns the fact that the explanation has the best chance of 
being correct, without it being probable that it is correct. To determine that an 
explanation is likely to be correct: 
"one must hold that it is more likely that it is true than that the disjunction of all other 
possible explanations is correct" (Fumerton 1993:208). 
To return to the concepts of belief and evidence and justification, it is clear that 
formalising the notion of evidential support is inordinately complex. It is less of a 
problem with relatively simple perceptual beliefs but becomes an issue with 
more complex and theoretical beliefs. However, theoretical systems are the 
concern of this study. In philosophy an internal state such as a belief, or the 
believed propositions themselves can constitute evidence, and the evidence for 
a belief confers justification. Only something that is itself justified can grant 
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justification to anything else (Feldman 1993:120). However, if a justified belief 
can only be inferred from another justified belief, there would have to be an 
infinite regress of justifications. Since this is not acceptable, there must be 
beliefs that are not reached by inference or essentially justified. Such beliefs 
would be considered basic or foundational in that they are the bedrock from 
which all other justified beliefs emerge (Post 1993:209). 
2.2 Foundationalism 
This brings us to the issue of foundationalism which is a theory that asserts that 
there are basic beliefs, that there must be basic, non-demonstrable knowledge, 
which is the ground for all further knowledge, and has been the concern of 
philosophy from the time of Aristotle (Post 1993:209). Justification insists on a 
link between the belief and the reasons or evidence for holding the belief. 
Foundational theories claim that there are a chain of reasons, one supporting 
another in a linear way, until an end point is reached which qualifies as a self 
justifying belief. This is a belief that the radical foundationalists hold to be 
absolutely certain, indubitable, infallible, and self evident, so that they can 
function as the ground for knowledge (Malherbe 1994:145). Obviously this is an 
almost impossible task and theories of coherentism and contextualism have 
been suggested as alternatives. 
Put simply, coherentism refutes the notion of basic beliefs and says that 
justification is a matter of the extent to which a belief 'coheres' with, or binds with 
other beliefs in the same arena. Coherence can be defined by consistency, 
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explanation, probability or 'comparative reasonableness' (Goldman & Bender 
1995: 434). While there are those who would consider coherentism as referring 
to a complex web of interrelationships among beliefs, there are those who see 
the reasoning as simply circular, and that it is difficult to demonstrate an 
objective link to the world (Malherbe 1994:146). Some may say that this is the 
problem with African traditional thought where happenings are phenomena 
construed in terms of the web of belief. 
To return to the notion of a basic belief, the question arises as to whether 
experience can be construed to be evidence for a basic belief. Traditional 
debates about knowledge of the external world, or knowledge about other 
minds, or knowledge as a function of induction, are all questions about the 
adequacy of evidential support (Feldman 1993:121 ). Recourse can be made to 
some of the tenets of the natural sciences, in particular to what is observable. 
Leyden (1993:104) makes reference to a distinction between simple 
observational beliefs and theoretical beliefs, and considers this crucial to 
making what are considered irrational beliefs intelligible. Since this work is 
concerned with African traditional thinking, long considered to be irrational, and 
more particularly with the status of theoretical entities, this distinction is 
essential. 
According to Leyden (1993:104) observational beliefs are: 
"generally true beliefs issuing out of our shared and universal, minimal, perceptual, 
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cognitive and linguistic capacities; they are not infallible, untheoretical, incorrigible or 
epistemologically-privileged, but they are nevertheless relatively simple, and invariant 
across cultures and throughout history" 
Theoretical beliefs are: 
"more complex .. and represent inference from or interpretations of, observational beliefs. 
While they approximate or aim at, truth, they can nevertheless have a fairly low, general 
truth-content. Theoretical beliefs can vary from individual to individual, culture to culture or 
epoch to epoch, but they are all related to universal, human goals of explaining, predicting 
and controlling the environment" (Leyden 1993:104). 
The work of Quine and Ullian (1970:17) contributes to this distinction through 
the development of their notion of 'observational sentences'. Central to their 
approach is how a belief may be articulated by enlisting a sentence as a 
subordinate clause. In other words, the belief can be expressed by a sentence 
form using the prefix that to introduce the name of the 'thing' believed - for 
example, the belief that Van Riebeek discovered the Cape. This however, leads 
to the implicit problem that the things believed are not the sentences 
themselves. The point is to discern, given a set of sentences about beliefs, what 
a speaker of the language believes to be true. Instead of trying to understand 
the verb 'believes' and relating that to sorts of believed things, Quine & Ullian 
(1970:4-5) suggest that one moves to the word pair 'believes true' as a way of 
relating people directly to sentences with the intention of finding out if what 
someone believes is true. 
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The criterion for determining that a belief is true, is that the speaker on 
questioning asserts that the belief is true. The criterion can of course fail if the 
speaker does not understand the language of the inquirer. In this way Quine 
and Ullian (1970:5) avoid the problem raised by philosophy as to what 
constitutes 'objects of belief'. 
In addition, they point out that causes of belief are not evidence of belief, and 
that the quest for evidence is different from the origins of the belief, the 
complexities of which lie in the domain of psychology. The concern of this study 
is: 
"with grounds, with reasons, with the evidential relations that hold among beliefs whether 
the believer recognizes them or not" (Quine & Ullian 1970:7). 
This approach applies mainly to the conception of beliefs as propositional 
attitudes, and views belief and meaning as 'indeterminate' and dependent on 
the particular linguistic context in which it is articulated (Heil 1993:46). The 
relationships between beliefs constitute a system that Quine and Ullian (1970) 
refer to as the web of belief which they consider a theory of meaning rather than 
empirical fact, as already mentioned. 
For Quine and Lillian (1970:13) the assessment of the system or web of beliefs 
is not unlike the explorations and predictions that characterise science and 
everyday thinking. It is possible that when predicted outcomes or events do not 
occur, a review of the system may reveal incompatibilities. Steps can then be 
taken to restore consistency by rejecting some of the beliefs. This is not 
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necessarily a simple procedure. As Quine and Lillian (1970:13,16) put it, 
'observations are the boundary conditions of a system of beliefs' and central to 
their approach is what they call 'observation sentences'. They demonstrate how 
through the acquisition of language in childhood, observation sentences are 
distinguished from other utterances. It is through a social convention that native 
speakers would agree to the meaning of a sentence in a similar situation. In 
other words, observation sentences are those sentences for which there is 
evidence, and their fallibility is limited because the words of an observation 
sentence are learned by association with 'the observable circumstances of their 
utterance' (Quine & Lillian 1970:17). However, the notion of observation 
sentences is more complex than described here. There are some philosophers 
who reserve the term for introspective reports such as 'I am in pain', an 
observation that is not open to public scrutiny and whose truth is not one to 
which a variety of witnesses attest. 
Quine and Lillian (1970:19) suggest that when there is dissonance between 
theorists, recourse to observation sentences could yield agreement. If all the 
members of a community are inclined to agree to the meaning of a particular 
sentence 'under the same stimulations of their sensory surfaces', that sentence 
qualifies as an observation sentence and the belief that concurs with that 
sentence can be considered true. Jn this sense observation in relation to the 
specific community of speakers 'takes its proverbial place as the arbiter of 
science' (Quine & Lillian 1970:19). Horton would agree wholeheartedly with 
this. Indeed Horton (1974,1982) develops some of these ideas, albeit with less 
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philosophical rigour than Quine. 
Horton's distinction of primary and secondary theory is directed mainly at 
determining what is universal in human experience and what is culturally or 
historically diverse. As discussed in chapter two, primary theory reflects a 
shared universal dimension and incorporates our everyday experience, while 
secondary theory reflects a cultural and historical diversity, extending the limited 
causal vision of primary theory, and permitting greater control and prediction. It 
will be recalled that secondary theory postulates a 'hidden' realm of entities and 
processes that underpin everyday experience. For Horton (1985:229-30) the 
link between the 'given' of primary theory and the 'hidden' of secondary theory 
make sense of events which seem inexplicable, unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. One could consider that Horton's distinction and the 
epistemological distinction between observational and theoretical beliefs is not 
a distinction of kind but rather one of degree (Leyden 1993 123, 125). 
There is one further issue to be considered in this chapter: the concept of 
predictability. 
2.3 Predictive or explanatory power 
In every day life the term 'prediction' refers to any proposition about future 
events, irrespective of who makes it or on what grounds. In science, prediction 
is a central objective and predictions are based on arguments that follow 
definite forms. Interestingly in these deductive-nomological and inductive-
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probabilistic schemes there is no reference to time. The logical connections 
between premises and conclusions exist separately from time and an 
explanans can therefore predict events in the future. This is known as the 
'symmetry thesis' (Kistner 1985:28) which deals with the range of observable 
facts that can be deduced from the predictive or explanatory power of an 
hypothesis. Horton (1974) does concede that the power of science in this 
regard is unrivaled by African traditional thought. The greater the predictive 
power of an hypothesis the more it explains and the better it contributes to our 
understanding of the phenomena with which it is concerned. However, if an 
hypothesis is false, that is, inconsistent with any fact of observation, it is false 
and must be rejected. If there are two different sets of hypotheses entailing 
incompatible consequences, then a crucial experiment must be set up between 
them. This may demand the development of new equipment or waiting for 
circumstances to observe and measure the predicted phenomena. The ultimate 
criterion for evaluating an hypothesis is its predictive power, because the 
consequences are involved here and the hypothesis can stand or fall by it. The 
performance of a ritual neither explains the facts nor permits practical 
application. It is incapable of being tested and has been accused of using 
secondary elaborations to explain away contradictions. The question arises as 
to what the force and effect of an explanation that does not have predictive 
power might be. This disanalogy in African traditional thought is important as 
Western science has been very successful at prediction. Prediction in 
traditional thought not only does not display the requisite regularity but displays 
coincidental regularity. 
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In conclusion, reliability refers to the fact that in science events can be predicted, 
and in so far as this is possible explanations can be tested. Testability is one of 
the central criteria differentiating explanation in the natural sciences from any 
other. Horton (1993:148) claims that the Xanadu put the predicted experimental 
consequences of their mystical beliefs to the test. He claims that: 
"If such predictions are confirmed by experience, they point to this fact with satisfaction as 
evidence tor the correctness of the original oracular revelation and for the efficacy of the 
oracle poison. If the predictions are refuted, they would look for reasons:e.g. sorcerers 
interfering with the revelation or spoiled oiacle poison. Here again, vve are still in a world 
not notably different from that of the scientist". 
African traditional thought does not render itself amenable to testing. In the 
above quote by Horton the idea of prediction is underpinned by spiritual causes 
which are vastly different notions from those of science. 
Prinsloo (1993) suggests that the belief systems of the Kalabari are such that 
they are occupied making sense of past experiences and do not postulate future 
ones. A prediction is stated as an hypothetical statement. For example if a 
certain set of circumstances arise it will rain tomorrow. The circumstances are 
stated in terms of facts like moist air, low pressure systems etc. Prediction in 
African traditional thought introduces the notion of spirits, so prediction is ruled 
out as the spirit's involvement can only be determined in retrospect. 
In understanding another culture, one needs to consider their own reasons for 
their actions and beliefs. However, when we explain the behaviour of others by 
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postulating hypotheses about their beliefs based on observed regularities and 
patterns of behaviour, they are not reason-giving explanations (Taylor 
1970:70). 
African traditional thinkers have their own reasons for their action and beliefs 
which, however, strange they may appear to an outsider, may in fact be rational, 
given other beliefs and attitudes. Making their beliefs accessible to us, they are 
giving an explanation in terms of reasons. Horton (1974) however, seems to be 
explaining the behaviour of other people based on an hypothesis about their 
beliefs and patterns of behaviour (Taylor 1970:70). As indicated above this is 
not an explanation in terms of reasons. This type of hypothesis would have to 
be about an inclination to a particular kind of behaviour and would have to be 
testable. Taylor (1970:70) suggests that behavioral and reason-giving 
explanations are different, since the expression of attitude in a reason-giving 
explanation does not constitute an empirical hypothesis about human 
behaviour. The problem with reason-giving explanations is that while they may 
say something about a person's thinking an action to be good, they do not imply 
a person acted in a particular way or indicate if he acted at all (Taylor 1970:71 ). 
For example the man thought that sacrificing a chicken would be the best thing 
to avoid his wife leaving him. However, he may also believe that a new dress 
will do the same. An examination of his reason though, shows that a reason-
giving explanation is appropriate on both counts and no such explanation 
implies he acted in one way and not another. 
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Attributing reasons for human behaviour by hypothesising about attitudes and 
beliefs is an inordinately complex process. It seems impossible to calculate 
human desires and attitudes from observing behaviour. An hypothesis 
advanced on the grounds that all people desire pleasure will have no way of 
predicting how people will act. According to Taylor (1970:69): 
"If a statement represents a hypothesis about a man's reasons or beliefs it constitutes a 
what explanation" . 
We may of course hypothesise that a person's behaviour conforms to a model 
and use this model to explain his/her actions. However, patterns of behaviour 
will not offer scientific evidence but rather guide us in understanding a 
description of the behaviour based on these patterns of behaviour. A scientific 
explanation attempts to relate two things in such a way that the one can be 
predicted from the other. Explanations that stop at reason are expressions of 
evaluative views. However, it is the evidence for the belief that supports it. As 
regards mental concept explanations, also considered a what explanation, 
these tell us what sort of pattern a particular event is part of. They too do not 
relate two things in a way that one can be predicted from the other. Traditional 
thought is also not necessarily a precursor of science, as Horton tries to show. 
There is however, evidence to support the idea that both types of thinking 
coexist. 
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Chapter Four 
Explanation and webs of belief, world views, conceptual schemes and 
paradigms. 
This chapter elaborates on some of the issues raised in chapter three and 
considers how webs of belief and/or world views, conceptual schemes and 
paradigms underpin the issues discussed. This chapter stresses the notion of 
fitting into a system like Quine and Ullian's (!970) metaphor of the web of belief. 
1. Personal and Impersonal paradigms 
In dealing with personal and impersonal paradigms formulated as Western 
scientific thought and African traditional thought by Robin Horton (1974), I have 
taken that these are two disparate paradigms. As indicated Horton claims not 
that they are disparate but that some of the differences between the two 
paradigms are merely a surface matter, a difference in idiom. It is the 
differences in idiom which he claims obscure the underlying similarities. In 
order to analyse these paradigms I have taken recourse to a working definition 
of paradigm as follows: 
"It is sufficient to regard a paradigm as a framework that determines which facts and 
problems and hence which questions and tests, are pertinent to a particular piece of 
research" (Kistner 1985: 59 ). 
The paradigm of African traditional thought generally characterised as opposed 
to science, has been formulated as: 
"The claim made by Meinrad Hebga that spirits, magic, oracles and witchcraft are real is a 
claim which suggests that those who believe in spirits, magic oracles, and witchcraft 
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operate in a thought pattern or use basic epistemological principles which are quite 
distinct from the pattern or principles which form the basis of claims which deny the reality 
of spirits, oracles and witchcraft. In other words, the former claim is based on a specific 
"mode of thought'', on patterns of proof and judging, of making inference, and of defining 
the real which are opposed to the characteristics and "modus operandi" of the models 
which deny them. This is an example of what Kuhn meant when he argued that any 
defense of a particular paradigm must possess a certain circularity in that whoever rejects 
the paradigm is also committed to a rejection of the standards by which it is defended" 
(Masolo 1994:18). 
The above comparison of science and African traditional thought expresses the 
view that there are different paradigms informed by distinct patterns and 
principles which form the basis of our reality. 
African traditional thought is marked by a magical or religious account about 
how things are in the world. Therefore contrary to Horton's view it would not 
qualify as scientific. Horton (1974) is of the view that social science has to 
proceed with the same 'modus operandi' as natural science. Having dealt with 
Hempel's (1966) view on natural science in chapter two, I would like to briefly 
consider the residue of what questions which would allow us to describe and to 
classify the contents of the two frameworks. 
In applying explanations in terms of the question what it transpires that African 
traditional thought answers a type of what question that does not permit it to be 
classified as scientific, but does qualify it to be classified as a social theory. 
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''This is the case w~h explanations in terms of models or theories of social systems, for 
such models and systems are defined or characterised by interrelated generalisations or 
rules concerning the character of events and behaviour" (Taylor 1970:37). 
Generalisations are solely employed to define a particular model or to 
characterise a particular system. Consequently the correctness of such an 
explanation depends only on whether that system or model obtained at the time 
of the event to be explained does not depend on the generalisations holding it 
universaiiy. When an event is expiained in terms oi a sociai sysiem, no 
universal generalisation can be accurately asserted. For example, crop failure 
in African traditional thought would be explained in terms of spirits, ancestors 
etc. This would be in terms of that particular model which is prevalent in 
traditional societies of this kind. The system of personal theoretical entities 
would include generalisations about consequences of breaching the social 
order but those would not hold universally. 
A system in which events take place according to certain generalisations is 
asserted to have obtained at a particular place and time. In other words such a 
system is considered situationally specific. Those that adhere to naturalism that 
is 'the doctrine that the methods of natural science can be used in the study of 
society' (D' Agostino 1993:479) may add that this particular fact like any other 
requires scientific explanation. 
An objection to the requirement of scientific explanation being applied to a 
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social system is explained in the following example by Taylor (1970:37). He 
compares a social system to an electronic device, in this instance, a radio. The 
problem would arise that the proper or faulty operation of the radio is explained 
within the context of the science of electronics. In the case of a social system, 
no general theory exists that would enable us to predict that the social system 
will break down nor explain why it doesn't. African traditional thought is 
entangled in a social system and there is no general theory (in the sense that a 
theory is universalised) either within or outside of its bounds, that allows us to 
generalise in the sense that we can on those grounds make a prediction about 
the future. 
Explanations in terms of models or systems consist only of particular 
statements of fact. They are explanatory because they describe patterns into 
which a particular event can be fitted. Descriptions may aid a scientific 
explanation, but do not necessarily qualify as scientific because they do not 
answer the scientific question, why the event occurred. In other words they do 
not explain why this system operated as it did. A description places items in a 
general context and implies selection and interpretation but not necessarily 
explanation. 
To convert a what explanation of this kind into a scientific explanation would 
require that the system in question, and the generalisations or principles 
defining it, be asserted to hold universally. It appears that as yet no system, or 
model exists in the social sciences which is capable of such universal 
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application. The complexity of social phenomena makes it impossible to 
experimentally manipulate and observe, both of which involve abstraction, 
idealisation and the identification of underlying mechanisms. The complexity is 
located in the interplay between the social scientist and the subjects of their 
research and in the contestability of some of their theoretical concepts. The 
application of these concepts have an ineradicably evaluative dimension, while 
the theoretical concepts of the natural sciences appear not to be evaluative. 
Attempts to 'operationalise the concepts in terms of which the theories of social 
science are formulated has been pointless' (D'Agostino 1993:480). 
What explanations are a device to explain to people what something is or what 
is going on. They may indicate theoretical or practical interest. These types of 
explanations may provide precise information to someone who does not know 
how to classify or describe something. But as we saw in chapter one, theoretical 
or practical interest or classification as such does not constitute a scientific 
explanation. What then does constitute a scientific explanation as opposed to a 
question posed by the social sciences? Some what questions can give rise to 
causal explanations as was explained in chapter two. ·However, it is why 
questions that involve both reason and cause and are therefore considered 
scientific. Issues of identity may be merely classificatory, or may provide 
elucidation neither of which necessarily constitute a scientific explanation. This 
implies that there is a difference in techniques appropriate to the social sciences 
and those appropriate to the natural sciences. The natural sciences aim at 
prediction and the control of natural phenomena, while the social sciences aim 
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at understanding or interpretation of social phenomena. The word explanation 
also has peripheral uses and not merely formal ones, for example explaining 
the meaning of a word (a speech act). Peripheral cases of explanation may 
also be considered under the notion of fitting something into a web of belief, but 
successful explanation requires 'having hypotheses that are acceptable 
because they fit into one's whole system' (Smart 1990:3). 
2. Problems within and across paradigms - Relativism in conceptual 
schemes 
2. 1 Kuhn - the idea of incommensurability 
Kuhn's (1970) view of 'no common measure' can be understood both in terms 
of schemes and translation. According to him theories operate as world views 
or paradigms which do not so much present the facts, as tell us what we should 
see in the facts. In terms of this view science leaves us with logical and 
historical difficulties in accounting for the acceptance or rejection of theories. 
Theories on Kuhn's (1970) account can be applied to all events and this leaves 
us with the existence of theories which do not seem explicable as 
generalisations from evidence that can be described in everyday observational 
terms. Theories may introduce all types of non-observable forces and entities, 
and require us to understand one form of behaviour in terms of some other form 
of behaviour. 
"Relations between theories and facts cannot be simply explained: the images which 
dominate the literature are those of 'maps', 'models', 'analogies', 'hidden mechanisms' 
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and none of these things looks remotely like a generalisation from the events they are 
explaining" (Ryan 1970:73). 
It could be that theories are merely catering to our need to render causal 
sequences intelligible. The use of analogy in theory may allow us to fill causal 
gaps in a sequence, but this casts doubt both on the adequacy of Western 
scientific and African traditional thought. A successful theory is what Kuhn 
would call a paradigm (Kistner 1985:62). If all successful theories are 
paradigms, then how would we distinguish between those that are true and 
those that are false ? 
At the very least, a paradigm provides a focus of research and experiment, as is 
evidenced by Horton's use of personal and impersonal paradigms. Kuhn holds 
the view that a paradigm functions as a set of puzzles and also a set of 
standards for their solution (Ryan 1970:80). The point about scientific 
paradigms, is that they have gained universal acceptance, such as Newton's 
mechanics, whereas the paradigm that fails to generate consistent experimental 
consequences, would mean the end of that particular theory. 
African traditional thought does not provide us with experimental 
consequences, and cannot therefore be seen as a scientific paradigm. For 
example a traditional diviner may offer the explanation of a drought as 
retribution from the ancestors visited on the disobedient people. The scientist 
would look at solar phenomena like the El Nino by way of explanation. The 
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facts considered by the traditional healer are disobedience and the facts 
considered by the scientist are weather patterns. In other words the facts 
considered by one paradigm are different from the facts considered by the 
other. Hence the two paradigms are incommensurable as they belong to 
different contexts and are constituted be different sets of facts (Kistner 1985:62). 
Kuhn is referring to a revolution within science itself wherein, he claims an 
entirely new paradigm replaces the previous one. What is relevant about this to 
African traditional thought is that Kuhn claims that it is impossible to say which 
interpretation is 'true' or 'correct', since each paradigm has its own laws, facts 
and concepts. 
"In terms of Kuhn's theory this implies that one cannot mix propositions, laws or 
hypotheses (or concepts) from different paradigms" (Kistner 1985:62). 
According to Kistner, Kuhn's theory therefore has two important implications, 
the first is that one cannot choose between different paradigms on logical or 
rational grounds, and secondly, that science cannot be seen to be evolving 
towards the specific goal of describing the world realistically. This is so because 
the paradigm itself determines how we see the world and which facts exist. 
These implications reminiscent of Evans-Pritchard's (Winch 1974b:90) call to 
mind that the Zande, cannot get out of their 'web of belief' as it is their thought 
and they cannot think their thought is wrong. This is an example of the view of 
a paradigm itself determining how the world is seen. 
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It is Kuhn's contention that even within science, different paradigms not only do 
not share the same concepts but also correlate them in different ways. The 
implication of this is that there are no facts which may be used independently of 
a paradigm. If this is the case how are we to decide which paradigm is best ? 
Criteria such as simplicity and relevance may be adopted but these criteria are 
subjective and not necessarily logical. Thus one is left with Winch's (1974a:4-5) 
relativism which holds that the meaning of actions in a particular culture can 
only be judged from within the context of that particular culture. This means that 
there is no external or as Kistner (1985:63) puts it 'extracultural vantage point', 
from which one can judge a culture. 
2.2 Horton and relativism of paradigms 
Horton (1993) is aware of the work of Kuhn. He anticipates the objection that 
scientists too, in defending their paradigms, develop elaborate subsidiary 
hypotheses, some of which may appear with hindsight to have a sort of 
secondary elaboration. He is not committed to a Popperian vision of science 
consisting of unremitting attempts to falsify existing theories. For he says, 
though a scientist often holds on to existing theory in the light of anomalies, he 
does so, not because of a feeling that if his theory fails him, chaos is at hand, but 
because since he knows that the theory is not something timeless and absolute, 
he is reluctant to throw it away before giving it the benefit of the doubt. When it 
starts failing, defense of the theory switches inexorably to attack. It seems here 
that Horton's analysis of Kuhn, is in terms of an emotive view, as he is dealing 
with the world of emotion and informal logic, not with reason as such. Kuhn 
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(1970) rejects the idea that science is the accretion of knowledge. In his view it 
is an entirely new system of knowledge that develops as a revolution rather than 
an evolution. 
If invariable criteria exist within the paradigm, then no good reason can be 
argued in terms of 'own worlds', and the schism between others and ourselves 
is narrowed (Lukes 1982:262-263). In terms of a universalist view of rationality, it 
has been argued that it is nonsensical to make any comment whatsoever about 
another culture and belief system, without recognising that the statement itself is 
predicated on the very existence of general criteria of rationality. This is the 
standard attack on relativism by those who hold the view that there are non-
contextual criteria by which to evaluate another culture. 
Relativism is the view that different cultures order their experiences according 
to different concepts. Schemes of classification differ across cultures and 
epochs. These include witches and ancestors, electrons and magnetic fields. 
These schemes link the particular to more general concepts, for example 
disease to witches. Each scheme itself may be relative to a context or culture. 
In short whether we live in different worlds where the: 
"rules of argument and criteria of truth are internal to a social system, that truth and 
rationality are to be redefined as internal to given societies and that where explanation is 
to stop is simply the point where questioning by the relevant local consensus ceases" 
(Hollis & Lukes 1982 :13 ). 
The issue with African traditional thought is that because it posits personal 
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theoretical entities in order to account for phenomena, it is more likely to involve 
the issue of faith as a justification, rather than that of evidence as a justification. 
A difficulty in inductive thinking is that we cannot, for example, prove that the 
sun will rise again tomorrow, but in the interests of coherent living we have to 
believe that it will. So one may argue that an element of faith is required in any 
paradigm, be it personal or impersonal. However, particular problems arise 
when the entire paradigm is predicated on personal theoretical entities, to the 
exclusion of explicit knowledge of the general laws of material nature. It is here, 
that I believe one of the problems envisaged by Kuhn comes into play. We are 
left with two disparaie ways of perceiving the world which is problematic in 
cross cultural communication. 
2.3 Problem of indeterminacy - Quine 
Quine's {Hookway 1993a:409) conceptual scheme seems most appropriate to 
this analysis as it deals with language and truth - some of the fundamental 
difficulties that need be resolved in cross cultural understanding. 
Quine's (Hookway 1993a:409) view of a conceptual scheme concerns a set of 
sentences held to be true. He uses the ideas of 'core' and 'periphery' with the 
core sentences having a kind of permanence, while those on the periphery are 
empirical and more likely to be given up in the light of new experience. His 
conceptual scheme is characterised by assignment of truth values. Two 
schemes differ, in his view, when some substantial number of core sentences of 
one scheme are not held to be true in another scheme. Thus the central point 
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of Quine's theory is the indeterminancy of translation, as there are too many 
incompatible translations between two groups speaking disparate languages. 
In Ian Hacking's view (1982:58) 
"This is not a matter of settling on nuances: Quine means that you could take a sentence 
s of L and translate it by one system of translation into p of M and translate it by another 
system into q of M, and p and q would, in M be held to be incompatible". 
For Quine there are no translation independent facts of the matter, about what 
sentence L or any given seniem;e means. There are no non-contextual facts oi 
the matter, as to what a given agent believes. 'Belief like meaning is 
indeterminate' (Heil 1993:45). Therefore, there is no fact of the matter in 
relation to what any expression in an alien language means. According to 
Quine, we are obliged to pick out the true core sentences of M, and show how 
many we are able to translate into sentences L holds false, then how are we to 
be assured that it would be the right translation. This leaves us with the pursuit 
as to what would constitute truth? 
If there is no fact of the matter as to the kinds of objects to which the terms of a 
language refer, then Quine is committed to ontological relativity. He has tried to 
eliminate the traditional conceptual scheme that treats every proposition as 
either analytic or synthetic (Ayer 1946, Hookway1993a:409). As discussed in 
chapter three, traditional empiricism depends on what Quine considered 'two 
dogmas'. The first concerns analytic and synthetic statements. Analytic 
statements like 'all bachelors are male' are true by virtue of meaning . Synthetic 
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statements, are grounded in 'fact'. The second concerns radical reductionism. 
'Every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement true or 
false about immediate experience' (Hookway 1993a:409). Quine held that the 
analytic/synthetic distinction could be sustained only if radical reductionism was 
true. This gains support from the verificationist theory of meaning. The 
verificationist theory of meaning involves translating each statement into a 
statement about immediate experience. It's meaning is true by virtue of 
showing what experiences would be required to verify it. The analytic 
statements are seen as 'vacuously' confirmed (Hookway 1993a:409). 
Quine rejects reductionism and the epistemology that goes with it, by showing 
how our beliefs relate to experience and likening the whole of our knowledge 
to 'a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges' 
(Hookway 1993a:409). Experience may require us to revise our beliefs, but we 
can choose what statements to re-evaluate. Furthermore any statement can be 
held true if we make adjustments in the system as 'no statement is immune from 
revision' (Hookway 1993a:409). This results in a holistic picture revising things 
to restore harmony between our beliefs and experience. We do, according to 
Quine, have a natural tendency to disturb the total system as little as possible, 
and this explains why we treat some beliefs as answerable to experience and 
others as not. The underdetermination of theory by evidence, holds that 
logically incompatible theories may fit all the possible evidence. Alternatively, 
there may be empirically equivalent theories which while not contradicting each 
other, use radically different theoretical notions. Examples of such 
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underdetermination constitute problems for empiricist philosophers because it 
leaves them in the position of either denying that such theories are in 
competition, or finding an empirical basis for preferring one of the pair 
(Hookway 1993b:517). 
2.4 Operationalism as a paradigm - black box 
Operationalism which is sometimes referred to as the black box theory of 
theories, (Ryan 1970:92) is a view which considers the relationship between 
theories and observational results as analytic. It is analytic in the sense that the 
only terms that have implications for what the contents of the world are, are 
those referring to experimental observables. This is so, because they suggest 
new experiments and make us aware of connections between observable 
states of affairs that we could not otherwise have noticed. For example the idea 
of unconscious projection may serve a useful purpose in suggesting to us how 
we should link a woman's anger to how she was treated as a child. It may also 
suggest therapeutic moves by a therapist to relieve or cure distress by possibly 
providing an environment in which emotional habits can be relearnt. This is an 
important point as: 
''we do not have to claim that there really is an unconscious mjpd at work but that the 
network of successful analogy is its own justification" (Ryan 1970:93). 
The problem with Horton's (1974) theory is that .although we don't have to 
know the contents of the box for example ancestors, we still have to transform 
true statements into true predictions. Horton has made an attempt to borrow 
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plausible models of explanation from natural sciences, using an analogical 
argument of causal connections between postulated personal entities and 
phenomena, which are also a means of ordering and classifying African 
traditional thought. Horton's analogy between Western science and African 
traditional thought is an as if or apparent relationship, the similarities are 
there, but they are coincidental, not real. They are not the visible outcome of 
underlying mechanisms. To say that phenomena possess a particular structure, 
is different from saying that by virtue of analogic claim they behave as if they 
did. 
"The deficiency of operationalism is that it blurs the distinction between theories and 
models between analogies which state that the phenomena behave as 1f they were the 
visible outcome of some underlying mechanism or quasi mechanism, and theories which 
maintain that the phenomena behave as they do because they are the visible outcome of 
such and such a mechanism" (Ryan 1970:94). 
This distinction holds for Robin Horton's view of African traditional thought as a 
theory which postulates that the phenomena possess a structure of Western 
scientific explanation as contrasted with the merely analogical claim that they 
behave as if they did. African traditional thinkers are said to behave in matters 
as if their mode of thought were scientific. On these grounds, to provide a 
genuine theory it would have to be seen that Horton's view allows one to predict 
or test his claim to show that it is a valuable and genuine theory. 
The theories that scientists construct, constitute claims about the contents of the 
world. Realism is therefore a more plausible account, as we don't merely 
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accept a theory because things happen as if the account were true but because 
it is a true account. A theory may abstract from objects within its own culture, 
but the theory fails to be accurate at least on the grounds of abstracting from 
different cultures and assimilating the two disparate theoretical objects. 
"Scientist are not content to merely say that things can happen as ii a certain mechanism 
is at work: they claim that there is a mechanism at work, and this claim is a claim about the 
contents of the world" (Ryan 1970:95). 
A theory on the grounds of the above can faii, because its ciaims can be 
measured against what is really there and found to be mistaken. There is some 
way in which the account is true and not merely a situation in which it appears 
as if the account were true. The concern with personalised theoretical entities 
is that there are no grounds for grading the theory as either true or mistaken. 
When a claim is made by science that gas is composed of particles, that is what 
is meant. Science is clear in its meaning of theoretical statements. It allows us 
to follow causal sequences by showing us precisely, and in what sequence 
things really do take place. We can ask a causal question about what results 
are to be expected. In Horton's case when a claim is made we have an 
'analogical formula' where causal questions may be postulated, but can't be 
answered with any degree of certainty. Operationalism within science is an 
attempt to define the relationship between theoretical terms and actions or 
observations. The idea is that all scientific terms be specified by a procedure 
which provides both qualitative and quantitative criteria for applying the terms. 
The point here for our purposes is that a theoretical term that is totally 
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unassociated with observational terms can have no meaning. While this may 
only apply to actual scientific practice, it does indicate that one should exercise 
some caution in postulating theoretical entities (Kistner 1985:88-93). 
2.5 Problem of incommensurability - Donald Davidson 
A definition of incommensurability is that there is no way of translating from one 
scheme to another. While indeterminancy finds too many translations between 
schemes, (Hacking 1982:59) incommensurability according to Feyerabend 
(Laudan 1996) is the inability of one body of thought to understand another. 
Donald Davidson (1984, 1986) is against a conceptual scheme that lends 
credibility to either incommensurability or indeterminancy. He dismisses the 
idea of total untranslatability and is against even the notion of partial 
untranslatability between groups of people. In Davidson's view, psychology 
includes an irreducibility normative component. Agents are obliged to exercise 
charity, and this to him means assigning beliefs and desires in such a manner 
that it optimises the rationality of the other. It is in Davidson's view a 'synthetic 
a priori' truth about agents that, on the whole, they satisfy the canons of decision 
theory (Heil 1993:47). 
A conceptual scheme is defined as a classificatory scheme and classifications 
necessarily employ generalisations. Because it employs generalisations the 
classification may be mistaken for a scientific explanation. Davidson (1984:185, 
189) seems to be saying something like this: The criteria of identity and 
individuation of x is an essential part of a person's having the concept of x. If a 
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person cannot determine whether what is before him/her is the cup or two 
different cups, he/she has no criteria for individuation for cups. If he/she has no 
criteria for individuation for cups, he/she does not know what a cup is. This 
means that he/she does not have the concept of a cup. Similarly, if no criteria of 
individuation for conceptual schemes are available or usable, then the concept 
of a conceptual scheme itself is empty and unusable. Taking a neutral stance 
and divesting oneself of all conceptual schemes and then comparing them is 
impossible, because conceptual schemes are embedded in language and to 
divest oneself of all conceptual schemes would require giving up the use of 
language. Language is necessary for thought, therefore if one gives up 
language, then one could not engage in the kind of thinking required for 
comparison and differentiation of conceptual schemes. I think Davidson's 
(1984:197) concern is primarily with the issue of no 'neutral ground' from which 
to classify conceptual schemes. From this he derives the Principle of Charity by 
which he means that unless we legitimately make assumptions about the 
objects of our study we will be entirely unable to access them. All assumptions 
should be considered correct. The Principle of Humanity suggests 
unintelligibility be kept to a minimum in our attempts to make trans-cultural and 
trans-theoretical understanding. 
Both Quine and Davidson show that it is not easy to avoid relativism particularly 
in the realm of interpretation. Horton refers to the bridgehead which allows us to 
access other cultures. This bridgehead is composed of 'primary theory' the 
everyday obseNational and practical beliefs that people hold and which Horton 
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regards as common to all societies. These beliefs are neither relative nor 
incommensurable (Hollis & Lukes 1982:20). This will be considered in chapter 
five. 
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Chapter Five 
Rationality and the issues of relativism, objectivity and subjectivity and their 
application to the views of Robin Horton. 
1. Rationality 
This chapter considers the issues of relativism, objectivity and subjectivity in 
relation to approaches to rationality and the manner in which they may be 
applied to Horton's views. 
1.1 Horton's view of rationality 
Horton (1979) claims that traditional thought is not really irrational, given its 
technical, social, cultural and psychological context and that it thereby merits 
rational appraisal. In terms of his intellectualist approach, traditional thought is 
part of attempted explanations about the world, developed in a rational way but 
on the basis of poor evidence, lack of awareness of alternatives, unreflective 
thinking and mixed motives. Horton may be said to have overextended this 
type of interpretation, in the sense that rather than explaining the world, and 
showing how beliefs are considered rational, intellectualists offer the meagre 
comfort of a petitio principii (begging the question). This occurs when the 
proposition to be established occurs both as a premise and as the conclusion. 
While it is a perfectly valid argument, it is irrelevant to the proving or 
establishing of the conclusion (Copi 1978:98). It is unclear how by adding 
personalised theoretical entities the world becomes easier to describe. 
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Horton's (1979:83) arguments rely on there being a level of thought and 
discourse shared by all cultures. As already indicated he takes the 
"intellectualist" view that traditional African beliefs can be seen as attempts at 
theoretical explanations of the world. This therefore implies that they are subject 
to trans-cultural and trans-theoretical standards of rational appraisal. Thus he 
introduces the idea of a super-standard against which an alien culture's thought 
may be measured (Hollis & Lukes 1982:17). 
The allegation against African traditional thought is that it is superstitious in the 
sense that it is rationally unsupported. The dimension of superstition in African 
traditional beliefs is a vice which leads to the stagnation of knowledge 
according to Kwasi Wiredu (Mascio 1994:224). This presupposes a particular 
view of rationality namely that of rationalism. Hollis (1982:81-2) infers from 
apparently irrational beliefs, not relativism but the necessity for rationalism in 
order to identify the irrational beliefs. Horton (1993) admits varieties in theory 
and the concomitant diversity of truth and value, but argues that although 
context-dependent criteria are necessary, they are not sufficient. What would 
constitute sufficiency is the admission of general or universal criteria of 
rationality. Formal rational procedures are the defining features of science and 
are considered universal. These criteria are basically defined in terms of a 
realist notion of science, humanity and rationality. In these terms, rationality 
would be identified with logical consistency, based on the universally valid rules 
of inference, logic and coherence in an explanation of reality. The implication of 
154 
this is that there is a single reality, a common core of universal criteria, to which 
all people subscribe. If there is in fact, such a common core then it serves as a 
rational bridgehead which makes translation between cultures possible (Hollis 
1982:16). 
Ian Hacking's (1982:52) view is that of an 'anarcho- rationalist': 
"The arch rationalist wants to know how the world is. There are good and bad reasons for 
propos~ions about nature. they are not raltive to anything. They do not depend on 
context". 
This notion of rationality as decontextualised thought and the ideal of objective 
cognition, places thinking outside morality (Overing 1982:13-4). 
The rationalists further view this reality as: 
" ... one whose relations are objectively discernible by science ..... In this view, a rational 
explanation is defined in the analytic fashion as a body of verifiable propositions relating 
cause to effects. This position consequently views the notions of consistency and 
reason as functions of scientttic evidence" ( Masolo 1994:126). 
To access another culture a universalist would limit the bridgehead argument to 
laws of thought, the language of material objects and the perception of the 
world as physical. 
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1.2 Laws of thought 
In terms of the above view, Western rationality is based on rules which are 
known as the laws of thought. These laws of thought (formulated by Aristotle) 
are considered by the rationalist to be the basic principles which enable 
successful communication and translation and which are implicit in all systems 
of knowledge which can then be held as rational. These laws of thought are a 
key part of Western rationalism since Levy-Bruhl's writing on the " pre- logical" 
mentality (Horton 1973b:253) and it is the purported failure of other cultures to 
implement the laws of thought that has resulted in a judgment of them as 
irrational. The laws are as follows: 
1. The law of identity - (A is A) - if something is A, then it is A. Every subject 
has its own set of predicates. 
2. The law of non-contradiction - (It is not true that both A and not A) - two 
judgments cannot both be true when the falsity of one follows from the truth of 
the other. 
3. Modus ponens (If P, then Q P therefore Q). 
Modens ponens is a simple form of inference and an alleged form of 
universal reason. When searching for the causes of phenomena we seek 
causes and/or reasons for the phenomena. A rationalist shows that a 
deductive form of inference 'can be shown to be rationally justified in an 
absolute and context-free sense' (Barnes & Bloor 1982:40, Masolo 1994:126). 
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The status of these laws is not descriptive in the sense of showing how 
people think. Instead they are prescriptive or formal, indicating how people 
should think or more directly how they should reason. When they are 
prescriptive they are considered to state either absolute or conventional 
standards of reasoning. They may be seen to be true by virtue of their form 
and possibly independent of content (Kirwan 1995:476). 
Since Aristotle's laws of thought are prescriptive or formal they are 
acceptable from a Western scientific view. As regards African traditional 
thought, Horton would view these laws as prescriptive as he adheres to the 
cognitive common core idea. For Horton (1982:228) it is the primary theory of 
everyday observation and 'push-pull' causation, which provides 'the cross-
cultural voyager with his intellectual bridgehead'. If the laws of thought are 
descriptive, their form can only be ascertained after investigation. 
The idea of the Western notion of reason as providing a background against 
which to measure other cultures, can be considered as suspect both by the 
people of the culture, and by anthropologists. This raises the question of 
whether it would follow that contradictions, inconsistencies, affirmation and 
denial of the same proposition at the same time are acceptable or rational. 
The limits set on these are clear according to the rationalist, but the view of the 
relativist would be that the limits are fixed internal to the particular culture 
under consideration (Wilson 1974:viii-ix, Masolo 1994:125-6). 
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In order to defend his view Horton (1974) has to show that African traditional 
thought does conform to these basic criteria of rationality according to the laws 
of thought. The crux of the issue according to relativism is the question of 
whether such invariable criteria do in fact exist. 
An example of the problem of identity are claims like -'Twins are birds'. This is 
common in African traditional thought and violates the law of identity. The 
question to be raised is: In what sense can a man be like a bird ? One answer 
to this is given by Evans-Pritchard (Mascio 1994:137) who regards a 
comparison between African traditional thought and Western science as leading 
to imaginary problems. Evans-Pritchard suggests that we should not take this 
statement more literally than the African traditionalists take it and understand 
themselves. 
"They are not saying that a twin has a beak, feathers, and so forth" (Mascio 1994:144). 
The problem of identity may be merely a misinterpretation of the linguistic 
identity predicate "is". Evans-Pritchard's ( Mascio 1994;144) accusation is 
that we interpret beliefs in terms of our own linguistic structure which is not 
necessarily correct in the context of another tradition. The word "is" may not 
have the same meaning for the indigenous person as it has for the native 
speaker of English. Similarly literal translations of African statements about 
reality can lead to false arguments and conclusions. Logical principles of the 
meaning of identity as defined in the Western scientific tradition can lead to an 
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incorrect evaluation of African traditional thought (Masolo 1994:144). The 
implication here is that Horton, in using a model of Western science, as the 
means of comparison with African traditional thought, 'has committed an error 
of translation' (Masolo 1994:138 ). Another way of possibly dealing with the 
problem of the apparently irrational beliefs of another culture is found in 
relativism where the idea of a single world is challenged by Kuhn (1970). He 
has argued against the belief of Western science in a unified objective world, 
unaffected by the activities of scientists. 
2. Relativism 
There are many relativist doctrines and the problem of relativism is a complex 
one. Relativism may be variously contrasted with realism, objectivism 
foundationalism, rationalism or universalism (Jiang Tianji 1994:161 ). To define 
relativism therefore (and for the purposes of this study, specifically cognitive 
relativism) would be to say that relativism has no universal standards of 
rationality. Rationality according to this view then, may be defined as: 
" ... the relationship of an action or belief and the reasons for its choice in distinction to the 
causes for determining ~" (Jiang Tianji 1994: 161). 
Having or giving reasons for action and belief is distinctively human. Different 
people may have different reasons for the same belief or action which they 
choose from among alternatives. As a result rationality is relative to the agent. 
Agents belong to different communities, rely on different beliefs or background 
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assumptions and have different resources. They will automatically have 
different reasons for their beliefs and actions when dealing with either the same 
or similar problems (Jiang Tianji 1994:161 ). 
2. 1 Evolutionism and relativism 
Two opposing paradigms in anthropology are unilinear evolutionism and 
cultural relativism (Jiang Tianji 1994:162). Horton (1993:71,78) believes that 
the study of primitive thought throws light on the nature of scientific or modern 
thinking. In support of this view he refers extensively to the work of both Levy-
Bruhl and Durkheim. Horton aligns himself with the continuity/evolutionary 
schema of Durkheim (Horton 1993;171-2). 
"So It is far from true that this mentaltty has no connection with ours. Our logic was born of 
this logic .... Every time we unite heterogeneous terms by an internal bond we forcibly 
identify contraries ... the terms we unite .. we choose according to different criteria and for 
different reasons; but the processes by which the mind puts them in connection do not 
differ essentially ... " . 
Another contribution at this level is the work of Sir James George Frazer (Jarvie 
& Agassi 1987:365) who in his theory of magic not only speculated that there 
may be evolutionary stages in human thinking, from a magical stage, through 
religion to a scientific stage, but also that the three modes are competing 
systems. Frazer suggests that religion has explanatory power but is logically 
defective in relation to science, while magic, he says, is factually defective. 
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Frazer's article is mainly concerned with the problem of rationality in magic. 
The evolutionists associate rationality with science and assume because there 
is an absence of science, primitive people lack rationality. Further along the 
line primitive societies are granted a type of rationality but it is seen as deficient 
because of their prescientific cognition. Tylor and Frazer perceive the scientific 
method as a progressive force that should eclipse superstition and unreason. 
Their view is based on the idea that Western science is the highest 
achievement of rationality. The basic idea in the evolutionists' approach is the 
developmental pattern of thought and its forms and, mapping the growth of 
rationality (Jarvie & Agassi 1974:177-8, Jiang Tianji 1994:162). 
2.2 Translation 
The problem of translation from one culture into another, according to Horton 
(1993) is twofold. Firstly there is the imposition of one's own conceptual 
categories on the alien material to be interpreted and secondly there is the 
issue of being acquainted with one's own conceptual categories. Horton 
attributes inadequately informed interpretations of traditional magical religious 
thought to inadequate notions of science. It is difficult to see how he intends 
on these grounds to avoid the charge of cultural hegemony. 
2.3 Relativism of Reason 
The relativist claims that knowledge can only be assessed and guaranteed 
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internal to a particular culture. According to this view there are many 
alternative conceptual frameworks and possible criteria are only available 
within each particular knowledge system itself. The result of this, some argue, 
is that cross- cultural comparisons are either misleading or impossible. On the 
other hand the universalist holds that there are fundamental principles 
common to all claims of knowledge as well as to rational behaviour, and that 
these rules are implicit in all human reasoning. Conceptual frameworks are 
therefore universal and their criteria consist in general rules applicable to all 
conceptual frameworks. The result is that a failure to reason or to act in 
accordance with these rules, would result in being judged irrational. Cross-
cultural comparisons in terms of this view are possible. 
To return to relativism according to Barnes and Bloor (1982:27): 
" ... there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really 
rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such" . 
This extreme form of relativism answers the question about whether 
apparently irrational beliefs in the history of science and among alien peoples 
require us to accept strong relativism in the affirmative. For Hacking 
(1998:48) such a view is 
"An inane subjectivism (which) may say that whether p is a reason for q depends on 
whether people have got around to reasoning that way or not" 
His view of relativism is that the proposition p in the sense of the way it points 
to truth and falsehood has a style of reasoning appropriate to p. On these 
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grounds we could not criticize the style of reasoning as a way of getting from p 
or not p because p simply is that proposition whose truth value is determined 
that way. He puts this in a more extreme form as: 
"nothing, which is true, is true, and nothing which is false, is false, but thinking makes it 
so" (Hacking 1982:50). 
2.4 Objection to evolutionism 
Cultural relativism takes exception to the simplistic unilinear evolutionism 
which imposes one's own standards and values on other cultures. It advocates 
a thesis of incommensurability between different cultures. This means that 
each culture and society has to be understood in terms of its own values, ideas 
and beliefs rather than adopting a trans-culturally neutral standpoint which 
advocates measuring them all by one standard. Franz Boas is one who sees 
no hierarchy among people of different cultures, nor an evolutionary scheme 
connecting different phases of culture, as Tylor and Frazer have argued (Hollis 
& Lukes 1982:2, Jiang Tianji 1994:162). In line with cultural relativism, 
Herskovits (Jiang Tianji 1994:162) would have us see: 
'1he validijy of each set of norms for the people whose lives are guided by them and the 
values they represent". 
The important issue is how to go about the interpretation and understanding of 
alien culture. This problem according to Jiang Tianji (1994:163) has been 
focused on by hermeneutics and neo-Wittgensteinians who consider that our 
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ability to make sense of social phenomena refers to our participation in the 
practices of our own community. In studying alien cultures one's own societal 
practices would form the core of one's view of an alien culture. In other words 
we are bound to employ our own conceptual framework in interpreting another 
culture. This however, would constitute an imposition of our own standards 
when evaluating that of an other. Rationality within a society can only be 
measured by the standards of that particular society. Effectively then, the 
beliefs and actions of different cultural groups are seen as more or less 
equally rational in terms of their own standards. But what of the question of the 
rational standards themselves furnished by their view ? Relativism does allow 
comparison but does not include evaluation, as evaluations are always in terms 
of a standard and standards are derived internally from a culture. The result is 
that an evaluation cannot escape 'the web of culture' as all evaluations are 
culture- bound (Jiang Tianji 1994:163). 
The crucial difference between the evolutionary paradigm and the relativist one 
is that of evaluation. What is in question is whether it is possible to differentiate 
societies as better or worse or cultures as more or less successful (Jiang Tianji 
1994:163). 
The rationality debate in science has a parallel paradigm shift. 
2.4. 1 Thomas Kuhn 
In his book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' (Kuhn 1970) does a 
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historical analysis of science in which he refutes the view of science as a 
gradual accumulation of knowledge moving coherently towards a greater 
system of knowledge. In reality he claims that a particular set of theories or 
paradigms become prominent for a period of time during which the experiments 
or data that support the paradigm are classed as scientific and anything which 
doesn't is disparaged as unscientific. Over time, more and more data 
accumulate that are not consistent with the reigning paradigm, until someone 
comes along and proposes a whole new paradigm that replaces the old one to 
become the new 'standard' version of science. The point is that one paradigm 
or set of theories does not flow logically to another. A paradigm is more a 
dogma than science and more subjective than objective, more faith than fact. 
Nevertheless, in the case of African traditional thought we might agree that the 
theory has flown flagrantly in the face of adverse evidence that we knew to be 
abundantly available to the users themselves. 
Kuhn points out that there are 'rationality gaps' during scientific revolutions with 
rationality predominating in normal science. The parallel paradigm shifts briefly 
referred to above have shown that trans-cultural and trans-theoretical relativism 
support each other. Unilinear evolutionism and inductivism are its opposition 
and they too support each other. These variants of universalism consider 
science and its methodology as the pinnacle of rationality and the benchmark 
against which other cultures can be ranked in terms of the level of their 
intellectual development, or as a line, dividing modern scientific thought from 
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traditional world views. However, the thesis of incommensurability has 
introduced some level of distrust to science and its methodology, and so 
undermined any evolutionary scheme of the Tylor and Frazer type. Conceptual 
incommensurability seems to be explanatory in relation to the more obvious 
facts of cultural differences and cultural incommensurability (Bernstein 1994:85, 
Jiang Tianji 1994:164). 
The universalists' definition of commensurability is in terms of rationality that is 
universal and depends on their own paradigm of science. So if this rationality 
does not follow, then incommensurability does: but incommensurability is 
impossible since their form of rationality is a human universal (Jiang Tianji 
1994:164). 
2. 5 The Strong Form of Relativism - Barnes and Bloor 
Rationality as it appears in natural science, which is considered the most 
objective aspect of human knowledge, is least expected to be susceptible to 
relativism. But it seems that Kuhn (Jiang Tianji 1994:163) has shown that 'no 
algorithm can be constructed for a choice among competing scientific theories'. 
Kuhn introduced the idea of scientific communities to replace logical calculi 
bringing sociology, psychology and anthropology into the domain of science. 
This has inspired a strong trend of radical relativism in the sociology of 
knowledge (Jiang Tianji 1994:163). Barnes and Bloor (1982:22) are advocates 
of this theory which states that relativism is to be accepted in the place of the 
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principle of universal rationality in modern science. They argue that local 
acceptability goes with local modes of cultural transmission of social control of 
power and authority. It is therefore, the task of science to trace these links, 
seeking the 'specific local' causes of beliefs being held. So an explanation of 
theory acceptance is sought rather than the reasons for the theory (Jiang Tianji 
1994:164). According to Barnes & Bloor (1982:26-8), rules of arguments and 
criteria of truth are internal to the social system. Truth and rationality have to be 
redefined showing that what is acceptable is internal to the particular society 
and determined by 'the relevant local consensus' (Hesse 1980:76). They say 
there is no way to distinguish with validity between what is true, reasonable and 
explanatory and so constitutes knowledge, on the one hand and what is locally 
accepted as knowledge, on the other (Jiang Tianji 1994:164). For the relativist, 
Barnes and Bloor (1982:27) hold: 
"there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as 
distinct from merely locally accepted as such" . 
2.6 Strong form of Relativism - Winch 
The existence of a variegated spectrum of beliefs poses the question whether 
there are alternative standards of rationality. Given the extensive evidence of 
apparently irrational beliefs held by other cultures, are we required to accept 
relativism in a strong form ? A case is made by Peter Winch (1974) in this 
regard namely that what counts as warranted belief depends on canons of 
reasoning, either inductive or deductive that are relative to era and culture. The 
167 
very criteria of logic according to Winch are 'only intelligible in the context of 
ways of living and modes of social life' (Hollis & Lukes 1982:10). The rationalist 
refuses to separate reasons from objective truth, since a reason, if true, is a 
good reason. It has to be objectively true that one thing is good reason for 
another. In other words the rationalist is committed to prioritising the standards, 
while the relativist perceives differences in these standards for rating reasons 
as good (Hollis & Lukes 1982:11 ). Thus the evidence for relativism is twofold: 
some alien categories are culture-specific and interpretations of apparently 
irrational beliefs show them to 'make sense' in the context of culture-specific 
world-views. As particular beliefs can only be assessed within the world view to 
which they belong, a vital part of relativism is the warranted assumption that the 
evidence given on an alien culture's beliefs, is that the beliefs are integrated 
into coherent, all-embracing, culturally-transmitted world views. The position of 
a relativist is that whatever resemblance there is between African traditional 
thought and Western science, such a resemblance is only apparent. 
Is it the attribution of apparently irrational beliefs that is used to substantiate 
relativism? This means that the fundamental concepts and meanings used in 
human cognition are culturally determined. All conceptualised information is 
cultural and each culture has its own criteria of rational explanation and its own 
possible metaphors. There are no universal constraints on either. Relativism 
displaces intellectualism and symbolism as a solution to apparently irrational 
beliefs. Horton (1993) attempts a detailed refutation of symbolism as the only 
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other contender set against relativism.' 
2.7 Plausible arguments for relativism 
Cultural diversity in terms of religion, custom, social institutions, beliefs is so 
overwhelming that it can only be explained by different criteria for validity and 
rationality. Universalism and unilinear evolutionism have to be abandoned as 
they imply 'a cross-cultural super-standard to adjudicate between diverse 
standards' (Jiang Tianji 1994:165). 
There has been a fundamental change in the bedrock notions of philosophy, 
meaning, truth and rationality with the recent sociological tendency in 
philosophy. A socialised external epistemology, which has at its centre 
community practice, has taken precedence over an internal individualised 
epistemology of empiricism and rationalism. Different practices of different 
people bring forth norms that govern individual behaviour and beliefs and 
these differences attest to a diversity of rationality standards. These norms may 
initially be descriptive but they become prescriptive if most members of a 
' According to the symbolists there are two ways in which Western scholars portray non-Western systems 
of thought. The first is by attributing to them a degree of shared irrationality. The second is by attributing 
to them a scientific preoccupation with the explanation prediction and control of their space-time world. 
Horton's refutation of the symbolists' approach is to separate the notions of meaning and function. He 
criticises the use of the dichotomy rational-irrational where both refer to a style of thought that is 
instrumental, in that ii has a practical ulterior end, but the rational is adequate to the purpose and the 
irrational is not. The symbolists are convinced that patterns of thought and action are ultimately classifiable 
in terms of their guiding intentions and the evidence of the character of these intentions can only come 
from the context in which these patterns are deployed (Horton 1993). 
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community follow them and judge the actions of others by them (Jiang Tianji 
1994:165). 
Traditional philosophers advance the objection that even in the face of 
overwhelming diversity in cultures, radical incommensurability and therefore 
relativism does not follow. Diversity can be explicable in terms of differing 
environments and social organisations in which people live and perform their 
social activities. Even if their differences in behaviour cannot be assessed 
according to a universal standard and ranked along an evolutionary scale, they 
can still be evaluated in terms of their comparative degrees of function-fulfilling 
efficiency or success in the world. This objection, however, presumes a trans-
cultural standard, which gains its credibility from the idea that people 
everywhere are the same kind of animal, with the same pattern of psychological 
traits and the same sort of biological functions. The counter argument from the 
relativists is: 
'1hat the inference from a common biological and psychological base to a civilizational and 
cultural universal is incorrect. The gap between them has not been bridged and the 
inferential 'leap' is therefore unjustttied" (Jiang Tianji 1994:165). 
The last argument concerns the strength of relativism which is based on the fact 
that a unique characterisation of the methodology of science has not yet been 
articulated, and, a fortiori there can be no possibility of drawing on the theory of 
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scientific method for a unique model of rationality. 2 If there are divergent and 
incompatible theories of science, there are bound to be divergent and 
incompatible models of rationality. That no universal paradigm-independent 
and culture-independent standards of scientific rationality appraisal are ever 
hoped for, as the relativists claim, is implausible (Jiang Tianji 1994:165-6). 
2.8 Objections to relativism. 
The Bridgehead Argument - Hollis & Lukes (1982, Hollis 1970a, 1982, Lukes 
1970, 1973, 1982). This is an argument against relativism, which is based on 
the claim that identification of beliefs, 'seeing the actor's world from within' 
(Jiang Tianji 1994:166) requires a bridgehead or common core of true and 
rational beliefs (Barnes & Bloor 1982:35). A successful translation and radical 
interpretation of alien beliefs must presume that the core comprises a set of 
statements that rational men 'cannot fail to believe in simple perceptual 
situations' organised by 'rules of coherent judgment, which rational men 
cannot fail to subscribe to' (Hollis 1982 :74). This common core implies 
universal criteria that are context-independent for truth and rationality and 
makes translation between cultures possible (Barnes & Bloor 1982:35-6). This 
claim develops from Davidson's (1984, 1986) logical argument about how to 
distinguish between meaningful disagreement and disagreement that is 
meaningless. For Davidson this 'depends entirely on a foundation - some 
foundation - in agreement' (Jiang Tianji 1994:167). As already mentioned the 
'Feyerabend (1975:1) a philosopher of science attributes vagueness and a lack of clarity to major analytic 
concepts. He talks of the 'fictions of scientHic methodology and conceptual totalitarianism' 
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statements that comprise the foundation or bridgehead, are ordinary perceptual 
judgments (Hollis 1982:68) or what Horton (1974) calls "primary theory" or the 
everyday experiences common to all cultures. The question however, remains 
whether all these beliefs are shared by cultures. Relativists object on the 
grounds that the demarcation between different cultures depends entirely on 
the classification scheme it uses. It is not possible to merely presume that 
these schemes are all the same. The only way to identify an alien belief is by 
observation of a person's overt behaviour (Jiang Tianji 1994:167). This leads 
us to the issue of behavioural explanations. 
2.8.1 Behavioural explanations 
If we as outsiders attempt an explanation of the behaviour of an alien group we 
do so by putting forward an hypothesis about their behaviour based on 
observed regularities and patterns in their behaviour (Taylor 1970:70). Horton 
(1974) speculates about the behaviour of African traditional thinkers and 
consequently puts forward an hypothesis as to their behaviour. The explanation 
provided in this sense is not strictly a reason-giving explanation, but an 
hypothesis about attitudes and beliefs that must be testable. The hypothesis 
has to be sufficiently specific about the behaviour of someone holding these 
beliefs so as to predict what someone with such beliefs would do in a given 
situation. An explanation employing such an hypothesis would have the 
following form: 
i) A has attitude x (where to have x is by definition to behave in a certain way 
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e.g. to do things of type x in situations of type y). Let us say that x is the belief in 
personal theoretical entities. 
ii) A is in a situation of type y - y is a misfortune suffered by A. 
3) A does x - A goes to a diviner to placate the said theoretical personal entity. 
This type of explanation shows why A does x by demonstrating his action as 
part of a larger pattern of behaviour. This constitutes a what - explanation or as 
Taylor puts (1970:70) it a 'behavioural explanation'. 
Horton (1974:163, 1993) offers two accounts of behaviour to explain the anxiety 
which pervades in a closed system. If people are not aware of alternatives they 
can't possibly have anxiety about them and if they are aware of alternatives 
they are not necessarily anxious about them. Taboo reactions, for example, 
incest is explained as a response to events and actions which seriously deny 
the established line of classification of the culture (Appiah 1992:213-4). Horton 
(1993) argues that taboo reactions are to the classificatory system as secondary 
elaborations are to the system of theory; they defend the classificatory system 
from threats to its adequacy. These views are hypotheses and so should be 
open to test implications. 
In order to understand the meaning of overt behaviour we have to take 
cognisance of the role it plays in the context of other activities in the foreign 
culture (Jiang Tianji 1994:167). This means that there needs to be an 
independent understanding of the alien life. 
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"Therefore there are no conceptual grounds for supposing that the so called bridgehead 
actions (not to speak of perceptual judgments and primary theory) enjoy a privileged 
status in the interpretation of understanding of an alien life- form. A fortiori we have no 
reason to suppose that they are necessarily common to and shared by all cultures. That 
the evidence about all these divergent belief systems and behaviour in alien culture and 
divergent theories in different paradigms 'show up' at all, and moreover, are to be 
understood, is mainly due to the use of hermeneutic techniques by anthropologists and 
historians of science (Jiang Tianji 1994:167). 
As mentioned earlier, modern science and technology are regarded as the 
dividing line between Western culture and all primitive and traditional cultures 
(evolutionism). This argument therefore suggests that judgments of cognitive 
superiority of later phases of science over earlier phases, and of scientific over 
prescientific modes of thought are not, and cannot be relative to a specific 
scheme. That there is , therefore, 'a super paradigmatic standard of rationality 
after all', is the implication of this argument (Jiang Tianji 1994:167). Adherents 
to this argument are Gellner(1982) and Charles Taylor (1982). There are a 
number of important points that Taylor (1982:92) makes about rationality: 
i) In accordance with the relativist point of view, Taylor accepts a plurality of 
standards of rationality because different cultures and activities are 
incommensurable. 
ii) In disaccord with relativism, Taylor suggests that a plurality of standards 
does not preclude judgments of superiority and it is precisely 
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incommensurability that paves the way for such judgments. 
iii) Again in accordance with relativist thought, there are no super cultural 
standards of judgment of comparative superiority available or acceptable to 
both sides. 
iv) In disagreement with relativism, different standards can be considered 
superior or inferior hence the rationalities can also be rated as higher, lower 
fuller or poorer. 
In order to actualise ranking or rating, there must be some explicit or implicit 
standard. This would constitute a 'superstandard' for ranking different forms of 
rationality and may not be accepted by all sides. Usually it is a third party - in 
the instance of this study, an anthropologist who develops the criterion for the 
assessment of different belief systems and cultures. This raises the crucial issue 
as to whether this standard is 'internal' to the culture of the assessor (Jiang 
Tianji 1994:168). For Lukes (1982:298) there can be no culture-dependence to 
the judgments of superiority because he sees the super-standard that will 
permit comparison as derived from the 'Cartesian absolute conception of 
knowledge' (Jiang Tianji 1994:168). For Taylor, rationalities can be ordered in 
terms of the super-standard - a standard that measures by achievement of 
greater or lesser understanding of the world. Whether or not this standard is 
'internal' to Western theoretical culture in contrast to other a-theoretical cultures 
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is not clear. Without this clarity, it is difficult to determine whether or not 
comparative appraisal is possible (Jiang Tianji 1994:168). 
2.9 Local rationality and Universal rationality. 
To distinguish moderate from radical relativism we have to look at the 
recognition of universal rationality standards in relation to local ones. 
Rationality in radical relativism is local, and internal to the specific culture or 
community. This is Winch's (1974a,b) point of view. Rationality in universalism 
endorses a unique standard of rationality instead of a plurality of standards and 
any violation of the unique standard would constitute irrationality (Jiang Tianji 
1994:168). 
Since moderate relativism also admits the universal standard of rationality, it 
has to explain the derivation of the standard. Is it nothing but an imposition of 
our own local rationality on other communities and cultures as science-based 
19th century evolutionism is? Alternatively, is it abstract and absolute without 
any explanation of the growth of rationality (even within the scientific paradigm 
there is substantial evidence of revolutions across epochs) and the occurrence 
of a plurality of rationalities across different cultures? Then it comes a priori, in 
the sense of 'presuppositions or ultimate conditions of linguistic communication 
or human thinking', that facilitate in the first instance rational justification of 
beliefs or behaviour. This is why universalism has now been generally 
abandoned according to Jiang Tianji (1994:68). 
176 
Radical relativism is also at risk. It is not possible to have any regenerating 
process in a culture through outside influence, in a world where there are a 
plurality of closed cultures which do not interact with others. Close adherence 
to traditional practices or even rigid formalities in dealing with all situations 
would characterise such cultures. This reflects something of Horton's 
(1974:153-5) conception of the closed predicament The culture will become 
exhausted and people living in it would experience a stagnation of knowledge 
as Wiredu (1995) claims. From this could emerge the 'idea of separate and 
isolated isles of culture spread diachronically or synchronically all over the 
world' (Jiang Tianji 1994:169). This is the reductio ad absurdum of both radical 
relativism and universalism in their failure to explain that rationality develops 
and grows. A denial of a universal rationality is just as preposterous as a 
denial of a plurality of local rationalities. What the standards of universal 
rationality are, and how they are to be distinguished from those of local 
rationality, however, remain questions to be answered (Jiang Tianji 1994:169). 
3. Subjectivity and Objectivity 
The issue of subjectivity and objectivity is a complex one. A relativist may 
classify as subjective any comment emanating from outside a particular 
society while considering the views of those internal to the society as being 
more or less objective. A universalist on the other hand, would only attribute 
objectivity to the super standard of rationality. The evolutionist view can be 
articulated as one moving from the objective to the subjective. Western 
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science has the implication of objectivity, while African traditional thought 
implies subjectivity. 
3. 1 Subjective and objective views on rationality - Horton 
It is Robin Horton's (1974) contention that it is to some extent possible to access 
and assess another belief system by virtue of the fact that the criteria of 
rationality are universal and scientific and thus objective. This is in opposition 
to the relativist point of view namely that the criteria of rationality are to be 
defined solely and purely in terms of the particular cultural norms in which they 
occur and would thereby be considered subjective. However, Winch (Lukes 
1974:203) 
"objects to this position on the ground that it relies upon a notion of objective reality 
provided by science''. 
and as Kuhn (1970) has pointed out, science is not necessarily as objective as 
it claims. 
Horton (1974) is opposed to the views held by Winch (1974a,b), regarding the 
laws of consistency and coherence, which are themselves dependent on 
modes of social life. Each mode of social life has criteria of rationality peculiar 
to itself. 
Truth and values are variable from culture to culture according to the relativist 
point of view. A definition of truth in this regard is given by Jiang Tianji 
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(1994:161) who distinguishes semantic concepts from epistemic concepts. 
''The concept 1ruth' on the standard two-value logic is a semantic concept denoting the 
relationship between a belief or a sentence and an extra-linguistic fact, however, you 
construe this latter term. As a semantic concept 'truth' is thus absolute. One has to 
redefine the concept as an epistemic one, by introducing the cognitive subject or 
speaker for whom the sentence is accepted or acceptable, to obtain the doctrine of 
relative truth" . 
Truth i believe in terms of this view, is not on one side or the other but depends 
on one's perspective. The idea of truth is ideally linked with what is objective 
and therefore uncontroversial. It tells us how things really are. 
As regards the world of unobservables there are two basic views: 
i) Levy-Bruh l's ideas about unobservables are essentially verbalisations of the 
emotion provoked by the impact of social activity on the individual. Since these 
ideas are subjective rather than objective in origin, they impede the emergence 
of rational thought . They obscure how the world realty is (Horton 1973:269). 
ii) For Durkheim however, 'ideas about unobservables are an objective 
response to the impact of society on the individual. Since they are objective 
rather than subjective in origin, they are the sine qua non of higher forms of 
reasoning ' (Horton 1976:269). 
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The views of Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim that observables are on the one account 
subjective and on the other objective lends credibility to Jiang Tianji's 
formulation of truth. 
3. 1. 1 Subjective and Objective accounts of Knowledge 
If an account of knowledge is that which is approved of by most members of a 
particular community in terms of their relevant standards, then that account of 
knowledge is subjective and has a social dimension to it (Foley 1993:496). In 
the light of this, African traditional thought can be seen to be subjective (but then 
it must also be subjective for all communities) It has the attribute of practical 
rationality (which applies to actions designed to achieve the agent's ends). It is 
a context-bound rationality and it's subjectivity is a function of its dependence 
on the goals and convictions of the agents. 
This may be contrasted with knowledge of natural phenomena which is 
objective. The question of an agent's belief is epistemic rather than practical in 
the sense of whether the belief in question is acceptable or not. The criteria 
would be whether the person holding the belief has sufficient reason to hold it. 
The quest for certainty has been largely abandoned (Salmon 1993b:292). 
3. 1.2 Subjective rationality 
One consideration that aligns itself with subjectivism is that many of our 
judgments of rationality cannot be understood convincingly in an objective 
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manner. For example, when examining the beliefs of individuals from a 
different culture, it often seems appropriate to do so in terms of standards of 
their own, or at least in terms of some standard that is relative to that particular 
community (Foley 1993:496). 
The classification of subjective entities would include sensations, dreams, 
memories, some moral values, tastes and secondary qualities as they are 
variable depending on observation and conditions. Dreams do not qualify as 
objective because they are considered private experiences, although at some 
level dreams can be considered a shared experience in so far as we all 
dream. 
In the realm of rationality there are subjective accounts. There is a notion of 
practical rationality that applies to action as a means to an end and so is 
concerned with practice rather than cognition. It is subjective or context-
bound, in the sense that it depends on the goals and conviction of the 
individual performing the action. It is centered on what would promote the 
agents purposes or interests or what would maximise them. 
A further form of rationality that has relevance here is a moral one in which 
rationality would be concerned with the means rather than the agent's ends 
(Cohen 1993:416). A subjective account of epistemic rationality can take an 
individualistic or intersubjective form as it makes reference to the individual 
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believer or the individual's community who either approve the belief or take it 
as given. Subjective beliefs must meet standards that are those accepted by 
the majority of the population of that specific community. There is no 
guarantee of a reliable acquisition of true beliefs in terms of these standards. 
It is true that any account of rational beliefs involves some degree of 
subjectivity, as many of our judgments cannot be understood in a purely 
objective manner and this is particularly true of African traditional thought. It 
may be more appropriate and justifiable to assess them in terms of their own 
standards or at least minimally held standards relative to that particular 
community. There is no commitment to an extreme, and therefore, 
unacceptable form of relativism, through a subjective view but it does 
introduce some theoretical disputes. An objective view on the other hand, 
could give rise to evaluations of the other through assimilation into your own 
paradigm and or through the conclusion that the other culture is irrational. 
3. 1.3 Objective rationality 
This group include plants, galaxies, atoms and other features of the material 
world. In addition there are things like numbers, time and space, propositions 
and primary qualities (Bell 1993:31 O). The aim in construing rational belief 
on objective grounds is that such a view will always turn true belief into a good 
candidate for knowledge. The realist claims that theoretical commitment to the 
existence of abstract objects like numbers and propositions arises only if we 
allow that they exist in their own right. It is on these grounds then, that we can 
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claim objectivity for logic and science. However, it is improbable to claim 
objectivity for personal theoretical entities as they have been attributed 
subjective human qualities. Further, objectivity can be as we have thus far 
seen, considered an ontological concept but there is a notion of objectivity that 
is epistemic and here the distinction between objective and subjective is not 
intended to demarcate a reality split between: 
" .... autonomous and dependent entities, but serves rather to distinguish two grades of 
cognitive achievement. In this sense only such things as judgments, beliefs, theories 
concepts and perceptions can significantly be said to be objective or subjective . Here 
objectivity can be construed as a property of the contents of mental acts and states. 
(Bell 1993:310). 
To acquire a minimal concept of objectivity which will be considered neutral 
by all contending parties attempting to specify what objectivity is, is the aim of 
both the realist and anti-realist. 
Yet an anti-realist would hold that it is not possible to ascertain whether our 
beliefs are objectively true and intelligible. Invoking the nature and existence 
of reality that is autonomous is insufficient for them. What does constitute 
sufficiency for them is objectivity. Genuine knowledge that consists in beliefs 
must be rational, justifiable, coherent, communicable and intelligible. The 
properties according to this view are explicable only on the basis of notions 
such as '1he way reality appears to us" and "what criteria we are able to apply" 
etc. On the other hand for a belief to be epistemologically objective it has to 
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stand in some specified relation to independently existing and determinate 
reality, which is of course in line with the realist's view (Bell 1993:311 ). 
3.2 Words and magic 
Within the realm of subjectivity/objectivity, it seems interesting to consider 
words and magic again. Horton (1974:155) it will be recalled, considered the 
magical versus non-magical attitude to words as one of the features 
differentiating Western science and African traditional cultures. Here the issue 
concerns subjective and objective knowledge and the realist-anti-realist 
debate. 
There is an objective world that operates independently of human will. Magic 
does not. The idea is that there is a connection between words and the 
objects I situations they stand for. This connection between the word and the 
thing referred to is a common magical belief. According to the realists' 
account, a belief is epistemically subjective if one can show that for a given 
class of judgments, no independent reality exists that those judgments 
characterise or to which they refer. The anti-realist view on this point, is one in 
which the objectivity of a judgment has been construed in terms of its function 
and coherence with other judgments, or the kinds of grounds that warrant it 
and of its acceptance within a given community. For example, a question 
would be considered objective if it is answerable by a procedure that yields 
adequate justification for the answer (Masolo 1994:131 ). 
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In conclusion, the issue of evaluating competing strategies for interpretation is 
complex. Of course how the world is, doesn't alter how it is construed or 
described by the people, whose beliefs are to be explained. In terms of my 
argument though, however, bizarre or strange a belief may seem to us it must 
be compatible with "ordinary human reasoning propensities that is, 'natural 
rationality"' (Bloor 1993:484). Furthermore there are social contingencies that 
operate in the development of knowledge, for example ideology or other 
particular interests operate regardless of evaluative distinctions between true or 
false theories and correct or incorrect conclusions. Whether this can be 
attributed to the underdetermination of theory, as we are dealing with social 
phenomena, is another issue. It is the relative world that presents us with these 
problems of objectivity versus subjectivity. In the case of Western science, 
objectivity may be reformulated as 'fact' as the dominant feature, whereas in 
the case of African traditional thought subjectivity could be seen as 'value' 
according to the classification given herein. It can therefore be seen that the 
objectivity/subjectivity debate is a matter of degree as nothing can ever be 
entirely objective and is bound at the very least to be tinged with some degree 
of subjectivity. 
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Conclusion 
" In fact the idea of philosophy like that of any discipline, is variable, and there is never a single 
overriding paradigm sufficiently protean to fit every stage of its history. Indeed, much of what we 
admire today as ancient Greek philosophy does not satisfy some contemporary notions of 
philosophy, and some did not satisfy even Aristotle's. It would be pointless to try to bring the 
diverstty of even contemporary philosophical practices under one paradigm" (Abraham 1995:95). 
This quote expresses the idea that 'collective' philosophy is a fiction both when 
comparing African with Western philosophy, or within the Western tradition 
itself. 
Scientific methods have proved an efficient and a viable means of explaining 
the world and of controlling and predicting events. The method is applicable to 
the phenomena of the material world and, in question is, how it applies to 
understanding human behaviour (Ryan 1970:101 ). It is not necessarily the only 
way in which human behaviour and beliefs can be understood. However, when 
something is explicable according to the laws of nature which have been 
established as 'fact' through rigorous observation and verified by using the 
prescribed methods, then it is to be considered 'scientific knowledge' until 
contradictory data becomes available (Hempel 1966:17). The rules of science 
are applicable to theory building and hypothesis-testing in the material 
universe. They do not apply to personal theoretical entities and as I have 
argued, I do not believe that they should. 
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As an example, a requirement of a scientific theory is that it is disprovable. This 
does not mean that it has to be proven wrong. However, it does mean that 
testable hypotheses have to be set up, derived from theory. It also means that 
what can be said at the outset of an experiment is that 'if you get x results, the 
theory is supported'. However, it also means that you have to be able to say 'if 
the experiment yields y results', something is most likely wrong with your theory 
(Hempel 1966:35). 
In chapter two science has been shown to have established the autonomy of 
the natural order cumulatively. Subatomic entities and vast galaxies however, 
complex can be studied without any reference to personalised entities (Hick 
1983:113). In contrast the complexities in fathoming beliefs in African traditional 
thought demand reference to personalised entities. An example of this comes 
from the belief of the Azande that their capacity to thrive and their common state 
of well-being is dependent on the performance of certain rites. This fact cannot 
be discredited. If the rites do not have the desired effect then they believe that it 
is due to the evil thoughts of someone present at the performance of these 
rites. This belief of the Azande cannot be falsified nor verified in principle. For 
example, a conjunction of the rite with no evil thought and the occurrence of 
some catastrophe could falsify it, but in fact it cannot be falsified (Mcintyre 
1970:67). 
It is therefore highly unlikely that beliefs in personalised theoretical entities are 
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scientific. However, it is not necessary for something to be science in order to 
be appreciated. Freud's theory has a similar flaw vis a vis science and that is 
that whatever is found in the unconscious can be explained. It is not possible 
to prove Freud's theory wrong. His theory is like a 'rubberband' which can be 
stretched to incorporate many things, even completely contradictory findings. 
The similarity of Freud's theory to African traditional thought should be obvious 
by now and by way of an analogy I think that it is a better 'fit' than Horton's 
analogy to personal and impersonal entities. 
In mitigation however, Robin Horton's approach to African traditional thought 
does not equate idiom with myth. This allows one to penetrate the peculiarities 
of the idiom of the mode of thought. In this sense he avoids superficiality. 
Nevertheless, Horton's assimilation of African traditional thought and Western 
science is fraught with difficulties. The Hempelian age of Western science 
attempts to objectify the world, reducing or even neutralising subjectivity as far 
as possible. Implicit in Horton's desire to find similarities between African 
traditional thought and Western science, is the view that modern Western 
thought is cognitively superior (Lukes 1982:300). His comparison advocates the 
scientific method as appropriate and is therefore questionable. Horton might 
stand accused of having a logocentric hierarchy of values (Overing 1982:7). 
Nietzsche's point of view has relevance here. He concedes the truth of specific 
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scientific theories. He does however, deny that a scientific interpretation can be 
'the only justifiable interpretation of the world' (Nehamas 1993:305). For 
Nietzsche there is no special place for either the facts science addresses nor 
the means it employs. Scientific theories do serve a purpose as has been 
discussed, but they are no more important than the many other purposes of 
human life. A mechanistic view may be appropriate to parts of human life but 
not to the whole of it (Nehamas 1993:305). 
Horton treats everything as one and does not distinguish between different 
areas of social organization. He specifically attempts to equate African 
philosophy with rationalism. This is fallacious because he equates ancestor 
worship which falls in the realm of religion with science. He refers across 
disciplines and so confuses different arenas (Hollis & Lukes 1982:19). Sogolo 
(1993:103) agrees with Horton that both African traditional thought and science, 
share a common goal of attempting to understand nature, but science stresses 
control and prediction, while African traditional thought emphasises the 
'predicament of life'. It seeks to place events in a context that makes their 
occurrence and their impact on the lives of individuals, meaningful. 
There seem to be basically two kinds of motives for African traditional thought. 
The first is ideological or political, expressly exempting this way of thinking from 
European standards (Masolo 1994:30). The same is true for European 
philosophy exempting itself from African traditional thought. The second is 
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hermeneutic. African culture is of a different order. To access or explain it we 
have to use principles that come from within the culture itself. This advocates 
some form of relativism as appropriate to the understanding of another culture. 
This does not mean African traditional thought and Western science are 
mutually exclusive systems which rival each other. To speak of African 
traditional thought as true or false is inappropriate as systems apply to a culture 
or community and one cannot refer to them as true or false (Hick 1983: 113). It 
seems pointless to measure the qualities of the two approaches against each 
other. It is not enough to have only knowledge brought by the scientific 
method, nor is it enough to have the descriptions of the poetic and magical 
world of African traditional societies. They co-exist as Masolo (1994:125) 
suggests and an appreciation of what our own and other cultures demonstrate 
about the world brings both humility (Overing 1982:7) and a capacity to think 
about and ultimately to 'know' more about the world in which we live. 
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